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Social Axioms as Predictors of Psychological and 
Subjective Well-being in Iran and England 
 
Abstract 
The concept of social axiom represents generalized beliefs regarding individuals, agencies 
and other social institutions, and the spiritual world. The relationship between social axioms 
and social and mental well-being has not been widely investigated. The aim of this research 
is to consider the role of culture in four distinct areas of study:  1) The role of social axioms 
and their dimensions in predicting mental well-being (subjective and psychological well-
being) as well as the mechanism of the relationship between social axioms and well-being 
through controlling the variables of Iranian and UK students and the big five personality 
factors. 2) The mediation role of mindfulness and perspective taking. 3) The scope of 
influence of one’s attachment to national or ethnic identity on well-being. 4) The 
understanding of the participants of various social beliefs, especially of the concept of divine 
providence and its impact on one’s well-being. As method, the first three goals were 
addressed by correlational studies while the fourth goal was investigated using grounded 
theory. The research sample for the first study consisted of 73 Iranian students (37 females 
and 36 males) residing in Iran and 66 students (45 females and 21 males) living in the UK. 
The sample for the second study included 72 Iranian students (34 females and 38 males) who 
reside in Iran, and in the third study the sample was composed of 66 Iranians (35 females and 
31 males) who live in the UK. In the qualitative research (fourth study), the participants were 
14 Iranians living in the UK for at least 3 years (4 male and 10 female). Instruments used 
were the Social Axiom Survey (SAS; Leung et al., 2002), Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, 
Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John & Srivastava, 1999), Psychological Well-Being Scale (Ryff, 
1989), Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998), the perspective taking 
subscale of the Empathy Questionnaire (Davis, 1980), the acceptance subscale of the 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), Paullhus’s Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1984), and the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure-
Revised (MEIM-R; Phinney & Ong, 2007).  In the qualitative research, a structured interview 
was used. Results show that: 1) In both samples of students who live in the UK and in Iran 
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social cynicism and fate control are related with well-being. Also, in the Iranian case reward 
for application, social complexity, and religiosity have significant relationships with well-
being but in the UK based students this is not the case. Results also showed that social 
axioms can predict well-being over and above the role of country and personality traits. 2) 
The mediation role of mindful acceptance was not endorsed in the relationship between social 
cynicism and subjective well-being. It was found that the predictor (social cynicism) and the 
mediator (mindful acceptance) were not significantly correlated with the outcome (subjective 
well-being). However, the mediation role of perspective taking in the relationship between 
social complexity and psychological well-being was endorsed. 3) The moderation role of 
attachment to national identity in the relationship between social axioms and subjective well-
being was endorsed. 4) The qualitative study indicated that Iranian immigrants have an 
indigenous strategy for attaining mental well-being in the face of complications and 
difficulties, relying on their national identity and religious background. This strategy is based 
on the concepts of free will and predestination of life events. Paying attention to negative 
events and ignoring positive events and inefficient problem-solving strategies can account for 
the relationship between social cynicism and low well-being and inattention to cultural 
elements. However, the Iranian collective culture, optimal coping style, and excessive 
insistence on religious elements as a cultural attribute can explain the relationship between 
religiosity, reward for application, and well-being in the Iranian sample. On the other hand, 
surrendering to divine will and the belief in divine will and predestination of life events along 
with the belief in human free will account for the role of attachment to national identity in the 
relationship between social axioms and well-being in the Iranian sample. In conclusion, it 
seems that though social axioms are related to well-being, different aspects of social axioms 
seem to be related to different aspects of well-being in different ways and this relationship is 
influenced by cultural attributes. 
 
Keywords: cultural differences, social axiom, well-being, personality traits, mindfulness, 
perspective taking 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
One of the central concerns of humankind since the dawn of history has been to understand 
the meaning of, and live, a good life. Philosophers as well as lay people have been constantly 
grappling with this question. Of critical importance for humanity is to find the key to true 
well-being and flourishing. Until recent times, philosophers and religions have been the most 
important authorities on these questions. However, over the last few decades, important 
developments have occurred in the field of well-being studies. Scientists from various 
branches of social science (such as psychology, economics, and sociology) have empirically 
explored various aspects of the phenomenon of well-being. With an upsurge of empirical 
studies on various aspects of well-being across fields, and increasing attention and popularity 
gained by empirical findings on mental well-being in social media, mental well-being is 
becoming one of the hottest topics in social sciences as well as a favoured theme in the media 
(De Vos, 2012).  
This does not mean that we know all we need to know about mental well-being and its 
predictors. For example, in this thesis, I argue that not much is known about belief domains 
that generate variability in the levels of mental well-being across individuals and cultures. 
Before getting into this understudied aspect of mental well-being, it is appropriate to examine 
what mental well-being is. Presented next is a short review of the concepts of mental well-
being which have emerged from recent scientific studies on happiness. The present thesis 
includes two main sets of predictors for mental well-being: social axioms and the Big Five 
personality traits, which will be introduced later. In the following section, I focus on views on 
the nature of mental well-being emerging from recent empirical research to set the stage for a 
discussion of some gaps in the literature on predictors of mental well-being.   
 
Hedonic and Eudaimonic Aspects of Well-Being 
According to Ryan and Deci (2001), there are two principal approaches to defining well-
being: hedonic and eudaimonic. “In the hedonic view, well-being is achieved through the 
pursuit of pleasure, enjoyment, and comfort. Hedonic ends range from physical pleasures and 
comforts to emotional-cognitive ones, such as enjoyment of social interaction or art” (Huta & 
Ryan, 2010, p. 736). That is, in the hedonic view, well-being is equated with pleasure and 
hedonically positive experiences as well as the absence of pain and hedonically negative 
experiences. The predominant view among hedonic well-being researchers is that well-being 
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consists of a subjective sense of happiness (Ng, Ho, Wong, & Smith, 2003). Although there 
are numerous ways to evaluate the pleasure/pain or pleasant/unpleasant continuum, most 
research within the hedonic tradition has measured well-being using scales of subjective well-
being.  
Subjective well-being is generally operationalized as both hedonic balance (a preponderance 
of positive over negative affect) and a global satisfaction with life (Diener, 1984). Hedonic or 
affective balance is considered to be the emotional aspect of subjective well-being, and life 
satisfaction is considered to be its cognitive aspect. Life satisfaction scales ask respondents to 
judge their lives. Affect scales on the other hand ask respondents to report the frequency of 
their experienced positive and negative emotions in a certain period (e.g., during the last 
month). 
Although subjective well-being is a very important aspect of well-being, there have been 
some philosophical objections to the view equating subjective happiness with well-being 
(e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff & Singer, 1998). Some researchers argue that the subjective 
aspect of well-being is only one aspect of well-being, and there are other aspects that deserve 
attention, such as psychological functioning (Keyes & Annas, 2009; Keyes, Shmotkin, & 
Ryff, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008; Ryff & Singer, 1998).  
Subjective well-being researchers such as Diener and colleagues state that subjective well-
being is a necessary condition of a healthy life but not a sufficient one (Diener, Sapyta, & 
Suh, 1998). However, it is postulated in the field of subjective well-being that subjective 
well-being is a proxy for many other objective aspects of well-being such as psychological 
functioning, and thus is worth being measured and largely relied on in well-being research.   
The eudaimonic view, on the other hand, does not equate well-being with pleasure and 
hedonia. Instead, psychologists working in this line of research equate well-being with the 
presence of psychological strengths and skills. Pleasure and positive emotions are not central 
to this understanding of well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2008). This view is concerned with 
actualizing one’s potential and living a virtuous life (Ng, Ho, Wong, & Smith, 2003). The 
study of eudaimonia dates back to Greek philosophers such as Aristotle (Ng, Ho, Wong, & 
Smith, 2003) who generally asserted that hedonism will not lead to long-lasting and genuine 
happiness.  
A number of psychology researchers are currently working on different aspects of 
eudaimonic well-being (e.g., Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008; Ryff & Singer, 1998; Waterman, 
Schwartz, & Conti, 2008). The existing conceptualizations of eudaimonic well-being have 
both shared and unshared components. Many of these models emphasize personal growth and 
meaning in life as central components of eudaimonic well-being. In contrast, there is 
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disagreement among the eudaimonic conceptualizations in terms of the centrality of certain 
qualities such as engagement and flow (involving a sense of deep immersion in the 
immediate experience and a loss of sense of time and self-consciousness) in the concept of 
eudaimonic well-being (for a comprehensive discussion see Huta & Waterman 2013). The 
present thesis uses Ryff’s (1989) conceptualization of eudaimonic well-being (which is 
introduced in more detail later).  
The distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic well-being has been empirically 
investigated (for a review see Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002). For example, McGregor and 
Little’s (1998) factor analytic study showed that subjective well-being (indicated by 
depression, positive affect, and life satisfaction) and meaning (including personal growth, 
purpose in life, positive relations with others, and autonomy) formed two distinct well-being 
factors corresponding to hedonic well-being and eudaimonic well-being. 
Compton, Smith, Cornish, and Qualls (1996) factor-analysed a relatively large number of 
well-being scales. In their factor analysis, four separate factors emerged. Subjective well-
being scales (e.g., happiness, life satisfaction) mainly loaded on one factor while variables 
related to personal growth (which is related to eudaimonic well-being) mainly loaded on the 
other (e.g., openness to experience, maturity). The authors concluded that, although measures 
of mental well-being share significant variance with each other, personal growth (i.e., 
eudaimonic well-being) and subjective well-being describe constructs that are related but 
separable. 
In another study, Keyes, Shmotkin, and Ryff (2002) examined the factor structure of nine 
aspects of subjective (i.e., the three aspects of positive affect, negative affect, and life 
satisfaction) and eudaimonic well-being (i.e., the six aspects of Ryff’s psychological well-
being model: autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with 
others, purpose in life, and self-acceptance), using a large national sample of Americans. 
They found that measures of subjective well-being and psychological (eudaimonic) well-
being formed correlated and overlapping but separate factors.  
King and Napa (1998) found that, in their ratings of the features of “the good life”, 
individuals implicated both happiness and meaning. King and Napa conducted two studies 
using a sample of college students and community adults. The respondents were shown a 
career survey seemingly completed by a person rating his or her occupation. They were then 
asked to rate the respondent's life, in terms of the amount of happiness (an indicator of 
hedonic well-being), meaning in life (an indicator of eudaimonic well-being), and wealth. 
Results indicated that, while wealth was relatively irrelevant to judgments of a good life in 
both samples, meaning and happiness predicted the desirability rating of a life. One important 
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point arising from participants’ responses in this study seems to be that for them, hedonic and 
eudaimonic well-being are separable from each other and from objective circumstances such 
as wealth.  
Finally, using a sample of Iranian university students, Joshanloo, Rostami, and Nosratabadi 
(2006) revealed that the two-factor model specifying subjective and psychological well-being 
as correlated but separate factors fitted the data better than a model which specifies these two 
constructs as different aspects of a single factor. This study indicates that the distinction 
between these two aspects of well-being is empirically supported in Iranian samples.   
Altogether, these findings support the viewpoint holding that a distinction should be made 
between hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of well-being in well-being studies. Below, 
different aspects of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being are introduced in more detail.  
 
Subjective Well-Being 
Subjective well-being (SWB) captures the hedonic dimensions of well-being. Diener (1994) 
defined subjective well-being as “the global experience of positive reactions to one’s life …” 
(p.108). In other words, subjective well-being can be defined as “an individual’s subjective 
belief or feeling that his or her life is going well” (Lucas & Diener, 2008, p. 798). Subjective 
well-being is deemed to be a multifaceted construct. Diener (1984) proposed that subjective 
well-being has three distinct components: life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect. 
This three-fold categorization has been widely accepted by researchers in the field of 
subjective well-being.  
Diener (1984) distinguishes cognitive and affective components of subjective well-being. 
Life satisfaction is considered to be the cognitive component of subjective well-being 
because it is based on evaluative beliefs about (or attitudes towards) one’s life. In contrast, 
positive and negative affect assess the affective component of subjective well-being and 
reflect the amount of pleasant and unpleasant feelings that people experience in their lives 
(see Schimmack, 2008).  
Although the components of subjective well-being are substantially correlated, each one 
needs to be understood as independent of others (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). 
Bradburn (1969) provided empirical evidence that positive and negative affect were 
separable. Other researchers also showed that these two components of subjective well-being 
are better to be understood as orthogonal factors (e.g., Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Moreover, these two factors have been found to be related to 
different predictors (for a review, see Schimmack, 2008). For example, whereas neuroticism 
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is more strongly related to negative affect than positive affect, extraversion is often a better 
predictor of positive affect than negative affect (Costa & McCrae, 1980; Schimmack, 2003). 
Based on these findings, SWB researchers often recommend assessing positive and negative 
affect separately (Lucas & Diener, 2008).  
Finally, although the cognitive and affective components of subjective well-being correlate 
positively with each other (e.g., Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Ahadi, 2002; 
Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998), it is important to note that life satisfaction judgments 
do not simply reflect the sum of one’s affective experiences over time (for empirical 
evidence, see Lucas et al., 1996). Instead, cognitive judgments (i.e., life satisfaction) and 
affective experiences (i.e., hedonic balance) provide different information about the 
subjective quality of one’s life as a whole (i.e., subjective well-being) (Lucas & Diener, 
2008). However, it does not mean that the two components of subjective well-being are not 
influenced by each other. There is ample evidence showing that people rely to varying 
degrees on their affective experiences to judge life satisfaction. That is, affective experience 
may provide one important source of information that individuals can use to make life 
satisfaction judgments (Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). 
Research indicates that culture also has a role to play in the relation between cognitive and 
affective components of subjective well-being. For instance, an interesting study by Suh et al. 
(1998) showed that positive and negative affect predicted life satisfaction to different degrees 
in different cultures. In individualistic cultures, affective experience was strongly associated 
with life satisfaction, whereas among participants from collectivistic cultures, the correlations 
were weaker. 
Research examining the psychometric properties of SWB measures shows that self-report 
scales tend to be reliable and valid (for reviews see Lucas & Diener, 2008; Pavot, 2008). 
Multiple-item measures of life satisfaction, domain satisfaction, and positive and negative 
affect scales show high estimates of internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Diener et 
al., 1999). Lucas, Diener, and Suh (1996) showed that life satisfaction, positive affect, and 
negative affect scales formed separate but correlated factors. They also showed that these 
three factors were empirically separable from self-esteem. Sandvik, Diener, and Seidlitz 
(1993) found that self-report subjective well-being measures converge with other types of 
assessment, namely, expert ratings based on interviews with respondents, experience 
sampling measures, participants’ memory for positive versus negative events in their lives, 
and the reports of family and friends.  
Predictors of subjective well-being have been extensively investigated by researchers. 
Demographic variables such as age (Yang, 2008), gender (Diener & Diener, 1995; Diener et 
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al., 1999; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008), income (for reviews see Biswas-Diener, 2008; Diener 
& Diener, 1995; Diener et al., 1999), education (Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976; 
Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Diener, 1993), health (George, 2006), and marriage (Diener, 
Gohm, Suh, & Oishi, 2000) have been linked to subjective well-being. For example, physical 
health and socioeconomic status (which is largely determined by one’s level of income and 
education) are positively related to subjective well-being. However, Diener, Oishi, and Lucas 
(2003) conclude that such external factors often only have a modest impact on well-being 
reports. “Demographic factors such as health, income, educational background, and marital 
status account for only a small amount of the variance in well-being measures. Research 
shows that SWB is fairly stable over time, that it rebounds after major life events, and that it 
is often strongly correlated with stable personality traits.” (p. 406).  
 
Psychological Well-Being 
Ryff (1989) argued that the field of subjective well-being suggests equivalence between 
eudaimonism and hedonism, which is contrary to the important distinction made by the Greek 
philosophers (e.g., Aristotle) between hedonia and eudaimonia. She also calls attention to the 
fact that the literature on psychological well-being (which was mainly focused on subjective 
well-being at that time) had not been guided strongly by theory. Ryff (1989) integrated ideas 
about positive human functioning from existential, clinical, developmental, and humanistic 
psychology to develop her model of psychological well-being. Ryff’s model of optimal 
functioning has six dimensions (Ryff 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995): 
1- Self-acceptance, which is defined as holding positive attitudes towards oneself, including 
one’s past life. Ryff and Singer (2008) state that the concept of self-acceptance as 
conceptualized by Ryff is notably richer than standard views of self-esteem: “It is a kind of 
self-evaluation that is long-term and involves awareness, and acceptance of, both personal 
strengths and weaknesses” (pp. 20-21). 
2- Personal growth, which is defined as a sense of continued growth and development as a 
person. Ryff (1989) asserts that optimal psychological functioning requires that one continues 
to develop one's potential, and to grow and expand as a person. Ryff and Singer (2008) 
comment that among all six dimensions of psychological well-being, personal growth comes 
closest in meaning to the ancient Greek conceptualization of eudaimonia, since it is explicitly 
concerned with self-realization of the individual, which was emphasized by ancient Greek 
philosophers.  
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3- Purpose in life, which is defined as the belief that one's life is purposeful and meaningful. 
This dimension of well-being draws heavily on existential perspectives. Ryff holds that 
beliefs that give one the feeling that there is purpose in and meaning to life is one of the 
important component parts of mental health in many various philosophical and psychological 
perspectives of well-being. 
4- Positive relations with others, which is defined as the possession of good relations with 
others. Ryff and Singer (2008) state that all the perspectives that Ryff has drawn on to 
formulate her model of mental health describe quality relations with others as a central 
feature of a positive and well-lived life. Ryff and Singer (2008) further assert that there is 
near universal endorsement of the relational realm as a key feature of how to live well (see 
also Ryan & Deci, 2008). 
5- Environmental mastery, which is defined as the capacity to manage one's life and the 
surrounding world effectively. In other words, environmental mastery is the individual's 
ability to choose or create environments suitable to his or her psychological conditions (Ryff, 
1989). Ryff and Singer (2008) point to the fact that although this dimension appears to be like 
other psychological constructs, such as self-efficacy, “the emphasis on finding or creating a 
surrounding context that suits one’s personal needs and capacities is unique to environmental 
mastery” (p. 23). 
6- Autonomy, which is defined by Ryff as a sense of self-determination. Ryff and Singer 
(2008) remind us that this aspect of well-being is undoubtedly the most Western of all other 
dimensions of psychological well-being. Some other researchers, however, argue that 
autonomy is a basic psychological need and is valued in all cultures. Ryan and Deci (2008), 
for example, argue that autonomy is a basic psychological need and therefore is natural in the 
sense that it is invariant, and foundational. They believe that the need for autonomy is 
universal, and applies to all individuals regardless of gender, upbringing, or culture. 
However, it assumes various shapes in various cultures.  
Ryff (1989) developed the psychological well-being scale to assess the six dimensions of 
optimal functioning as described above. This scale has been widely used in various national 
contexts. Ryff and Singer cite five studies that have confirmed the six-factor structure of this 
scale using confirmatory factor analysis: Cheng and Chan, 2005; Clarke et al., 2001; Ryff and 
Keyes, 1995; Springer and Hauser, 2006 and van Dierendonck, 2004. Shokri et al. (2008) 
examined the factor structure of 3, 9, and 14-item Persian versions of Ryff's Scales of 
Psychological Well-being in Iranian university students. The results of the confirmatory 
factor analysis conducted by these researchers supported the original six-dimensional model 
of psychological well-being.  
8 
 
Sociodemographic correlates of psychological well-being aspects have been investigated in a 
few studies. Age, gender (Ryff, 1989, 1991; Ryff & Keyes, 1995), and marital status (Marks 
& Lambert, 1998), for example, have been found to relate to various aspects of psychological 
well-being. For example, purposes in life declines by age, but positive relations with others 
improve by age (Ryff & Keyes, 1995). Women have been found to score significantly higher 
than men on positive relations with others and personal growth in the USA (Ryff & Keyes, 
1995).  
The associations between the aspects of psychological well-being and some psychosocial 
variables have also been investigated. Researchers have linked aspects of psychological well-
being to variables such as emotion regulation (Gross & John, 2003), personal goals (Carr, 
1997), personal growth initiative (Robitschek, & Keyes, 2009), social comparison processes 
(Heidrich & Ryff, 1993), and spirituality and religiousness (Kirby, Coleman, & Daley, 2004) 
(for a review see Ryff & Singer, 2006).  
However, regrettably, not much is known about the relationships between general beliefs and 
dimensions of well-being. In the present thesis, social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2008), which 
are general beliefs about various aspects of the social world, were studied as predictors of 
subjective and psychological well-being. These are introduced next.  
Social Axioms 
Leung and Bond (2008) write that: “For most people, life is not an aimless, mindless drift; 
their actions and activities are conscious or unconscious manifestations of their responses to 
two fundamental questions: What do they want to pursue in life and how do they pursue those 
goals?” (p. 199). These authors suggest that the “what” question has been extensively 
investigated by researchers working on human values. Human values are goals that people 
attach importance to. Values have been used to describe and interpret cultures (e.g., Chinese 
Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Leung and Bond argue, 
however, that values do little to answer the “how” question presented before. They propose 
the construct of social axioms to provide answers to the “how” question.  
Social axioms, according to Leung and Bond (2008) represent people’s cognitive map of their 
social world. They are “generalized beliefs about people, social groups, social institutions, the 
physical environment, or the spiritual world as well as about categories of events and 
phenomena in the social world. These generalized beliefs are encoded in the form of an 
assertion of the relationship about two entities or concepts” (Leung & Bond, 2008, p. 200). 
That is, social axioms assume the following form: “A is related to B” (e.g., “Fate determines 
one’s successes and failures”). A and B can be any constructs, and people’s beliefs are 
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reflected by their perceived likelihood of the relationship. Social axioms are different from 
values, in that values assume the form “A is good/desirable/important” whereas social axioms 
posit a relationship between two concepts. Social axioms are also different from normative 
beliefs that do not address the relationship between two entities. For example, “we should 
help the poor” is a normative belief but not a social axiom. 
Of course, not any belief that posits a relationship between two concepts can be considered a 
social axiom. Leung et al. (2002) argue that beliefs vary widely along the continuum of 
specificity. Some beliefs are very specific and are related to a specific place and time. For 
instance, we may develop specific beliefs about one of our friends (e.g., David is shy with 
strangers). Such beliefs are only applicable to a narrow range of situations and actors. In 
contrast, some beliefs are very general. Social axioms are general beliefs. The term 
generalized expectancies is used to describe such beliefs, a term introduced by Rotter (1966). 
These general beliefs are  
 
“Pitched at a high level of abstraction and hence are likely to relate to 
social behaviours across a variety of contexts, actors, targets, and time 
periods. We label such general beliefs as social axioms in the sense that, 
like axioms in mathematics, these beliefs are basic premises that people 
endorse and use to guide their behaviour in different situations. These 
beliefs are axiomatic because they are often assumed to be true as a result 
of personal experiences and socialization but not as a result of scientific 
validation.” (Leung et al., 2002, p. 288) 
 
The functionalist approach to beliefs proposes that beliefs and other attitudinal constructs 
serve human survival and functioning (Leung et al. 2002). Following this argument, Leung et 
al. (2002) propose that social axioms serve four main functions for human survival. They 
facilitate the attainment of important goals (the instrumental function), help people protect 
their self-worth (the ego-defensive function), serve as a manifestation of people’s values (the 
value-expressive function), and help people understand the world (the knowledge function). 
Given this extensive range of functions, Leung and Bond (2004) argue that social axioms 
qualify to be considered as fundamental psychological constructs. In sum, social axioms are 
believed to play a key role in people’s belief systems and enhance the survival and 
functioning of people in their social and physical environments. 
To identify a comprehensive set of social axioms, Leung et al. (2002) drew on the Western 
psychological literature on beliefs as well as sources from two relatively understudied 
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cultures: Hong Kong and Venezuela. A Social Axioms Survey containing 182 items was 
initially constructed and administered to college students and adults in Hong Kong and 
Venezuela. Exploratory factor analysis suggested a five-factor structure for both cultures. 
Leung et al. (2002) collected data from three other cultures: the USA, Japan, and Germany. 
They used confirmatory factor analysis and factor analysis to examine the universality of the 
five-factor structure. Their analyses supported the same five-factor model.  
Leung and Bond (2004) conducted a large-scale cross-cultural study to examine if the five-
factor structure would generalize to other cultures. In this large-scale project, data from 41 
national/cultural groups (including Iran and England) were included. Findings of this global 
project confirmed the five-factor structure of the social axioms. These five dimensions were 
labelled social cynicism, social complexity, and reward for application, religiosity, and fate 
control.  
Social Cynicism 
The term cynicism originates from the Greek word cynic meaning, literally, dog-like 
(Branham and Goulet-Caze, 1996). The dog-like references stem from the deeply rooted 
counter-cultural aspects of cynicism based on a rejection of social convention and an 
unequivocal affirmation of more natural and minimal forms of living. More specifically, the 
reference to a dog is based on parallels made by Greeks about Diogenes’ uncivilized and 
animal-like qualities (Shea, 2010, p.14). Mazella (2007), keeping in mind these Greek 
origins, charts the evolution of the term’s use throughout history and concludes that at the 
beginning of the 19th century, these terms began to take on radically new meanings. Mazella 
terms this transition the “vernacularization” of cynicism. Maze argues that cynicism became 
disconnected from its more deontological roots and began to become interpreted as a 
condition of distrust in others or cynicism in today’s meaning.  
Social cynicism refers to a negative view of human nature, a bias against some social groups, 
a mistrust of social institutions, and a belief that people tend to ignore ethical means in 
pursuing their goals (Leung and Bond, 2007). Social cynicism is a view that life produces 
unhappiness (e.g. it is rare to see a happy ending in life), that people exploit others (e.g. kind-
hearted people are easily bullied), and a mistrust of social institutions (e.g. the various social 
institutions in society are biased toward the rich) (Leung & Leung, 2010).  
Research has found that social cynicism is related to lower life satisfaction ( Lai, Bound, & 
Hui, 2007), lower interpersonal trust, lower help seeking attitude, stronger beliefs in external 
locus of control and supernatural power ( Singelis, Hubbard, Her, & An, 2003), higher social 
anxiety ( Lo, 2006), higher death anxiety ( Hui, Bond & Ng, 2007), lower collaboration in 
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conflict resolution ( Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nelson, 2004), lower self-
esteem, higher loneliness ( Neto, 2006), higher perceived stress (Kuo, Kwantes, Towson & 
Nanson, 2006), lower internal locus of hope (Bernardo & Nalipay, 2016), lower job 
satisfaction (Leung, Ip, & Leung, 2010), and tendency to earn lower income (Stavrova & 
Ehlebracht, 2016). Also, Chen, Bond and Cheung (2006) found that social cynicism has 
negative relationships with responsibility, practical mindedness, optimism, meticulousness, 
graciousness, interpersonal tolerance, veraciousness, social sensitivity, and harmony and 
positive relationships with emotionality, inferiority and defensiveness.    
These studies indicate that social cynics tend to dislike themselves and other individuals, they 
lack sufficient motivation to get external professional help concerning everyday challenges, 
they use maladaptive coping styles, and they feel helpless against a corrupt world. In sum, 
this view can lead to mental vulnerability and lower psychological well-being. 
Social Complexity 
Social complexity refers to the belief in multiple ways of achieving a given outcome, and 
agreement that human behaviour is variable across situations. This means that social 
complexity is defined as a belief that there is no single rule governing social occasions, so 
that individuals need to adjust their behaviours to varying circumstances. In general, social 
complexity serves as an active facilitator of problem solving, and it may orient problem 
solving in a prosocial manner as indicated by its links to self-transcendent values, egalitarian 
political attitudes, and a collaborative conflict resolution style (Bond et al., 2004). 
This dimension of social axioms involves the notion that the world is complex, and there is 
no single pattern of general rules which always work in all contexts because social behaviour 
is different in different contexts. The dimension concerns whether people always depend on 
methods which have worked before or whether individual behaviour is driven by situational 
changes. It is fairly like self-monitoring, and the difference is that the dimension focuses 
more on all aspects of the external world rather than the reactions of others to one’s 
behaviour as is the case in self-monitoring. Moreover, it clearly shows that some people 
themselves are, in fact, intuitive social psychologists and sensitive to the situational 
changeability of behaviour (Leung et al., 2002). 
Singelis, Hubbard, Her, and an (2003) found a positive correlation between social complexity 
and cognitive flexibility. Chen, Fok, Bond & Matsumoto (2006), in their study conducted on 
a sample of students from Hong Kong, concluded that there is a positive correlation between 
social complexity, neuroticism, and openness. There also seems to be a positive correlation 
between social complexity and intelligence because people who obtain high scores in social 
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complexity are "interested in diverse and unconventional ideas and search the world around 
them intelligently" (Chen, Fok, Bond & Matsumoto, 2006. P: 836). Furthermore, that such 
people examine issues from many different angles leads to less trust, inner conflict, and thus 
neuroticism. Based on these findings, Leung et al. (2012) examined the relationship between 
social complexity and intelligence. They found a positive correlation between social 
complexity and intelligence in all samples from different cultural groups except for a 
Norwegian group. 
The results have not been consistent for the relationship between social complexity and well-
being. Safdar, Lewis, and Daneshpour (2006) studied Iranian immigrants in Canada, Iranians 
living in Iran, and Canadian samples. They reached the conclusion that social complexity was 
related to coping and adjustment in all the cultural groups. In contrast, Chen, Bond, et al. 
(2006) found a negative relationship between social complexity and life satisfaction. Neither 
of the studies examined the well-being construct, and they only focused on the related 
constructs. 
 
Religiosity 
From prehistoric times to the present, religion has been a central part of human experience 
and culture. Traditionally the term religion was used to refer to all aspects of the human 
relationship to the Divine or transcendent, that which is greater than us, “the source and goal 
of all human life and value” (Meissner, 1987, p. 119). More recently, scholars have started 
to understand religion as activities and a way of life: “the fashioning of distinctive 
emotions; of distinctive habits, practices, or virtues; of distinctive purposes, desires, 
passions, and commitments; and of distinctive beliefs and ways of thinking,” along with “a 
distinctive way of living together” and a language for discussing “what they are doing and 
why” (Dykstra, 1986, quoted from Nelson, 2009; p. 3). 
From an Islamic perspective, the Holy Quran considers religious tendencies to be innate and 
arising from the depth of man’s being. As stated in Surah Ar-Rum, Verse 30: “So direct 
your face toward the religion, inclining to truth. The fitrah (i.e. Allah’s Islamic 
Monotheism) of Allah (God) upon which He has created [all] people. No change should 
there be in the creation of Allah. That is the correct religion, but most of the people do not 
know.”  
Muslim scholars view religion as a structural phenomenon and an approach which 
influences all aspects of human life and directs the person to the main and transcendental 
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objective, which is indeed bliss and happiness (Khodayarifard et al., 2006). There will be an 
overview of some contemporary Islamic thinkers’ views in the following paragraphs. 
Allameh Tabatabai (1984) argued that according to the Quran any approach, rule or 
regulation that could serve as a basis for human life is called "religion ."Religion is, 
therefore, based on a comprehensive and universal truth which involves every person, even 
those who deny God. Religion is thus a practical way of life in the world based on a 
worldview and the human as a component no matter from what that approach is derived, 
prophecy and revelation or human conventions. However, Allameh Tabatabai contended 
that not all religions bring humans real happiness except for a religion which is God 
ordained. Moreover, Allameh Tabatabai (Al-Mizan, vol. 3) argued that religion consists of 
beliefs and a series of practical and moral principles spoken by a prophet on behalf of God 
for the guidance of mankind believing and following which lead to happiness in two worlds, 
this world and the afterlife. 
He also argued that all the heavenly religions have the same nature but differ in their degree 
of perfection and considered Islam the latest and most complete religion (Allameh 
Tabatabai, 1984). He divided Islamic teachings into three general categories: A. the three 
principles of Islam, i.e. monotheism, prophethood, and resurrection; B. ethics; and C. 
religious law and practical rules (Allameh Tabatabai, 1984). 
Motahari (1996) considered religion a set of teachings provided by God through his chosen 
ones. He divided them into three general categories: A. beliefs: the ideas and facts which 
must be recognized and believed, like the concept of monotheism; B. ethics: the instructions 
on how to be a spiritual being in terms of, for example, justice, virtue, and courage; and C. 
laws: the practical guidelines on how and what things must be done, such as praying and 
fasting. 
Ayatollah Javadi Amoli (2002) argued that religion is a set of doctrinal, moral, religious, 
and legal rules to manage human and social affairs and for human education provided by 
God. Thus, religion was not only defined in Islam on spiritual and personal dimensions, but 
also on social, political, and ideological dimensions. Accordingly, religion provides humans 
not only with plans for eternal life and salvation, but also for their worldly life which is yet 
related to afterlife. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Al-Fatawa Al-Wadiha) described Islamic 
teachings based on humans’ relationship with God, with self, others, and the universe. 
According to these four relationships, the three essential elements (beliefs, ethics, and laws) 
defined by several scholars (including Ayatollah Tabatabai, Javadi Amoli, and Motahari) 
are psychological, emotional, and behavioural characteristics. Khodayarifard et al. (2006) 
defined religiosity as follows: The cognition of and belief in God, prophets, afterlife, and 
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divine orders and, moreover, love for God, self, others, and the universe for the nearness of 
God and commitment to and practice of religious duties. 
The relationship between religiosity and well-being can be examined from two perspectives, 
Christian and Islamic views. 
Nelson (2009) argued that there are two general approaches to well-being in Western 
psychology: the medical and positive model. The medical approach is based on the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA). In contrast, the positive model considers well-being to be 
more than just the absence of illness. Rayan and Deci (2001; quoted in Nelson, 2009) 
argued that the positive model of mental well-being itself includes two different approaches. 
In the hedonic view well-being is subjective happiness, i.e. a short-term experience of 
pleasure and the avoidance of negative emotions. The second view is the eudemonic view, 
which is someone’s assessment of the quality of their life. Based on this approach, well-
being is more a dynamic process than a state of ultimate pleasure and seen as psychological 
well-being in some cases; a situation in which a person gets involved in life and strives: A. 
to develop his or her talents and find the meaning of life; B. to improve the quality of his or 
her relationships; and C. to acquire competence and environmental mastery. In contrast, 
Abu Torabi (2007) argued that humans intrinsically find peace of mind and heart only if 
they have faith in God and the hereafter, and otherwise there is always anxiety and poor 
mental health. In this regard, we can see below verses of the Holy Quran: 
 “but whosoever turns away from My remembrance, his life shall be narrow and on the Day 
of Resurrection We shall raise him blind” (Surah of Taha, Verses 124) 
“those who believe, and whose hearts find comfort in the remembrance of Allah. Is it not 
with the remembrance of Allah that hearts are satisfied” (Surah of Raad, Verses 28).  
In both verses, turning away from God is regarded as the source of distress and stress, and 
turning to God as the source of peace.  
 
Reward for Application 
The concept of reward for application implies that investment in human resources will lead 
to a positive outcome, that is, one will succeed if he/she really tries. In other words, it refers 
to a complex set of beliefs that efforts, knowledge, careful planning, and other resources will 
lead to positive outcomes (Leung, Lam et al., 2012). It seems that there is a relationship 
between reward for application and internal locus of control and self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1991) as belief in reward for application is belief in human agency. In addition, it is not 
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limited to personal aims unlike the concept of self-efficacy but concerns people in general 
(Gari, Panagiotopoulou a7 Mylonas, 2009).   
Regarding the relationship between reward for application and other variables, Leung, Lam 
et al. (2012) claimed that there is a relationship between reward for application and 
agreeableness since people with high reward for application scores believe in putting efforts 
into interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, reward for application can relate to 
conscientiousness as it emphasizes people’s efforts. The study results confirmed that there is 
a relationship between reward for application and both variables. Research has also 
confirmed positive relationships between reward for application and mastery (Neto, 2006), 
internal locus of control (Gari, Panagiotopoulou a7 Mylonas, 2009), life satisfaction (Lai et 
al., 2007), active coping (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong & Chemonges-Nielson, 2004), positive 
adjustment (Safdar, Lewise, and Daneshpour, 2006), hope (Bernardo, 2013; Bernardo & 
Nalipay, 2016), effortful behaviour (Singelis, Hubbard, and An, 2003), value of power 
(Leung et al., 2007 ), less unemployment, and weekly number of work hours (Bond et al., 
2004). 
In respect of the relationship between reward for application and well-being, Hui & Bond 
(2010), based on mediational analyses, suggested that social cynicism was related to less 
adaptive self-regulatory orientations, which in turn compromised subjective well-being, 
whereas reward for application was related to more adaptive self-regulatory orientations, 
which thereby enhanced subjective well-being. 
Fate control 
Fate control is the belief that there are impersonal, external forces that determine life events 
(e.g., fate, destiny, luck, etc.) and the possibility for individuals to exert influence over or 
shape their outcomes by engaging in various culture specific practices (Leung & Bond, 
2004). In other words, people who endorse fate control try to adapt to their perceived fate, but 
at the same time they are also active in finding ways to improve their fate.  
Given the highlighted role of external factors in events, there is a relationship or overlap 
between fate control and locus of control. However, the belief in fate control is different from 
a personal belief that events are controlled by external forces. It is thus close to the concept of 
religiosity because both emphasize a powerful external factor influencing events. By contrast, 
religiosity emphasizes a benevolent transcendental being who seeks positive outcomes (Hui 
& Hui, 2009). 
Leung et al., (2012) found two subfactors for fate control in their study on a large sample 
from eleven countries: fate determinism and fate alterability. Items in the fate alterability 
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subfactor are about predicting fate and we argue that these predictions are typically for 
improving and hence altering fate. They concluded that fate determinism, but not fate 
alterability, related positively to neuroticism.  
Research evidence indicates a positive relationship between fate control and distancing, a 
coping style characterized by being passive and avoidance of thinking about difficulties 
(Bond et al., 2004); better academic performance (Zhou, Leung, and Bond, 2009); and 
wishful thinking (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, and Chemonges-Nielson, 2004).  
 
SAS (Social Axiom Survey) across cultures 
The five-dimensional structure described above needs to be examined by focusing on both 
individual and culture level data. Van de Vijver, Valchev & Suanet (2009) conducted a social 
axiom survey which involved data collection at the individual level. They focused on two key 
questions. First, they examined the structural equivalence of the SAS questionnaire in 41 
countries, and then whether there are particular items or countries that are problematic.  The 
three major results were (1) social axioms show important similarities across cultures; (2) 
numerical comparisons of scores obtained in different countries must be treated with caution; 
(3) the observed bias was due to both item and country characteristics. Several items showed 
secondary (i.e., deviant) loadings in the global factorial solution, which means that these 
items measure not only their intended constructs, but also tap other social axioms. The best 
example is the item, “Humility is dishonesty,” which was apparently interpreted in different 
manners by the participants. Level of economic development and religion (main religious 
denomination of a country) were associated with bias. 
Ismail (2009) examined the factor structure of the survey on a sample of Chinese, Malay, 
and Kadazan (an ethnic group indigenous to the state of Sabah in Malaysia) students. Using 
exploratory factor analysis through principal components analysis with varimax rotation, 
they concluded that the five-factor structure better reflects the correlation matrix, and the 
factors extracted were like the results of Leung & Bond (2004). 
Gari, Panagiotopoulou and Mylonas, (2009) also examined the factor structure in a sample 
of 371 Greek students. The study indicated a five-factor structure like the original structure 
proposed by Leung & Bound (2004) and at the same time a six-factor structure including 
some items such as reward for application and social cynicism representing stereotypes 
about fairness in the world. Comunian (2009), in a study on a sample of 689 Italian 
students, showed similar findings confirming the five-factor structure. However, it should 
not be forgotten that dimensions at the individual level may differ in number and 
composition from dimensions at the culture level (e.g., Leung & Bond, 2008). Even if 
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similar structures emerged at both levels, the structures’ implications would be different 
because there might be different bases for interpretations of the factor structure emerging 
from the data analysis at both levels. From a functional point of view, how culture allows 
people to respond to social and environmental factors in an adaptive manner is the basis for 
the interpreting SAS (Social Axiom Survey) structure at the individual level. But from a 
group-membership perspective, how people in a particular culture may share the same set of 
problems can be the basis for interpreting the factor structure of SAS at the culture level. 
To evaluate this possibility, Bond et al. (2004) analysed the dimensionality of social axioms 
at the cultural level, using item means from 41 cultural groups of college students as the input 
data. Factor analysis of these culture averages (rather than individual scores) revealed a two-
dimensional structure. Factor 1 contained items from four of the individual-level axiom 
dimensions: reward for application, religiosity, fate control, and social complexity and was 
labelled dynamic externality. The items in this factor “tapping religiosity and fate control 
involve the assertion of outside forces at play and give rise to the label externality, but the 
emphasis on effort and cognitive engagement gives a dynamic quality to this construct” 
(Leung & Bond, 2008, p. 205). Factor 2 is labelled societal cynicism, because “all the items 
are from the individual-level factor of social cynicism, but derived from a cultural group’s 
average scores, thus representing “citizen” endorsements. The adjective societal is used to 
signal that this factor is derived from these culture-level inputs” (Leung & Bond, 2008, p. 
205). The current thesis examined a limited number of cultural groups, and therefore the 
focus is on the five-dimensional individual-level structure. Thus, the constructs of interest are 
the five domains of social beliefs.  
Although some significant correlations between social axioms and values have been found 
(Bond et al., 2004a; Leung et al., 2007), social axioms are thought to be largely independent 
of values (Hui & Hui, 2009). Prior studies have also shown that less than 20% of the variance 
of each axiom dimension was explained by Western and Chinese indigenous personality 
measurements (Chen, Bond, & Cheung, 2006; Chen, Fok, Bond, & Matsumoto, 2006). 
Putting all these findings together, it can be concluded that social axioms are distinct 
constructs with sufficient incremental validity that can add predictive power in psychological 
investigations, over and above that provided by value and personality constructs. 
Other psychological correlates of social axioms have also been examined (for a review see 
Hui & Hui, 2009). Social cynicism has been found to correlate with such variables as 
competition (positively), accommodation (i.e., sacrificing one’s own in the interest of 
preserving the relationship) (positively), avoidance conflict resolution styles (positively, 
Chen & Zhang, 2004, as cited in Hui & Hui, 2009), and general death anxiety (positively, 
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Hui, Bond, & Ng, 2007). Social cynicism has also been found to be correlated with lower 
amicability and empathy, higher hostility (Dinca & Iliescu, 2009), and lower interpersonal 
trust (Singelis, Hubbard, Her, & An, 2003). 
Reward for application has been found to correlate significantly with such variables as 
cognitive flexibility (positively, Singelis et al., 2003), and accommodation (positively), as 
well as compromise and collaboration conflict resolution styles (positively, Bond et al., 
2004). Social complexity has been linked to such variables as egalitarian political attitude 
(positively, Leung & Bond, 2002), compromise and collaboration conflict resolution styles 
(positively, Bond et al., 2004), and hostility (negatively, Dinca & Iliescu, 2009). Fate control 
has been linked to such variables as “freedom from regulation” political attitude (positively, 
Leung & Bond, 2002), external locus of control (positively), spiritual beliefs (positively), 
supernatural beliefs (positively, Singelis et al., 2003), and general death anxiety (positively, 
Hui, Bond, & Ng, 2007). Finally, religiosity has been found to relate significantly to 
traditional beliefs (positively, Singelis et al., 2003), and general death anxiety (negatively, 
Hui, Bond, & Ng, 2007).  
In sum, much is known about the nomological network of social axioms, but a systematic 
investigation of the relationship between social axioms and aspects of mental well-being has 
not been conducted yet. The studies in the present thesis are conducted with the aim of filling 
this gap. The present studies are briefly outlined below.   
Culture, context and well-being 
Does the concept of well-being carry different meanings in different nationalities and 
cultures? Diener, Kahneman, and Helliwell (2010) examined the question in a dictionary-
based study and argued that there are differences and similarities in the conceptualization of 
well-being in different nationalities. They concluded that well-being means luck and good 
fortune in Japan, China, Korea, France, Germany, and Russia while it represents satisfaction 
of one’s desires, wishes and goals in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Britain (See also Oishi, 
Graham, Kesebir, and Costa Galinha, 2013). In Persian dictionaries, the equivalents are 
happiness, joy, and gaiety (Amid and Dehkhoda Encyclopaedic Dictionaries), which seems 
to be closer to the first group. 
In addition to cultural differences in the conceptualization of well-being and happiness, it 
seems that there are different and similar factors in different nationalities and cultures which 
can affect the sense of well-being and mental health. For example, Diener, Diener, and 
Diener (1995) examined the common predictors of well-being in an interesting study on a 
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sample of 55 different nationalities. The results indicate that income, individualism, and 
human rights were consistent and significant predictors. 
Colby (2009) considers contemporary cultural study of well-being as understanding the self-
world of individuals in context, a framework that encourages combining the 
personal/experiential with the cultural context. He assesses three domains that link a person’s 
reports of happiness and well-being to the context: the natural and cultural ecology perceived 
by a person – the material and biophysical situation; the social relational and interpersonal 
realm; and the symbolic realm of language categories, religious, and other beliefs. 
Kormi Nouri, Mokri, MohammadiFar, and Yazdani (2002) in a study conducted on an Iranian 
sample showed that health, economic status, autonomy in decision-making, job, sensation 
seeking, and having new experiences are the most important factors in well-being. 
This overview indicates cultural differences in the conceptualization and predictors of well-
being and the effects of culture on well-being and associated constructs such as mental 
health. These effects, that can be considered the rationale for the present study, are discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. 
 
Big Five personality traits 
There are numerous theories about personality based on different views on human nature. 
Free will or determinism, nature or nurture, past or present, generality or unity, balance or 
growth, and optimism or pessimism about human nature are factors which influence 
theorists’ views about personality in the formulation of their theories. Trait theory is one of 
the most important approaches to the study of human personality. This approach uses lexical 
traits to describe personality. Big Five personality theory today represents the trait approach 
to personality (See also Deary & Matthews, 1993; Digman, 1990; John, 1990; McCrae & 
John, 1992). 
          These “Big-Five” factors have traditionally been numbered and labelled as follows: 
 (a) Extraversion, (b) Agreeableness, (c) Conscientiousness (or Dependability), (d) Emotional 
Stability (vs. Neuroticism), and (e) Culture. Alternatively, Factor V has been interpreted as 
Intellect (e.g., Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Peabody & Goldberg, 1989) and as 
Openness (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1987).  
Neuroticism (vs Adjustment) is a classic dimension of personality integrated into most 
models. It considers individual differences in the inclination to construct, perceive and feel 
‘reality’ as being problematic, threatening and difficult (concern, worries, low opinion of self, 
etc.) and feel ‘negative’ emotions (fear, shame, anger, etc.) (McCrae & Allike, 2002). 
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Extraversion includes traits such as sociability, assertiveness, activity and talkativeness. 
Extraverts are energetic and optimistic. Introverts are reserved rather than unfriendly, 
independent rather than followers, even-paced rather than sluggish. Extraversion is 
characterized by positive feelings and experiences and is therefore seen as a positive affect 
(Clark & Watson, 1991). 
Openness to Experience includes active imagination, aesthetic sensitivity, and attentiveness 
to inner feelings, a preference for variety, intellectual curiosity and independence of 
judgement. People scoring low on Openness tend to be conventional in behaviour and 
conservative in outlook. They prefer the familiar to the novel, and their emotional responses 
are somewhat muted. People scoring high on Openness tend to be unconventional, willing to 
question authority, and prepared to entertain new ethical, social, and political ideas 
(Rothmann & Coetzer, 2003). 
Agreeableness is the tendency to be trusting, compliant, caring, considerate, generous, and 
gentle. Such individuals have an optimistic view of human nature. They are sympathetic to 
others and have a desire to help others; in return they expect others to be helpful. Agreeable 
individuals are prosocial and have a communal orientation toward others (Costa and McCrae, 
1992; John and Srivastava, 1999).  
Conscientiousness concerns individuals who are purposeful and determined. They have the 
tendency to act dutifully, show self-discipline, and aim for achievement against a measure or 
outside expectation. Conscientiousness describes socially prescribed impulse control that 
facilitates task- and goal-directed behaviour, such as thinking before acting, delaying 
gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organising, and prioritising tasks 
(John and Srivastava, 1999). 
There have been several criticisms of the five-factor model (FFM) of personality. For 
example, the FFM does not provide adequate coverage of the normal personality trait domain 
(let alone the abnormal personality trait domain); it is not linked to underlying physiological 
mechanisms or to neurochemical brain processes; it postulates heterogeneous broad traits 
which are too few in number to enable highly accurate predictions; it provides a static 
account of regularities in behavior; and a major difficulty with the FFM is that it has no 
established theoretical basis (Boyle, 2008). Other criticisms of the model relate to the 
statistical technique of factor analysis, and questionnaire measures of the Big Five.  
Block, (1995) believed that the algorithmic method of factor analysis may not provide 
dimensions that are incisive. The "discovery" of the five factors may be influenced by 
unrecognized constraints on the variable sets analyzed. Lexical analyses are based on 
questionable conceptual and methodological assumptions and have achieved uncertain 
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results. The questionnaire version of the Five Factor Approach FFA has not demonstrated the 
special merits and sufficiencies of the five factors settled upon. Serious uncertainties have 
arisen regarding the claimed 5-factor structure and the substantive meanings of the factors.  
One of the criticisms that can be more related to the present study is its lexical approach to 
personality because this approach has prompted much debate. The controversy arose over 
dissimilar individual and language interpretations in different cultures, which were not 
expected in the Big Five model.  
          Moreover, the results of intercultural research in this field have not been consistent. On 
the one hand, factor analysis-based studies showed either extra factors or one of the main 
factors was not extracted in some languages including Italian, Dutch, Greek and Filipino 
(Church, Reyes, Katigbak, and Grimm, 1997; Di Blas & Forzi, 1998; Quo Lobrano, 2014; 
Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis, and Goldberg, 2005; Szirmak & De Raad, 1994;). Similar 
findings were also observed in Islamic countries such as Malaysia (e.g. Mastor, Jin, and 
Cooper, 2000). However, there were some intercultural research studies which confirmed the 
factor structure. Schmitt, Allik, Benet-Martinez et al. (2007) in a comprehensive study of 
17837 students from 56 countries concluded that the five-factor structure is widely accepted. 
They had adopted a cross-cultural convergent validation strategy. 
Controversy concerning the model included an argument by Ashton & Lee (2007) that the 
Big Five structure should be revised to accommodate a sixth broad trait domain: Honesty-
Humility. They summarize evidence for the resulting six-dimensional structure and interpret 
these dimensions in terms of key evolutionary tasks.  
          Several Iranian studies were also found in which the researchers extracted and then 
confirmed the structure (Khormaei & Farmani, 2014; Yousefi & Molla Alizadeh, 2014). The 
main reason why this research was based on the five-factor model was its popularity among 
Iranian researchers, many of whom had used the model in their studies on personality. 
Moreover, the psychometric properties of different versions of NEO questionnaires which 
were developed to measure personality traits based on this model have often been confirmed 
over the past 15 years in Iran (e.g. Atari, Barbaro, Sela, Shackelford, and Chegeni, 2017; 
Erdle & Aghababaei, 2012; Gousheh, Ziaaddini, Baneshi, and Nakhaee, 2014; Zamani, 
Abedini, and Kheradmand, 2011). Even some studies, which adopted other models, referred 
to the popularity of the Big Five model and its widespread use in Iran (e.g. Wasserman, 
Aghababaei, and Nannini, 2016). 
22 
 
 
The Present Thesis 
 
A distinction between eudaimonic and hedonic well-being has been shown to be theoretically 
and empirically warranted. Prior research suggests that hedonic and eudaimonic well-being 
have different (albeit sometimes overlapping) sets of correlates and predictors. For instance, 
openness to new experience has been found to be a significant and consistent predictor of 
eudaimonic well-being while it has been shown to be generally unrelated to hedonic aspects 
of well-being (Joshanloo, Rastegar, & Bakhshi, 2012). Prior studies have investigated many 
different predictors of well-being in different cultural contexts, including demographic 
variables (such as income, age, gender, etc.) and personality variables (such as the Big Five 
personality traits and self-esteem). Past research indicates that although demographic 
variables play a significant role, the contribution of personality traits are considerably more 
pronounced in determining people’s sense of well-being (Joshanloo et al., 2012).  
A closer look at the literature reveals that, to date, the relation between beliefs and aspects of 
well-being has been less frequently investigated by researchers. Prior research has 
documented the effects of some belief domains on individuals’ mental health in different 
cultures. Some of these beliefs include belief in just world (Dzuka, & Dalbert, 2006; Correia, 
& Dalbert, 2007), self-efficacy beliefs (Caprara & Steca, 2005), meritocracy beliefs (Foster, 
& Tsarfati, 2005), existential beliefs (Cohen & Hall, 2009), and external control beliefs 
(Ferreira, & Sherman, 2006). However, a systematic investigation of the role of beliefs in 
determining mental well-being which is based on a comprehensive theory is lacking. 
Moreover, the contribution of beliefs over and above personality traits has received almost no 
research attention. To partially fill these gaps, this thesis sought to investigate the 
contribution of five domains of social beliefs in explaining the variance in dimensions of 
well-being. The five social belief domains used in the present thesis are the output of the 
relatively recent line of empirical research on social axioms (Leung & Bond, 2008).  
Empirical evidence on the relation between social axioms and dimensions of well-being is 
rare. Only a few previous studies have investigated the relation between social axioms and 
subjective well-being (Chen et al., 2006; Lai et al., 2007; Mak et al., in press; Safdar et al., 
2006). The relationship between psychological well-being and social axioms has not been 
explicitly investigated so far. All in all, it can be concluded that empirical evidence on the 
relation between dimensions of well-being and social axioms is rare and piecemeal, and 
therefore, this thesis can contribute novel insights in this regard. 
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Although the empirical findings suggest that it is wise to take the distinction between hedonic 
and eudaimonic well-being into account, past studies have generally focused on the relation 
between belief domains and subjective well-being. The relationship between belief domains 
and aspects of psychological well-being has been under investigated. This thesis sought to 
also partially fill these gaps by examining the predictive power of social axioms in predicting 
both hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of well-being.  
This thesis also investigated the role of country by including samples from two national 
contexts: Iran and England. These two nations are different in terms of belief systems, 
religious beliefs, and political regimes. Research indicates that Iran is a relatively 
collectivistic culture, while England is a relatively individualistic culture (Hofstede, 1980). 
Iranians are mainly Shiite, while the British culture is more heterogeneous in terms of 
religious affiliation. Such cross-cultural studies let us examine if the patterns of relationship 
which emerge in one culture are generalizable to the other or not. Additionally, this thesis 
investigated an immigrant sample of Iranians who have been living in England for a while. 
The inclusion of this sample gives us the opportunity to examine the effect of social context 
as a moderator of the effects of social axioms on mental well-being. Moreover, comparing the 
beliefs of the immigrant sample to those of the host and heritage culture provides preliminary 
insights regarding the flexibility of social beliefs.  
To increase the strength and breadth of this thesis, variables included were extracted from 
robust and comprehensive theories in psychological sciences. Well-being was measured 
using three variables related to subjective well-being (positive affect, negative affect, and life 
satisfaction), as well as the six aspects of Ryff’s (1989) theory of psychological well-being 
(i.e., autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, 
purpose in life, and self-acceptance). Social beliefs were measured using scales measuring the 
five domains of social beliefs as established in the field of social axioms (i.e., social 
cynicism, social complexity, and reward for application, religiosity, and fate control). 
Personality traits included were the Big Five traits (i.e., openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism), which are widely recognised as the main 
personality traits across all branches of psychology (McCrae & Costa, 1997; McCrae et al., 
2005).  
This thesis also recruited samples of Iranians living in Iran, Iranians living in England, and a 
UK student sample living in England. The purpose was to examine the main contribution of 
social beliefs, personality, and culture in the prediction of mental well-being in Iran and 
England (Study 1), examining possible mediators of these relationships (Study 2), examining 
Iranian immigrants in the UK with respect to focal variables of the study (Study 3), and 
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finally, interviewing Iranian immigrants in the UK about their views on well-being and social 
axioms (Study 4), which led to theory building. All these studies were designed to partially 
fill an obvious gap in the literature and inform future follow-up studies. The specific purpose 
of each study is briefly reviewed next. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Framework 
 
In this chapter, the focus is first on culture and its relationship with issues related to mental 
health and well-being as the basis of and rationale for the study. After that, the chapters and 
hypotheses discussed in each chapter are reviewed with the purpose of providing a general 
understanding of the research framework. The rationale for employing a mixed method 
approach is explained later and finally the researcher’s epistemological position is presented.  
 
Culture and its relationship with well-being and mental health 
The concept of culture is deeply contested. Between 1920 and 1950 alone, at least 157 
definitions were presented.  Culture constructs the way in which human beings perceive 
reality. It can be broadly defined as a unique meaning and information system, shared by a 
group and transmitted across generations that allows the group to meet basic needs of 
survival, by coordinating social behaviour to achieve a viable existence, to transmit 
successful social behaviours, to pursue happiness and well-being, and to derive meaning from 
life (Matsumoto, 2009). 
 Culture shapes perceptual and experiential patterns, which people use to describe, 
understand, predict, and control the world around them (Marsella 2010). According to 
Marsella (2010), culture can be defined as shared learnt behaviour and meanings acquired in 
life activity contexts that are passed on from one generation to another for purposes of 
promoting survival, adaptation, and adjustment. These behaviours and meanings are dynamic 
and are responsive to change and modification in response to individual, societal, and 
environmental demands and pressures. Culture is represented externally in artifacts, roles, 
settings, and institutions. Culture is represented internally in values, beliefs, expectations, 
consciousness, epistemology (i.e., ways of knowing), ontology, and praxeology, personhood, 
and world views. Cultures can be situational, temporary, or enduring. (Marsella 2010, p. 19).  
In psychology, core debates around culture include its relationship to function and role in the 
human condition and behaviour including mental health and well-being. Culture influences 
many aspects of well-being and mental health. These influences are summarised in the 
following sections. 
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Culture and personal experience of disorders and their symptoms 
One way in which culture affects mental illness is through how patients describe (or present) 
their symptoms to their clinicians. There are some well recognized differences in symptom 
presentation across cultures. Some of the research findings support the view that patients in 
different cultures tend to selectively express or present symptoms in culturally acceptable 
ways (Kleinman, 1977, 1988). For example, Change, Jetten, Cruwys and Haslam (2017) 
conducted three studies to examine the role of cultural norms in symptom expression. In the 
initial study, they confirmed greater somatization, minimization of distress and suppression 
of emotional expression among Chinese participants compared with Australians. They found 
Asian normative expectations of collectivism moderated these effects such that somatization 
was higher among those who endorsed collectivism norms, but only among Chinese 
participants. They also found that only when Asian participants identified strongly with Asian 
culture did collectivism norms predict somatic symptoms. 
 In another study Weiss, Tram, Weisz, Rescorla & Achenbach (2009) compared somatic 
versus affective symptoms in American and Thai children, from community and mental 
health clinic samples. In the clinic sample, Thai children were reported to have higher levels 
of somatic versus depressive symptoms relative to American children, whereas in the 
community sample both groups were reported to have slightly higher levels of depressive 
than somatic symptoms. The data used in this paper show that Haitians neither experience nor 
present with depression in the ways often described in Westernized literature. For instance, 
Haitian women present with three distinct types of depression: (a) (pain in the body), which is 
often described by symptoms such as feelings of weakness and faintness; (b) Soulagement 
par Dieu, (relief through God), which is often associated with specific times, circumstances, 
and situations in the person's life and is often mediated by the client’s belief in God; and (c) 
Lutte sons Victoire (fighting a winless battle), which often is painted as a very bleak 
generalized picture of the individual's life.  
In the only study that was done in this field in Iran, Davidian, Shahmohammadi, Azardgan, 
Karimi & Bagheri Yazdi (2001) analyzed a sample of 2034 Iranian people aged 15 years and 
older in terms of clinical and verbal expression of mental disorders. The results indicated that 
expression of somatic symptoms is common, and patients in Iranian culture tend to express 
their mental state by using physical symptoms and metaphors. 
 
Culture and treatment seeking  
It seems that culture can influence treatment seeking behaviour. For example, it is well 
documented that racial and ethnic minorities in the UK and United States are less likely than 
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whites to seek mental health treatment, which largely accounts for their under-representation 
in most mental health services (Islam, Rabiee & Singh, 2015; Memon et al., 2017; Sussman 
et al., 1987; Kessler et al., 1996; Vega et al. 1998; Zhang et al., 1998). Roberts, Gilman, 
Breslau and Koenen (2011) compared trauma exposure and risk for PTSD among those 
exposed to trauma, and, they compared treatment-seeking among Whites, Blacks, Hispanics 
and Asians in the US general population. Results showed that all minority groups were less 
likely to seek treatment for PTSD than Whites (range: 0.39–0.61), and fewer than half of 
minorities with PTSD sought treatment (range: 32.7–42.0%).  
Hsu & Alden (2008) examined culture-related influences on willingness to seek treatment for 
social anxiety in first and second-generation students of Chinese heritage, and their European 
heritage counterparts. Results showed that although at low- and high-severity levels of social 
anxiety, participants were similar on willingness to seek treatment, at moderate levels, first 
generation Chinese participants were significantly less willing to seek treatment compared to 
their European heritage counterparts. The reluctance of first generation Chinese participants 
to seek treatment was associated with greater Chinese heritage acculturation and was not 
related to perceiving symptoms of social anxiety as less impairing. The findings support the 
general contention that Asians in North America tend to delay treatment for mental health 
problems. 
It seems that in the last decade in Iran, people showed resistance to mental health services 
and referral to specialized centres .Sadeghi, Kaviani, and Rezaei (2003) argued that a large 
percentage of the families of psychiatric patients feel ashamed in Iran. For example, about 49 
per cent of families with schizophrenic patients claimed to be subject to discrimination and 
humiliation. The explanation may be found in Bayandor (2007). He believed that a distorted 
image of mental illness and people with mental disorders is presented in most of the media 
productions in Iran, especially in movies and TV series. Clearly, this can affect seeking 
treatment. 
On the other hand, the way the government considers, organizes, and provides mental health 
services can influence the seeking of treatment. Mental health care prices are high, and 
insurance companies do not cover such costs. This can affect seeking treatment as well. 
 
Culture and coping style 
Cultural values and beliefs can influence coping goals. One of the relevant dimensions is 
whether a culture is individualist or collectivist. Based on Hofstede (2011) ten significant 
differences between collectivist and individualist societies are:  
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Everyone is supposed to take care of him- or herself and his or her immediate family only / 
People are born into extended families or clans which protect them in exchange for loyalty; I 
consciousness / we consciousness; Right of privacy / Stress on belonging; Speaking one's 
mind is healthy / Harmony should always be maintained; Others classified as individuals / 
Others classified as in-group or out-group; Personal opinion expected: one person one vote / 
Opinions and votes predetermined by in-group; Transgression of norms leads to guilt feelings 
/ Transgression of norms leads to shame feelings; Languages in which the word "I" is 
indispensable / Languages in which the word "I" is avoided; Purpose of education is learning 
how to learn / Purpose of education is learning how to do; Task prevails over relationship / 
Relationship prevails over task.   
Currently very few stress coping theories have incorporated the influences of cultural values, 
such as collectivism or individualism, into the understanding of stress and coping processes. 
In the conservation of resources theory, Hobfoll, (2001) assumes a social, collective 
framework in viewing individuals’ stress-coping experiences. Hobfoll stipulated that stress is 
a product of individuals’ need to ensure the survival of the species and to fend off potential 
threats to the survival of the self, family, or tribe (Dunahoo et al., 1998; Hobfoll, 2001). A 
person’s coping, as a stress response, must be understood within the frame of ‘‘individual in 
social context’’ and be viewed as a function of one’s family, neighbourhood, religion, 
employment, charitable organizations, ethnic in-group, etc (Kuo, 2012). Also, the cultural 
transactional theory of stress and coping proposed by Chun et al. (2006) attempts to address 
the direct and indirect links between collectivism–individualism and stress-coping. The 
authors assert that in cultures oriented toward individualism, the self is a central unit of 
society. Consequently, individual rights, a concern for oneself and immediate family, and 
personal autonomy and self fulfilment are emphasized. In contrast, in cultures oriented 
toward collectivism the ingroup forms the central unit of society and binds individuals to its 
needs, goals, and fate. Accordingly, duty and obligations to the ingroup, interdependence on 
other individuals within the group, and fulfilment of social roles are emphasized. These 
orientations have important ramifications for the environmental and personal systems, and for 
the extent to which context influences behaviour. 
McCarty and her colleagues (1999) hypothesized that individualists with a more internal 
locus of control are likely to set primary control coping goals to modify or alter the 
environment to make it better fit their own personal agenda, whereas collectivists with a more 
external locus of control are likely to set secondary control coping goals to modify or alter 
themselves to fit environmental constraints. Thai children were more likely than American 
29 
 
children to have coping goals that reflected secondary control for stressors, but only for 
stressors that threatened their interdependence with others such as separation from others.  
In addition, compared to Nepali children, American children preferred to use primary control 
coping strategies that aimed at altering the situation (Cole, Bruschi, & Tamang, 2002).  
In Hofstede et al. (2010), Individualism Index scores are listed for 76 countries: 
individualism tends to prevail in developed and Western countries, while collectivism 
prevails in less developed and Eastern countries. On this dimension Iran, with a score of 41, 
is considered a collectivistic society. This is manifest in a close long-term commitment to the 
member 'group', be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a 
collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules and regulations. The 
society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members 
of their group. In collectivist societies, offence leads to shame and loss of face, 
employer/employee relationships are perceived in moral terms (like a family link), hiring and 
promotion decisions take account of the employee’s in-group, and management is the 
management of groups. Therefore, we can claim that coping style in Iran is collectivist. 
 
Culture and Epidemiology 
There is ample documentary evidence to emphasize the cultural differences in the prevalence 
of mental disorders. For example, according to the World Health Organization statistics 
(2015) suicide rates in Western countries include Belarus 22.8, Belgium 20.5, France 16.9, 
Hungary 21.6 and UK 8.9 while for Islamic countries they include Egypt 2.6, Iraq 3, Kuwait 
4, and Iran 3.6 (per 100.000 population). The lower suicide rates in some Islamic countries 
may relate to the prohibition of suicide in the Islam holy book, Quran.  
According to the review above, cultural factors influence mental health and well-being. 
Culture was thus included as the moderator variable, the effect of which was examined in the 
study wherever necessary. 
 
Rationale for mixed method 
One of the key issues in mixed methods research is the identification of the reasons for 
mixing quantitative and qualitative methods in one study. The mixing poses numerous 
challenges so mixed methods research should be used only when there is good reason for this. 
Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) introduced the first list of the main reasons for using a 
mixed method as follows: 
Triangulation seeks to converge, confirm, and match the results of different methods.  
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Complementarity seeks elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and clarification of the 
results from one method with the results from the other method. Development uses the 
results from one method to help develop or inform the other and includes decisions on 
sampling, implementation, and measurement. Initiation looks for paradox, contradiction and 
new perspectives in the hope of discovering why such contradictions exist, which requires an 
iterative approach to redesign the questions or results of a method with the questions or 
results of another method. Expansion seeks to extend the breadth and range of research by 
using different methods for different research components. 
The present study is an exploratory mixed method research study. Mixed methods research, 
that emerged to eliminate the disadvantages of purely quantitative or qualitative research and 
to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study (Salehi & 
Golafshani, 2010), is based on combining qualitative and quantitative methods (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
In other words, a research problem allows for investigating uncertain situations or facilitating 
the process by applying a set of methods which are based on different paradigms (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2007). Using qualitative and quantitative approaches in a mixed manner leads to 
a better understanding of problems compared to using each method alone. Tashakkori & 
Teddli (2003) argued that mixing qualitative and quantitative methods lays the groundwork 
for the integration of data collection and analysis techniques in parallel steps and the 
development of research methodology (Salehi & Golafshani, 2010). In simple terms, the 
nature of complex research problems has led researchers to seek answers beyond the numbers 
of quantitative methods and words of qualitative methods and mixing the methods and the 
data obtained can provide a complete analysis (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
There are various methods for data collection in qualitative research. The most common 
method is interview (Creswell, 2005). 
 In the present study, the interviews were in-depth, individual, and face to face. In such 
interviews, the interviewee need not fill in a form including questions with pre-defined 
answers and the interviewee is free to provide answers so there may be an intellectual 
exchange between the interviewee and interviewer from which a comprehensive range of in-
depth questions and answers may emerge (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Qualitative researchers 
generally use this kind of interview that is considered unstructured or semi-structured because 
structured interviews are inflexible while the flexibility in qualitative research is of great 
importance (Patton, 1990). 
In the study, the researcher aimed at using the data obtained through the interviews to offer a 
qualitative explanation of the results obtained in the previous stages and thus develop a 
31 
 
theory on Iranians’ mental health in England. To achieve this objective, grounded theory was 
used. Among the qualitative methods, grounded theory is a research method based on which a 
theory is developed through data collection. To put it another way, when a researcher 
believes that existing theories do not explain a process, he or she formulates a theory by 
collecting data on the problem or process. Since the theory is based on the data and suits the 
study situation, it can better explain the existing theories for an indefinite situation. 
Accordingly, the researcher adopted this method to develop a theory on Iranians’ wellbeing 
in England. 
 
Objectives 
The present study will follow four major objectives: 
1. Identifying the relationship between different aspects of social axioms and subjective and 
psychological well-being while controlling the role of personality traits and country in in Iran 
and a UK student sample (Study 1). 
2. Identifying the relationship between social cynicism and subjective well-being with an 
emphasis on the mediating role of mindfulness and the relationship between social 
complexity and psychological well-being with an emphasis on the mediating role of 
perspective taking (Study 2). 
3. Comparing subjective and psychological well-being and social axioms in Iranian 
immigrants living in England and a UK student sample and Iranians students living in Iran 
and examining how attachment to ethnic identity moderates the relationship between social 
axioms and well-being in the Iranian immigrants (Study 3). 
4. Identifying the Iranian immigrants’ understanding of different social beliefs and the 
possible benefits of such beliefs for well-being. (Study 4). 
 
Structure of chapters, Hypotheses and Questions 
The first chapter was a general introduction. This chapter first reviews the main variables 
including psychological and subjective well-being and social axioms and their relationship 
and provides a theoretical explanation and research evidence about the relationship and what 
distinguishes this study from previous research. Then, Study 1 (chapter 3) investigated the 
contribution of the five social axioms to the prediction of subjective and psychological well-
being. This study included data from Iranian students living in Iran and a UK student sample 
living in England. The contribution of culture and the Big Five were controlled to examine 
unique contributions of social axioms over and above them. Study 1 formed the basis for 
other studies in this thesis 
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The hypotheses of Study 1 based on the objectives outlined are: 
1. Social cynicism is negatively related to indicators of well-being in both Iranian and UK 
students. 
2. Reward for application is positively related to indicators of well-being in both Iranian and 
UK students. 
3. Social complexity is positively related to indicators of well-being in both Iranian and UK 
students. 
4. Fate control is negatively related to indicators of well-being in both Iranian and UK 
students. 
5. Religiosity is positively related to indicators of well-being in both Iranian and UK students. 
6. Social axioms significantly predict psychological well-being over and above the 
contribution of country.  
7. Social axioms significantly predict subjective well-being beyond the collective 
contribution of country and the Big Five. 
8. Social axioms significantly predict psychological well-being beyond the collective 
contribution of country and the Big Five. 
Study 2 (chapter 4) followed up on the findings of Study 1. The findings of the first study 
gave rise to the question of what the mechanisms of the influence of social axioms on mental 
well-being are. The second study predicted that two possible psychological variables would 
mediate the relationship between social axioms and mental well-being, mindfulness and 
perspective taking. The findings in an Iranian sample revealed that perspective taking 
partially mediated the relationship between social complexity and psychological well-being. 
In sum, this study shed light on the issue of the mechanisms of influence exerted by social 
axioms on well-being in Iranian students. 
The hypotheses tested in this study are: 
1- Mindful acceptance partially mediates the relationship between social 
cynicism and subjective well-being. 
2- Perspective taking partially mediates the relationship between social 
complexity and psychological well-being. 
Study 3 (chapter 5) followed up on the findings of Study 1. In this study, Iranian immigrants 
living in England were recruited to respond to a survey including the focal variables of the 
thesis (i.e., social axioms and well-being) together with a strength of ethnic identity measure. 
The main purposes of this study were two-fold: 1- to compare the immigrant sample with the 
Iranian and UK students sample from Study 1 on the variables of social axioms and mental 
well-being, 2- to investigate the role of ethnic identity on the relationship between social 
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axioms and well-being in the immigrant group. The findings of this study can feed into the 
literature on the relationship between general beliefs of the immigrants and immigrants’ 
adaptation. 
The hypotheses tested in this study are: 
1. Iranians in the UK will show social cynicism scores which are between those of student 
participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
2. Iranians in the UK will show religiosity scores which are between those of the student 
participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
3. Iranians in the UK will show social complexity scores which are between those of student 
participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
4. Iranians in the UK will show reward for application scores which are between those of 
student participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
5. Iranians in the UK will show fate control scores which are between those of the student 
participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
Study 4 (chapter 6) followed up on and supplemented the findings of the previous studies in 
this thesis (in particular, Study 3). Inspection of the findings of the previous studies, which 
included findings related to an Iranian immigrant sample, revealed that there were several 
gaps in the literature. The previous studies in this dissertation as well as other existing studies 
did not help to explain some of the findings. This is not surprising given that research on 
Iranian immigrants and on the relationship between social axioms and well-being is rare. 
Iranian culture has rarely been the target of psychological studies of this sort. Therefore, a 
qualitative study using grounded theory methodology was designed to draw on participants’ 
own understanding of their endorsement of various social beliefs and the possible well-being 
benefits of such beliefs. The findings of this study provided novel insights and helped explain 
part of the findings of Study 3 as well as other studies in this thesis. For example, the findings 
revealed one way in which social complexity and flexibility are understood in the context of 
Iranian-Islamic culture.  
One of the main findings was that Iranian immigrants believed that by attributing the cause of 
various life events to oneself under favourable conditions, and to God under unfavourable 
conditions, a person can cope with difficulties more effectively. Attributing the cause of 
favourable conditions to oneself is believed to boost one’s sense of self-worth, giving the 
individual a sense of satisfaction for exercising one’s free will successfully. Attributing the 
cause of unfavourable conditions to God, on the other hand, helps the individual to see 
difficult situations as a divine trial which will be compensated in the afterlife. 
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Finally, the General Discussion provides a summary of the findings, discusses the main 
contributions of the studies to the field of well-being and social axioms, and discusses 
limitations of the research and potential avenues for future research. 
 
Epistemological position 
The present section clarifies the reason for adopting a specific methodological approach for 
data collection and analysis and to draw a conclusion from the results. Thus, it indicates the 
researcher's epistemological position.  
The researcher claims to have taken a pragmatic approach to knowledge and truth in the 
present study. Pragmatism’s central ideas were developed by Peirce, James, Cooley, Mead and 
Dewey (Hammersley, 1990).  
In this approach, true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. 
False ideas are those we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true 
ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as (James, 1995, 
p.77). 
Pragmatism provides a philosophical basis for research including; A) pragmatism is not 
committed to any one system of philosophy and reality. This approach applies to mixed 
methods research. B) Individual researchers have a freedom of choice. C) Pragmatists do not 
see the world as an absolute unity. D) Truth is what works at the time. E) Pragmatist 
researchers look to the what and how to research based on the intended consequences—
where they want to go with it. F) Pragmatists agree that research always occurs in social, 
historical, political, and other contexts (Creswell, 2014).   
According to the above, I have chosen the method, technique, and tools in a way that they 
serve my current needs for solving the problem, and I conducted the study by following 
procedures that, I believed, would be more consistent with the study objectives. I have 
directly focused on the objective and the study question, to answer which I could not limit 
myself to just quantitative or qualitative methods.  
Therefore, I employed mixed methods (consistent with features A and B). I believe that 
although there are other theories and models, the value of a theory or model derives from its 
ability to explain a situation or solve a problem. Thus, I consider myself a pragmatist and will 
use what I think is the most helpful and workable in this regard. 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Study 1 
Social Axioms as Predictors of Mental Well-Being 
Introduction 
 
As elaborated in the Introduction, to date, the relation between general beliefs and aspects of 
well-being has been infrequently investigated by researchers. Prior research has documented 
the effects of some belief domains (e.g., religious beliefs) on individuals’ mental well-being 
(e.g., Abdel-Khalek, 2010; Green, & Elliott, 2010). However, the contribution of beliefs over 
and above personality factors has received little research attention. The present study sought 
to investigate the contribution of five social axioms (social cynicism, social complexity, 
reward for application, religiosity, and fate control) in explaining the variance in well-being 
scores over and above that made by the Big Five personality factors.  
The two dimensions of well-being included in this study were hedonic (subjective) and 
eudaimonic (psychological) well-being. Samples from Iran and the UK are used in the 
analyses, which enabled me to compare scores of participants in the two nations. Given that 
social axioms and dimensions of mental well-being were already reviewed in the previous 
chapter, two main issues are elaborated upon here: 1) the Big Five factors and their relevance 
to this study, and 2) prior research on the relationship between social axioms and mental 
well-being.   
 
 
 
The Big Five Personality Traits and Their Relationship to Social Axioms and Well-
being 
The most widely known and researched model of personality traits is the Big Five model 
(McAdams & Pals, 2006). The Big Five are five personality traits labelled as extraversion, 
neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience (McCrae & Costa, 
2003). The five-factor structure of personality traits has been replicated in almost all 
countries studied so far (McCrae & Costa, 1997; McCrae, Terracciano, et al., 2005; for a 
review of the cross-cultural evidence on the Five Factor Model of personality see McCrae, & 
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Costa, 2008). The same five traits have been replicated in Iranian student samples (e.g., 
Joshanloo, Daemi, Bakhshi, Nazemi, & Ghaffari, 2010; Nosratabadi, Joshanloo, & Jafari 
Kandovan, 2006). 
 
“Briefly, Extraversion implies an energetic approach toward the social and material 
world and includes traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive 
emotionality. Agreeableness contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation towards 
others with antagonism and includes traits such as altruism, tender-mindedness, trust, 
and modesty. Conscientiousness describes socially prescribed impulse control that 
facilitates task- and goal-directed behaviour, such as thinking before acting, delaying 
gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organizing, and prioritizing 
tasks. Neuroticism contrasts emotional stability and even-temperedness with 
negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad, and tense. Finally, 
Openness to Experience (vs. closed-mindedness) describes the breadth, depth, 
originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experiential life.” (John & 
Srivastava, 1999, p. 121) 
 
The Big Five traits have been found to predict many important aspects of functioning and 
performance. Most germane to the current study, they are also correlated with different 
aspects of well-being (as reviewed below). Given their robust relationship with aspects of 
mental well-being, it is important to control the role of personality traits in the prediction of 
well-being. While personality traits are assumed by some researchers to be substantially 
under the influence of the biology of the brain (DeYoung, Hirsh, Shane, Papademetris, 
Rajeevan, & Gray, 2010), social axioms seem to be largely under the influence of culture and 
belief systems dominant in an individual’s environment.  It is therefore not surprising that the 
Big Five traits and social axiom domains are largely independent from each other.  
The Big Five correlates of social axioms have been investigated in a study by Chen et al. 
(2006b). Social cynicism was significantly correlated with extraversion (negatively), 
neuroticism (positively), and agreeableness (negatively). Social complexity was significantly 
and positively correlated with neuroticism and openness. Reward for application was 
significantly and positively correlated with extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness. Religiosity and fate control were not significantly correlated with the Big 
Five traits. All the relationships between social axioms and personality traits were weak or 
moderate. Prior studies have shown that less than 20% of the variance of each social axiom 
dimension could be explained by Western and Chinese indigenous personality measures 
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(Chen, Bond, & Cheung, 2006; Chen, Fok, Bond, & Matsumoto, 2006). Putting all these 
findings together, it can be concluded that social axioms are distinct constructs that can add 
predictive power in psychological investigations, over and above that provided by personality 
constructs. Following this reasoning, social axioms were expected to contribute to well-being 
over and above the personality factors measured in this study.  
A question that arises, at this point, is whether personality is a significant predictor of mental 
well-being. Prior research indicates that personality exerts a strong influence on mental well-
being. Among the Big Five personality traits, neuroticism and extraversion have been found 
to be most strongly correlated with subjective well-being as measured by scales of life 
satisfaction and affect balance (Costa & McCrae, 1980; DeNeve &Cooper, 1998). 
Conscientiousness and agreeableness also have been found to relate to subjective well-being 
in some studies (see DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). However, openness is not a robust and 
consistent predictor of subjective well-being.  
The relationship between aspects of psychological well-being and personality traits has been 
investigated in a study by Schmutte and Ryff (1997) in an American sample. The Big Five 
traits were assessed using the 60-item NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992), and psychological well-being was measured using the Ryff’s psychological 
well-being scale (Ryff, 1989). They found neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness 
to be strong predictors of particularly three aspects of well-being: self-acceptance, 
environmental mastery, and purpose in life. Openness and extraversion predicted personal 
growth. Agreeableness predicted positive relations with others. Finally, autonomy was 
predicted by neuroticism, conscientiousness, openness, and extraversion.  
To summarize, extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness have been 
consistently found to relate to subjective well-being, and all the five traits (including 
openness) have been found to correlate with different aspects of psychological well-being. 
Given that personality is a robust determinant of mental well-being, it would be impressive 
for any psychosocial variable to be able to predict mental well-being over and above 
personality traits. Below, the relationship between social axioms and mental well-being is 
discussed. 
 
The Relationship between Social Axioms and Well-Being 
As mentioned earlier, based on the functionalist approach to beliefs which proposes that 
beliefs and other attitudinal constructs serve some purpose for human survival and 
functioning, social axioms are expected to have consequences for the individual’s sense of 
well-being and his or her functioning. Social axioms are believed to facilitate the attainment 
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of important goals (the instrumental function), help people protect their self-worth (the ego-
defensive function), serve as a manifestation of people’s values (the value-expressive 
function), and help people understand the world (the knowledge function). Social axioms 
researchers argue that social axioms play a key role in people’s belief systems and enhance 
the survival and functioning of people in their social and physical environments. 
Hui and Hui (2009) argue that social axioms serve as psychological tools helping individuals 
to understand, relate to, and control the social world. Hui and Hui further argue that social 
axioms serve as guiding principles facilitating progress towards the attainment of important 
goals in life. Above all, and most related to this study, Hui and Hui argue that, as social 
axioms define instrumentality of various means to reach a given goal, they should predict 
how individuals cope with the challenges of life and achieve self-worth and well-being. 
Empirical findings support these predictions. For instance, in a study by Kurman and Ronen-
Eilon (2004), it was found that immigrants from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union to 
Israel adapted better if they had accurate knowledge about social axioms characterizing the 
host culture. The authors conclude that lack of accurate knowledge about the social axioms in 
the host culture may interfere with adaptation of the immigrants.  
Other empirical studies have investigated the relation between social axioms and indicators of 
mental well-being. Chen, Cheung, Bond, and Leung (2006) found that social cynicism (i.e., a 
negative view of human nature, life, and social institutions) and social complexity (i.e., belief 
in various ways of achieving a certain outcome, and belief that human behaviour is variable 
across situations) were negatively, and reward for application (i.e., belief that effort, 
knowledge, and careful planning will lead to positive outcomes and help avoid negative 
outcomes) was positively correlated with life satisfaction in a Chinese sample. The findings 
from hierarchical regression analyses reported in this study demonstrated that social axioms 
added predictive power over and above the effects of self-esteem (measured by Rosenberg 
self-esteem scale, Rosenberg 1965) and personality (measured by the Cross-Cultural 
Personality Assessment Inventory-2; CPAI-2; Cheung, Leung, Song, & Zhang, 2001).  
In another study in Hong Kong Chinese students, Lai, Bond, and Hui (2007) found that social 
complexity and social cynicism were negatively correlated with life satisfaction. They also 
found that social cynicism was negatively correlated with self-esteem. Their 1-year 
longitudinal study suggested a possible causal influence of social cynicism on life satisfaction 
through self-esteem as a mediator. The authors argued that higher levels of social cynicism 
would lower life satisfaction because cynical individuals possess a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
unsatisfactory social outcomes, initiating a negative social feedback, which in turn leads to 
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lower self-esteem. Lever levels of self-esteem are in part responsible for lowering an 
individual’s level of satisfaction with life.     
Safdar, Lewis, and Daneshpour (2006) investigated the relationship between social axioms 
and adjustment. They showed that reward for application predicted active coping (positively) 
and social complexity predicted life satisfaction (positively) in an Iranian sample after 
controlling for gender, education, age, and occupation. In another study, Joshanloo, Afshari, 
and Rastegar (2010) investigated the relationship between social axioms and various 
indicators of interpersonal, social, and environmental functioning, namely, gratitude for what 
we already have, connectedness to nature, social participation, perspective-taking, and 
empathic concern in a sample of Iranian university students. Findings showed that reward for 
application, religiosity (i.e., belief in the existence of supernatural forces and the utility of 
religious beliefs), and social complexity significantly predicted gratitude. Social complexity 
and reward for application significantly contributed to explaining the variance in 
connectedness to nature. Social cynicism (negatively) and social complexity also predicted 
perspective-taking significantly. Social axioms were not successful in predicting social 
participation and empathic concern. Mak, Han, You, Jin, and Bond (2010) found that social 
cynicism and reward for application were significant predictors of life satisfaction as 
measured by the satisfaction with life scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), and 
served as mediators of the relationship between attachment styles and life satisfaction in 
Hong Kong Chinese and American participants.  
The relationship between psychological well-being and social axioms has not been directly 
investigated. Only the study by Joshanloo et al. (2010) provides some relevant insights. This 
study investigated the relation between social axioms and some interpersonal and social 
functioning indicators, which may be considered to be related to the interpersonal aspect of 
psychological well-being (positive relations with others).  
All in all, it can be concluded that the empirical evidence on the relationship between aspects 
of well-being and social axioms is scant and piecemeal. Only a few past studies have 
investigated the relation between social axioms and life satisfaction (Chen et al., 2006; Lai et 
al., 2007; Mak et al., 2010; Safdar et al., 2006). In particular, not much is known about the 
relationship between social axioms and eudaimonic aspects of well-being. Below, the 
relationships between individual social axioms and various aspects of mental well-being are 
discussed, which sets the stage for hypothesising in the present study.  
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Predictions of the Present Study 
Social cynicism refers to a negative view of human nature, a view that life produces 
unhappiness, that people exploit others, and a mistrust of social institutions. Based on this 
definition, social cynicism is expected to correlate negatively with aspects of well-being. 
Endorsing this belief is likely to encourage a person to keep themselves separate from other 
people and damage his or her interpersonal relationships. Endorsing this belief is also 
expected to hurt the person’s sense of social well-being (Keyes, 1998). Social well-being 
consists of some dimensions (such as social acceptance and social integration) showing 
whether and to what degree individuals are functioning well in their social world.  
The expectation that social cynicism is negatively related to well-being has received some 
empirical support in past studies. For example, optimism, which is roughly the opposite of 
social cynicism, has been found to correlate positively with various aspects of well-being (see 
Carver & Scheier, 2002). Social acceptance and social integration (conceptual opposites of 
social cynicism) also have been found to correlate positively with aspects of psychological 
and subjective well-being (Robitschek & Keyes, 2009). Furthermore, prior research has 
documented negative associations between social cynicism and subjective well-being (e.g., 
Chen et al., 2006; Mak et al., 2010) and job satisfaction (Leung, Ip, & Leung, 2010). Lam, 
Bond, Chen, & Wu (2010) found that social cynicism was positively correlated with five 
well-established suicide indicators: suicidal ideation, psychache, perceived burdensomeness, 
thwarted belongingness, and low self-esteem. Likewise, Chen, Wu, and Bond (2009) found 
that social cynicism was positively correlated with perceived stress, depressive cognition, low 
self-esteem, and suicidal ideation.  
Social complexity refers to the belief in multiple ways of achieving a given outcome, and 
agreement that human behaviour is variable across situations. Social complexity, therefore, is 
expected to be correlated with openness to experience, which describes the scope, 
complexity, novelty, and uniqueness of an individual’s mental and experiential life. As 
mentioned earlier, openness has been found to correlate positively with aspects of 
eudaimonic well-being (e.g., personal growth). Two past studies on Chinese samples revealed 
that, in China, this social axiom dimension was related to lower life satisfaction (Chen et al., 
2006; Lai, Bond, &Hui, 2007). In another study, Lam et al. (2010) found that social 
complexity was positively correlated with psychache and perceived burdensomeness, and that 
it was unrelated to thwarted belongingness, self-esteem, and suicidal ideation in a Chinese 
sample. Chen et al. (2009) found that social complexity was unrelated to perceived stress, 
depressive cognition, self-esteem, and suicidal ideation in a Chinese sample. Nevertheless, 
given that this dimension has been found to positively correlate with optimal functioning 
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indicators in Iran, it was expected that this dimension would be positively correlated with 
mental well-being in this study, at least in the Iranian sample.  
Reward for Application refers to the general belief that effort, knowledge, and careful 
planning will lead to positive results. Theoretically, this belief domain is expected to relate to 
self-efficacy and internal locus of control. Therefore, it was expected that this belief domain 
would relate positively to diverse dimensions of well-being, especially those related to self-
efficacy (e.g., environmental mastery). Empirical findings consistently indicate that this 
belief domain is related to better functioning and well-being. For example, Chen et al. (2006) 
showed that this belief domain was positively related to life satisfaction. Reward for 
Application has also been found to correlate positively with active coping (Safdar, Lewis, & 
Daneshpour, 2006) and better social and interpersonal functioning (Joshanloo et al., 2010). 
Reward for application has been found to correlate positively with self-esteem (Lam et al., 
2010). Likewise, Chen et al. (2009) found that reward for application was negatively 
correlated with perceived stress, depressive cognition, low self-esteem, and suicidal ideation. 
Finally, Mak, Han, You, Jin, and Bond, (2010) showed that this belief dimension was an 
effective predictor of life satisfaction in Hong Kong Chinese and American students.  
Religiosity refers to a belief in the reality of a supreme being and the positive (social) 
functions of religious practice. This belief domain is associated with religiosity and 
spirituality, which involve not only beliefs but also religious practice. Religiosity and 
spirituality have been consistently found to be associated with positive well-being both in 
Iran (e.g., Hadianfar, 2005) and European countries (for a review see Moreira-Almeida, Neto, 
& Koenig, 2006). However, empirical studies generally indicate that this belief domain is 
unrelated to aspects of well-being (Mak et al., 2010), perceived stress, depressive cognition, 
self-esteem (Chen et al., 2009), and suicidal ideation (Chen et al., 2009; Lam et al., 2010) 
mainly in Chinese samples.  
Joshanloo et al.’s (2010) study in Iran however shows that this belief is associated with 
gratitude. Gratitude seems to be related to a number of socially healthy behaviours and 
attitudes (Emmons, McCullough, & Tsang, 2003). Within the context of positive psychology, 
gratitude is believed to be a human strength in that it enhances one’s personal and relational 
well-being and is possibly beneficial for society as a whole (Emmons & Shelton, 2002). 
Gratitude has been found to predict psychological well-being in the United Kingdom over 
and above the Big Five (Wood, Joseph, & Maltby, 2009). Moreover, in Joshanloo et al.’s 
(2010) study, it was found that the religiosity dimension was related positively to two aspects 
of empathy, namely, perspective taking and empathic concern. Empathy is deemed to 
motivate prosocial behaviour (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg &Fabes, 1990) and to facilitate 
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people’s socially competent interactions (Eisenberg et al., 1996). It is also considered to be a 
critical determinant of social transactions (Feshbach, 1978). Based on these findings in Iran, 
religiosity was expected to correlate positively at least to some interpersonal aspects of 
functioning. 
Finally, fate control refers to a belief that life events are predetermined and that there are 
ways for people to influence these fated outcomes. Although this belief domain suggests that 
people can change the fated outcomes, it is theoretically associated with external locus of 
control and fatalism. Therefore, it is expected to have negative correlations with some aspects 
of well-being, especially those related to internal locus of control (e.g., autonomy). Chen et 
al. (2009) found that fate control was positively correlated with suicidal ideation among the 
Hong Kong Chinese. Other studies, however, have generally shown that this belief domain is 
unrelated to life satisfaction and indicators of interpersonal and social functioning (Joshanloo, 
Afshari, & Rastegar, 2010). Lam et al. (2010) also found that fate control was unrelated to 
five well-established suicide indicators: suicidal ideation, psychache, perceived 
burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and low self-esteem in Hong Kong. Therefore, the 
findings on the relationship between fate control and well-being are mixed and inconclusive.   
Earlier I summarized the evidence that personality traits and social axioms do not largely 
overlap and are separate sources of variation in human behaviour. Keeping this in mind and 
aiming to examine the unique contribution of social axioms to mental well-being, in the 
current study, both social axioms and personality traits were included. The main purpose was 
to control for the influence of personality traits and calculate the strength of the relationship 
between social axioms and well-being over and beyond personality.  
In the present study, I used samples from two nations: Iran and the UK. These two countries 
are vastly different in terms of social, political, and economic indicators. Iran has a religious 
and traditional culture, whereas the UK is much more secular. Iranian culture is strongly 
influenced by Islam, whereas the British culture is largely affected by Christian heritage. Iran 
is a developing nation dealing with problems such as poverty, environmental pollution, slow 
socio-economic development, and lack of personal and religious freedom, whereas the UK is 
a relatively developed, democratic, and wealthy country (Brown & Landreth, 1983; 
Ghaffarian, 1998; Porter, 2013). It has also been found that the UK scores higher than Iran on 
indicators of subjective well-being (e.g., Minkov, 2009).  
Having data from more than one nation enabled me to compare the results in the two nations. 
This possibility is very important in the context of the present study, considering that social 
axiom research is rare in Iran, and there is not much research published on this topic to draw 
on and to compare the current findings with. Availability of data from another country could 
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help put the findings from Iran in perspective. However, it should be noted that the present 
thesis is not focused on investigating actual cross-cultural comparisons. Various aspects of 
culture (such as individualism and collectivism) are not measured in the present study. Given 
the small size of the samples of the present study, and exclusion of indicators of cultural 
orientation, this study focuses on country (rather than cultural) differences in the major 
variables of the study.   
As noted earlier, there is not enough empirical data to let us develop informed hypotheses 
about the role of country in the present analyses. Most of the studies on social axioms have 
been conducted in China and Hong Kong. Research on social axioms and eudaimonic well-
being in England and Iran is very scarce. Based on the literature review presented above, I 
expected social axioms to predict aspects of mental well-being in both nations. However, 
given the differences between the two nations, the size and direction of the relationships 
between social axioms and dimensions of well-being may turn out to be different in them. 
Lack of previous research and the large number of variables used in  the present study 
make hypothesising about cultural differences very difficult.  
With regards to the hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of well-being, the size and direction of 
the relationships between social axioms and the subjective and psychological dimensions of 
well-being may also turn out to be different. However, again, lack of previous research makes 
it difficult to hypothesize about the differential relationships between social axioms and 
subjective and psychological dimensions of well-being. Therefore, the present study made no 
predictions in this regard. 
Based on the prior empirical findings, several hypotheses were developed to guide the 
analyses. All the expectations are summarized in the following hypotheses categorized into 
three groups: 
Contribution of the social axiom dimensions to well-being  
1. Social cynicism is negatively related to indicators of well-being in both 
nations. 
2. Reward for application is positively related to indicators of well-being in both 
nations. 
3. Social complexity is positively related to indicators of well-being in both 
nations. 
4. Fate control is negatively related to indicators of well-being in both nations. 
5. Religiosity is positively related to indicators of well-being in both nations. 
 
Contribution of the social axiom dimensions to well-being over and above the role of    nation 
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6. Social axioms significantly predict subjective well-being over and above the 
contribution of country. 
7. Social axioms significantly predict psychological well-being over and above 
the contribution of country. 
 
Unique contribution of social axiom dimensions to well-being over and above the Big Five 
factors and country 
8. Social axioms significantly predict subjective well-being beyond the collective 
contribution of country and the Big Five. 
9. Social axioms significantly predict psychological well-being beyond the 
collective contribution of country and the Big Five. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
In the present study, a non-random convenience sampling method was adopted at the 
Universities of Tehran and Hertfordshire in Iran and England respectively. 
Those who were selected as the study sample using convenience sampling, were those 
available now of sampling. For this purpose, the sample included undergraduate and 
postgraduate students from different disciplines who were visiting the university's campus 
and library, or those who had volunteered to participate in the study in response to talk with 
them.  
The number of people who refused to participate in the study was not counted exactly, but 
they are approximately double the sample group. Some of them mentioned their specific 
residence conditions (e.g. refugee status) and lack of trust in the goal of the research as 
reasons for refusing to participate in the study, and others mentioned the large number of 
questions.  
Prior to data collection, the participants were informed about the study objectives and assured 
there was no deception or misleading information to obtain their full consent. They were also 
assured that their identifying information and responses would remain confidential and 
inaccessible to others and that participation in the study would not be any risk to them. Their 
participation was voluntary, and they could leave at any time they wished. The Participants’ 
anonymity was preserved, and no unacceptable language was noticed in the formulation of 
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questions or during qualitative interviews and they were treated respectfully during the entire 
study period. The forms related to the commitments are available in the appendices. 
The participants in this study were 73 students in Iran and 66 students in the UK.   Of the 
Iranian sample, 37 were female students (50.7%) and 36 were male students. The sample was 
comprised of 72 undergraduates and the remaining one participant was a graduate student. 
Age ranged from 18 to 29, with a mean of 21.97 (SD= 1.95). Forty-one students reported that 
they had no partner, 17 reported that they were “in a relationship but not living with partner”, 
two students reported that they were “single and living with partner”, nine students were 
married, one student was separated, and three students chose “other”. Sixty-four students 
reported that they had no jobs, and nine students reported that they had part-time jobs. Fifty-
four, two, 11, and one reported their ethnicity to be Fars, Kurd, Turk, and Lor, respectively, 
and one student did not answer this question. Sixty-eight students reported being Muslims, 
one “secular humanist”, and four chose “no religious preference”. In response to the question: 
“Do you consider that you are actively practising your religion?” 29 chose “no” and 41 chose 
“yes”. Three students did not answer this question.  
One of the students reported that his father was illiterate. Five students reported their fathers’ 
highest educational qualification to be elementary school diploma, six secondary school 
diplomas, 22 high school diplomas, five junior college diplomas, 23 bachelor’s degrees, eight 
master’s degree, and three PhD. Ten of the students reported their mothers’ highest 
educational qualification to be elementary school diploma, six secondary school diplomas, 32 
high school diplomas, five junior college diplomas, 16 bachelor’s degrees, three master’s 
degree, and one of the students did not know the answer to this question. 
Of the UK student sample, 45 were female students (68.2%) and 21 were male students. The 
sample was comprised of 65 undergraduates and the remaining one participant was a 
graduate student. Age ranged from 18 to 45, with a mean of 21.35 (SD= 4.24). Thirty-four 
students reported that they had no partner, 13 students reported that they were “single and 
living with partner”, four students were married, two students were separated, and one 
student was widowed. Five students did not report their relationship status. Thirty-six 
students reported that they had no jobs and thirty students reported that they had part-time 
jobs.  
Thirty-seven students reported their ethnicity to be white, five Black – African, six Indian, 
four Pakistani, one Bangladeshi, 12 chose “other”, and one student did not answer this 
question. Five students reported their religion to be Anglican, seven Roman Catholic, one 
Protestant, one Eastern Orthodox, one Free Church, six “other Christian”, one Shia Muslim, 
46 
 
eight Sunni Muslim, five Hindu, 12 Sikh, 12 atheists, five agnostic, and 10 chose “no 
religious preference”. In response to the question: “Do you consider that you are actively 
practising your religion?”, 34 chose “no” and 24 chose “yes”. Eight students did not answer 
this question.  
Eight of the students reported that their fathers were illiterate. Twelve students reported their 
fathers’ highest educational qualification to be GCSEs or equivalent, 18 A-levels or 
equivalent, 11 bachelor’s degrees, three master’s degree, and three PhD. Ten of the students 
reported that they did not know about their fathers’ highest educational qualification. Eight of 
the students reported that their mothers were illiterate. Twenty students reported their 
mothers’ highest educational qualification to be GCSEs or equivalent, 21 A-levels or 
equivalent, eight bachelor’s degrees, and eight of the students reported that they did not know 
about their mothers’ highest educational qualification. One student did not answer this 
question. 
The two samples were compared in terms of age, gender, and relationship status. The results 
are reported in Table 3.1. The two samples were not significantly different with respect to age 
[t (83.407) = -1.385, p = .170]. However, they were significantly different in terms of gender 
[χ² (1) = 4.386, p<0.05] and relationship status [χ² (6) = 34.589, p<0.01].  
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of the samples and inferential tests 
  M(SD)    
  Iranian Sample  UK student sample  test p 
Age  21.97 (1.958) 21.08(4.919)  t .17 
Sex     χ² 0.036 
 female 37 45    
 Male  36 21    
relationship    χ² 0.000 
 No partner 41 34    
 Not living with partner 17 18    
 Single with partner 2 0    
 Married 9 6    
 Separated 1 2    
 Widowed 0 1    
 Other 3 0    
 Missing 0 5    
employment status      
 No jobs 64 36    
 Part time jobs 9 30    
ethnic      
 Fars 54 White 37   
 Kurd 2 Black 5   
 Turk 11 Indian 6   
 Lor 1 Pakistani 4   
 Missing  1 Bangladeshi  1   
   Others  12   
Father's education       
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 Illiterate  1  8   
 Elementary diploma 5 GCSEs 12   
 Secondary diploma 6 A- level 18   
 High school diploma 22     
 Junior 5     
 Bachelor 23  11   
 master 8  3   
 PhD 3  3   
 Missing  -  10   
Mother's education       
 Illiterate  -  8   
 Elementary diploma 10 GCSEs 20   
 Secondary diploma 6 A- level 21   
 High school diploma 32     
 Junior 5     
 Bachelor 16  8   
 master 3     
 missing 1  9   
Religion       
 Muslim 68 Anglican 5   
 Secular humanist 1 Roman Catholic 7   
 No religion  4 Protestant 1   
   Eastern Orthodox 1   
   Free Church 1   
   Other Christian 1   
   Muslim 2   
   Hindu 5   
   Sikh 12   
   atheist 12   
   agnostic 5   
   No religion preference 10   
Practicing religion      
 Yes 41  24   
 No 29  34   
 
 
Measures 
Social Axiom Survey (SAS; Leung et al., 2002). The 60-item Social Axiom Survey was 
used to measure social axioms. The 5-point Likert-type response format was anchored by “1 
=strongly disbelieve” and “5 =strongly believe.” This instrument is divided into five 
subscales: Social Cynicism (18 items, e.g., “Kind-hearted people are easily bullied”), Reward 
for Application (14 items, e.g., “Knowledge is necessary for success”), Social Complexity 
(12 items, e.g., “One’s behaviours may be contrary to his or her true feelings”), Fate Control 
(8 items, e.g., “All things in the universe have been determined”), and Religiosity (8 items, 
e.g., “Belief in a religion makes people good citizens”). In two past studies in Iran (Joshanloo 
et al., 2010; Safdar et al., 2006), the subscales of this survey yielded Cronbach alpha values 
which are comparable to those emerging in other countries (approximately between .51 and 
.74); for example, see studies by Chen et al. (2006a) in a Chinese sample, Singelis, Hubbard, 
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and Her (2003) in an American sample, Leung et al. (2007) in samples from Hong Kong, 
mainland China, the Netherlands, Israel, and Estonia.  
Big Five Inventory (BFI: John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991, John & Srivastava, 1999). 
This inventory was developed to address the need for a short instrument measuring the 
prototypical components of the Big Five that are common across various lines of research. 
The goal of developing this inventory was to create a brief inventory that would allow 
efficient and flexible assessment of the five dimensions when there is no need for more 
differentiated measurement of individual subdimensions. The BFI uses short phrases based 
on the trait adjectives known to be prototypical markers of the Big Five. It consists of 44 
items to measure Extraversion (8 items, e.g., “Is talkative”), Agreeableness (9 items, e.g., 
“Tends to find fault with others”), Conscientiousness (9 items, e.g., “Does a thorough job”), 
Neuroticism (8 items, e.g., “Is depressed, blue”), and Openness to experience (10 items, e.g., 
“Is curious about many different things “). The items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 =disagree strongly to 5 =agree strongly. According to John and Srivastava (1999), in 
U.S. and Canadian samples, the Cronbach alpha reliabilities of the BFI scales typically range 
from .75 to .90. Three-month test-retest reliabilities of the scales range from .80 to .90, with a 
mean of .85. Prior research indicates substantial convergent relations between this inventory 
and other Big Five instruments as well as with peer ratings (for a review see John & 
Srivastava, 1999; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008).  
Considering that the five-factor model of personality originated in Western cultures, there is 
less concern regarding the applicability of this model to Western cultures (like England). 
Fortunately, the five-factor model of personality has also been found to be relevant and 
applicable in Iranian contexts. Therefore, for the Iranian sample a Farsi (Persian) version of 
the Big Five Inventory which had been previously validated was used. 
Joshanloo et al. (2010), using the NEO-FFI-R (NEO Personality Inventory-Revised, Costa & 
McCrae, 1992), found that the five-factor structure of personality was replicated in a sample 
of Iranian students. In another study, Nosratabadi, Joshanloo, and Jafari Kandovan (2006) 
investigated the validity of the BFI in an Iranian university student sample. Face validity of 
the scale was confirmed by 6 experts (Iranian psychologists and psychiatrists). The authors 
found that this inventory has a five-factor structure in Iran. Internal consistency of the 
subscales of the BFI ranged from .61 to .80. They concluded that the BFI’s reliability and 
validity are acceptable, and it can be applied with Iranian university student populations.  
Psychological Well-Being Scale (Ryff, 1989).  The 54-item version of Ryff’s (1989) scale of 
psychological well-being was used to assess the six dimensions of psychological well-being 
based on Ryff’s conceptualisation of well-being. The six scales are as follows: self-
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acceptance (e.g., “I like most parts of my personality”), positive relations with others (e.g., 
“maintaining close relationships has been difficult and frustrating for me”), personal growth 
(e.g., “For me, life has been a continual process of learning, changing, and growth”), purpose 
in life (e.g., “I sometimes feel as if I’ve done all there is to do in life”), environmental 
mastery (e.g., “I am good at managing the responsibilities of daily life”), and autonomy (e.g., 
“I tend to be influenced by people with strong opinions”). Each subscale contains nine items. 
Items are scored on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 =strongly disagree to 7 =strongly agree. 
Although Springer and Hauser (2005) provide some evidence suggesting that this scale’s 
validity is not acceptable, Ryff and Singer (2006) review the evidence from five categories of 
studies (i.e., factorial validity, psychological correlates, sociodemographic correlates, 
biological correlates, and intervention studies) that document the distinctiveness of the six 
dimensions of well-being. They conclude that the reliability and construct validity of these 
subscales is well-established. Some empirical studies confirm the six-factor structure of this 
scale in various samples (e.g., Cheng & Chan, 2005; Clarke et al., 2001; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; 
Springer & Hauser, 2006; van Dierendonck, 2004). 
Shokri, Kadivar, Farzad, Daneshvarpour, Dastjerdi, and Paeezi (2008) examined the factor 
structure of the 54-item Persian versions of Ryff's Psychological Well-Being Scale in Iranian 
students. Results of the confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the six-dimensional model 
of psychological well-being (hypothesizing six distinct yet correlated factors) showed an 
acceptable fit to the data. They also showed that the face validity of the items of this scale 
was confirmed by a panel of experts. In another study, Bayani, Koocheky, and Bayani (2008) 
used a student sample to examine the reliability and convergent validity of the 84-item 
version of Ryff’s Psychological Well-Being Scale in Iran. They found two-month test-retest 
reliability coefficients greater than .71 for the six subscales of this scale. They also found that 
Cronbach’s alpha values of the six subscales ranged from .57 to .76. This scale also was 
found to correlate positively with some other scales of well-being, showing its acceptable 
convergent validity in Iran.  
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). The 
SWLS assesses global life satisfaction. This scale consists of five items (e.g., “In most ways 
my life is close to my ideal”). Each item is rated on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). This scale has been extensively used in many cultures. 
Almost all the past studies have confirmed the one-factor structure and acceptable reliability 
of this scale (e.g., Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & 
Sandvik, 1991; Shevlin, & Bunting, 1995). Pavot et al. (1991) reported test-retest reliability 
coefficients of .83 and .85 for this scale in American samples.  
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Joshanloo and Daemi (in press) investigated the reliability and validity of this scale in an 
Iranian student sample. Their confirmatory factor analysis results confirmed the 
unidimensional factor structure of this scale in Iran. They reported a Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability of .84 and a three-week test-retest reliability coefficient of .92 for this scale. Their 
findings also supported the convergent validity of this scale in this sample.  
Positive and negative affect scales (Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). To measure the affective 
dimension of subjective well-being, positive and negative affect scales were used. These 
scales assess the frequency of positive and negative affect. Respondents indicate how much 
of the time during the past 30 days—” all,” “most,” “some,” “a little,” or “none of the 
time”—they felt six symptoms of positive and negative affect (e.g., “cheerful” and 
“nervous”). The sum of the six negative effects can be subtracted from the sum of the six 
positive affects to obtain a measure of affect balance.  
Mroczek and Kolarz (1998) report internal consistencies of .86 and .91 for negative and 
positive affect scales respectively in a national sample of Americans. Bakhshi, Daemi, and 
Ajilchi (2009) investigated the reliability and validity of these two scales in Iranian students. 
Their exploratory factor analyses confirmed the unidimensional factor structure of the two 
scales in Iran. They found a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 for both scales. They also found that the 
scales evidenced acceptable convergent validity. 
 
 
Data analysis 
Given that the purpose of this study was to examine how much of the variance in mental 
well-being is explained by a group of predictors (the Big Five, nation, and social axioms), 
and the outcome and predictors are all continuous variables (with the exception of a 
dichotomous variable –country–as explained below), Pearson correlation and multiple 
regression analyses were used to analyse the data. Zero-order Pearson correlation is a 
univariate statistical technique used to investigate the relationship between two continuous 
variables (Clark-Carter, 2009). To investigate hypotheses 1 through 5 of the present study, 
five separate Pearson correlation analyses were conducted.  
In multiple regression, the relationships between a single outcome variable and two or more 
potential predictors are investigated (Clark-Carter, 2009). In this technique, all the predictors 
are usually entered simultaneously into the model. However, in the present study, for 
hypotheses 6 to 9, a variation of regression analysis was used, which is known as hierarchical 
multiple regression. This technique is used when the researcher places the predictors into the 
model in a prearranged order. This technique helps the researcher to examine how much of 
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the variance in the dependent variable is explained by one or more predictors when the 
contributions of one or more other variables are partialled out (Clark-Carter, 2009). In other 
words, this technique helps to determine if the unique contribution of a variable or a set of 
variables is significant over and beyond the contribution of other variables, which are placed 
in the model in earlier steps. Given that in the present study, the aim is to examine the 
contribution of social axioms over and above the personality traits and country, hierarchical 
regression is the most appropriate technique (for testing hypotheses 6 to 9). Here, country and 
personality were entered the model first to control for their effects. 
It is also noteworthy that in multiple regression analysis, dichotomous variables can be 
included as predictors. In the present study, I used the dichotomous variable ‘country’ (1 = 
Iran, 2 = UK) to control for country of origin. Therefore, if this variable turned out to be 
positively associated with an outcome, UK sample participants would have scored higher 
than Iranians on the tested outcome variable. If the association is negative, we would 
conclude that Iranians scored higher than UK sample participants on a certain outcome.  
The analysis was conducted using SPSS 19 and the G*power software was used to calculate 
statistical power. This is a tool to compute statistical power analyses for many 
different t tests, F tests, χ2 tests z tests and some exact tests. G*Power can also be used to 
compute effect sizes and to display graphically the results of power analyses1. Also, I used 
these two software packages in the other quantitative studies according to each analysis used 
in each study. For all the sample sizes that I used, the power was above 0.95. 
 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
The total psychological well-being score was obtained by summing all six dimensions of 
psychological well-being, and the total subjective well-being score was calculated by 
summing the scores of life satisfaction and affect balance. Table 3.2 and 3.3 show the means 
and standard deviations for all variables measured in the study as a function of sex and 
country. Prior to analysis, all nondemographic variables of the study were examined for 
accuracy of data entry, missing values, outliers, and normality.  
 
Missing data. As a rule, missing data on 5% or fewer of the cases in a single variable can be 
ignored (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). Analyses showed that all the variables contained 
missing data on 2.9% or fewer of the cases (ranging from 0 to 2.9%) in both samples. In view 
                                                          
1 . (http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html). 
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of this relatively low rate of missing data, missing data does not appear to be a serious 
problem in the current study. Therefore, no post-hoc data treatment was needed to handle 
missing values.  
 
 
Table3.2. Descriptive statistics for the variables as a function of country 
 Iran  UK 
 N M (SD)  N M (SD) 
Psychological well-being      
 Autonomy 73 41.67 (7.28)  65 40.86 (8.14) 
 Environmental mastery 71 41.53 (8.20)  66 42.24 (5.76) 
 Personal growth 73 43.35 (6.73)  65 46.13 (7.75) 
 Positive relations 72 40.95 (10.52)  63 45.20 (7.62) 
 Purpose in life 73 43.39 (8.42)  65 45.76 (7.83) 
 Self-acceptance 71 41.07 (9.42)  66 44.09 (6.86) 
Subjective well-being      
 Life satisfaction 73 22.02 (7.10)  65 24.70 (4.67) 
 Positive affect 73 18.78 (4.27)  66 20.22 (5.16) 
 Negative affect 73 14.76 (4.82)  66 13.07 (4.01) 
Social axioms      
 Social cynicism 71 53.46 (6.47)  64 52.31 (8.66) 
 Reward for application 73 51.95 (7.00)  64 49.84 (6.36) 
 Social complexity 73 44.17 (3.83)  64 45.89 (4.56) 
 Fate control 73 22.69 (3.91)  64 20.70 (5.17) 
 Religiosity 73 29.82 (5.15)  65 24.26 (7.19) 
Personality factors      
 Extraversion 71 24.90 (4.69)  66 27.18 (5.27) 
 Conscientiousness 72 30.22 (5.01)  66 30.54 (5.88) 
 Agreeableness 73 31.02 (5.60)  66 32.90 (5.47) 
 Neuroticism 73 24.00 (6.46)  66 22.90 (4.82) 
 Openness 72 34.80 (5.07)  64 34.95 (5.51) 
Note: Different Ns are a result of missing data 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics for the variables as a function of sex and country 
 Iran  UK 
 N M SD  N M SD 
 male female male female male female  male female male female male female 
Psychological well-being              
 Autonomy 36 37 40.25 43.05 7.76 6.60  21 44 41.14 40.72 7.38 8.56 
 Environmental mastery 35 36 39.31 43.69 7.58 8.31  21 45 39.90 43.33 5.07 5.78 
 Personal growth 36 37 42.44 44.24 6.24 7.15  20 45 43.50 47.31 8.31 7.28 
 Positive relations 36 36 37.27 44.63 10.54 9.25  19 44 41.47 46.81 7.96 6.95 
 Purpose in life 36 37 41.77 44.97 9.04 7.56  21 44 42.42 47.36 7.12 7.72 
 Self-acceptance 35 36 39.91 42.19 8.13 10.5  21 45 41.14 45.46 7.39 6.21 
Subjective well-being              
 Life satisfaction 36 37 21.75 22.29 6.30 7.88  20 45 23.00 25.46 5.09 4.32 
 Positive affect 36 37 18.44 19.10 3.57 4.89  21 45 21.28 19.73 6.30 4.53 
 Negative affect 36 37 14.88 14.64 4.29 5.35  21 45 13.14 13.04 4.50 3.81 
Social axioms              
 Social cynicism 34 37 53.88 53.08 5.80 7.09  19 45 55.57 50.93 7.92 8.66 
 Reward for application 36 37 52.16 51.75 7.95 6.03  19 45 51.63 49.08 6.47 6.23 
 Social complexity 36 37 44.22 44.13 4.24 3.45  20 44 44.35 46.59 5.60 3.87 
 Fate control 36 37 23.41 22.00 3.33 4.33  19 45 22.42 19.97 6.09 4.61 
 Religiosity 36 37 29.05 30.56 5.51 4.72  21 44 26.14 23.36 7.32 7.04 
Personality factors              
 Extraversion 36 35 23.86 25.97 4.53 4.67  21 45 26.76 27.37 5.17 5.36 
 Conscientiousness 36 36 30.22 30.22 4.43 5.60  21 45 30.04 30.77 5.54 6.08 
 Agreeableness 36 37 30.05 31.97 6.36 4.62  21 45 31.80 33.42 5.10 5.61 
 Neuroticism 36 37 24.38 23.62 6.52 6.46  21 45 20.76 23.91 4.79 4.55 
 Openness 36 36 34.75 34.86 5.00 5.21  20 44 35.80 34.56 3.94 6.09 
 
 
Outliers. To identify univariate outliers, the variables were examined separately for Iranian 
and British samples. Three cases in the Iranian sample were univariate outliers, because of 
their extremely low z scores on social cynicism (one case) and social complexity (two cases). 
The criterion used for identifying outliers was z scores more than the absolute value of 3.29 
as proposed by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). Based on the procedure proposed by 
Tabachnick and Fidell, to reduce the impact of these cases on the analyses, new scores were 
assigned to these outlying cases that were one unit larger than the next most extreme score in 
the distribution. No univariate outlier was identified in the British sample. No multivariate 
outlier was identified in both samples by means of inspection of Mahalanobis distances with 
p< .001 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Normality. A further step was to examine the normality of the distribution of the variables. 
For this purpose, the skewness and kurtosis of the variables were calculated separately for the 
two samples. Skewness and kurtosis of all variables are shown in Table 3.4. The results 
revealed that the skewness and kurtosis of all variables in the two samples were well within 
the generally accepted range of -2 to +2, indicating that deviations from normality were not 
severe. Therefore, no transformation of the data was needed in the two samples. However, 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the SD differences for some of the variables are still large, 
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raising concern about normality. Standard Deviation (SD) is the second component of the 
distribution, skewness the third, and kurtosis the fourth, which are calculated based on 
different formula and indicators (Ferguson & Takane, 1989). A high standard deviation does 
not indicate whether the data includes skewness or kurtosis. As shown in Table 3.4, none of 
the kurtosis and skewness values are more than 1.96 and, therefore, all the data are 
acceptable. 
 
Internal consistency. To examine the internal consistency of the scales, Cronbach’s alpha 
values were calculated for all scales. The Cronbach’s alpha values for both samples are 
shown in Table 3.5. Fate control and social complexity yielded relatively low Cronbach’s 
alpha values. However, the alpha values for the social axiom subscales were comparable to 
those reported by many researchers in several past studies in samples from different 
countries, for example, Chen et al.(2006a) in a Chinese sample, Singelis, Hubbard, and Her 
(2003) in an American sample, Leung et al. (2007) in samples from Hong Kong, mainland 
China, the Netherlands, Israel, and Estonia. Low alpha values should be interpreted with 
caution given the small size of the samples in this study. 
Table 3.4. Skewness and kurtosis of the variables in the Iranian and UK samples 
 Iran  UK 
 skewness kurtosis  skewness kurtosis 
Psychological well-being      
 Autonomy .546 -.049  -.377 -.328 
 Environmental mastery -.027 -.027  -.039 -.646 
 Personal growth -.173 -.130  -.466 -.013 
 Positive relations -.344 -.034  -.497 .049 
 Purpose in life -.305 -.875  -.290 -.205 
 Self-acceptance .170 -.333  -.399 .009 
Subjective well-being      
 Life satisfaction -.319 -.604  -.659 .816 
 Positive affect -.077 .119  -.370 .550 
 Negative affect .246 -.552  .432 .082 
Social axioms      
 Social cynicism -.166 -.685  .083 -.313 
 Reward for application -.254 1.109  .185 .421 
 Social complexity -.835 .404  .071 .853 
 Fate control -.419 .591  .532 -.210 
 Religiosity -.465 .441  .135 -.442 
Personality factors      
 Extraversion .232 -.435  -.148 .245 
 Conscientiousness .065 -.305  -.030 -.474 
 Agreeableness -.510 .539  -.609 .630 
 Neuroticism .600 -.044  -.035 -.432 
 Openness -.269 -.139  -.743 1.699 
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Table 3.5. Cronbach’s alpha values for the used scales in the 
Iranian and UK samples 
 Iran UK 
Psychological well-being   
 Autonomy .64 .75 
 Environmental mastery .73 .55 
 Personal growth .56 .77 
 Positive relations .85 .74 
 Purpose in life .73 .76 
 Self-acceptance .80 .67 
Subjective well-being   
 Life satisfaction .85 .70 
 Positive affect .84 .87 
 Negative affect .83 .64 
Social axioms   
 Social cynicism .65 .78 
 Reward for application .83 .73 
 Social complexity .60 .60 
 Fate control .55 .70 
 Religiosity .86 .84 
Personality factors   
 Extraversion .50 .75 
 Conscientiousness .64 .77 
 Agreeableness .70 .71 
 Neuroticism .82 .62 
 Openness .58 .70 
 
Gender and cultural differences. 
 
          To compare the variables in terms of gender and country, a two-way ANOVA (gender 
× country) was conducted. In this regard, gender was analysed in two categories 
(male/female) and country in two categories (Iranian/ UK student sample) and interactive and 
direct effects were then examined 
The results obtained from assessing the equality of variances using Leven's test confirmed the 
null hypothesis, that is, the equality of variances for the groups on all dependent variables 
except for environmental mastery. Given the similar group sizes (73 Iranians, and 66 UK 
students sample), it seems that further analysis was possible. 
The results indicated significant direct effects for gender (W11,109=.703, F=2.11, p<.001) and 
country (W11,109=.601, F=3.31, p<.00), but not a significant interaction effect (W11,109=.78, 
F=1.39, p>.043). Gender explained 30% of the differences (=.297), country 40% (=.399), 
and the interaction of both 21% (=.218).  A between subject effect revealed a significant 
gender effect on some variables, i.e. social cynicism (F=6, p< .05), social complexity 
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(F=4.96, p< .05), fate control (F=6.74, p< .05), environmental mastery (F=6.45, p< .001), 
positive relation (F=15.18, p< .0001), and purpose in life (F=7.49, p< .001) and for other 
variables was not significant.  
          In terms of gender, post hoc tests showed that males scored higher in social cynicism 
(MD= 3.7, p< .05), and fate control (MD= 2.25, p< .05), and females scored higher in 
environmental mastery (MD= 3.6, p< .05), positive relation (MD= 7, p< .05), and purpose in 
life (MD=4.4, p< .01). 
          In terms of country the results showed a significant difference between the two groups 
in certain variables, religiosity (F=27.67, p< .0001), personal growth (F=6.60, p< .05), and 
negative affect (F=4.90, p< .05). Post hoc tests showed that the Iranian sample scored higher 
in religiosity (MD=6.45, p< .001) and negative affect (MD= 2.05, p< .05), and the UK 
sample scored higher in personal growth (MD= 3.56, p< .05). 
 Results concerning the interaction effect of gender and country showed no significant effect. 
 
 
Table 3.6 gender and country differences results 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
COUNTRY social cynicism .00 1 .00 .00 .99 .00 
reward for application 164.44 1 164.44 3.65 .05 .03 
fate control 83.56 1 83.56 4.57 .03 .03 
religiosity 1087.81 1 1087.81 31.05 .000 .21 
 Social complexity 5.56 1 5.56 .33 .56 .00 
environmental mastery 2.30 1 2.30 .04 .82 .00 
autonomy 16.16 1 16.16 .26 .60 .00 
personal growth 285.59 1 285.59 6.21 .01 .05 
positive relation 211.35 1 211.35 2.60 .10 .02 
purpose in life 27.07 1 27.07 .43 .51 .00 
self-acceptance 122.55 1 122.55 1.98 .16 .01 
life satisfaction 126.62 1 126.62 3.39 .06 .02 
positive affect 11.10 1 11.10 .50 .47 .00 
negative affect 95.57 1 95.57 4.50 .03 .03 
extraversion 77.68 1 77.68 3.22 .07 .02 
agreeableness 47.13 1 47.13 1.60 .20 .01 
conscientiousness .40 1 .40 .01 .90 .00 
neuroticism 61.53 1 61.53 1.76 .18 .01 
openness 9.54 1 9.54 .35 .55 .00 
SEX social cynicism 324.06 1 324.06 5.62 .01 .04 
reward for application 9.96 1 9.96 .22 .63 .00 
fate control 87.41 1 87.41 4.78 .03 .04 
religiosity 12.05 1 12.05 .34 .55 .00 
Social complexity 106.47 1 106.47 6.48 .01 .05 
environmental mastery 371.04 1 371.04 7.86 .00 .06 
autonomy 39.67 1 39.67 .64 .42 .00 
personal growth 46.62 1 46.62 1.01 .31 .00 
positive relation 1167.73 1 1167.73 14.39 .00 .11 
purpose in life 655.69 1 655.69 10.54 .00 .08 
self-acceptance 177.53 1 177.53 2.87 .09 .02 
life satisfaction 34.32 1 34.32 .91 .34 .00 
positive affect 3.90 1 3.90 .17 .67 .00 
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negative affect .00 1 .00 .00 .99 .00 
extraversion 50.32 1 50.32 2.08 .15 .01 
agreeableness 102.72 1 102.72 3.50 .06 .03 
conscientiousness 7.05 1 7.05 .23 .63 .00 
neuroticism 25.54 1 25.54 .73 .39 .00 
openness 26.07 1 26.07 .97 .32 .00 
COUNTRY * 
SEX 
social cynicism 140.81 1 140.81 2.44 .12 .02 
reward for application 6.84 1 6.84 .15 .69 .00 
fate control 19.72 1 19.72 1.07 .30 .00 
religiosity 32.92 1 32.92 .94 .33 .00 
Social complexity 82.40 1 82.40 5.01 .02 .04 
environmental mastery 25.18 1 25.18 .53 .46 .00 
autonomy 71.00 1 71.00 1.16 .28 .01 
personal growth 6.36 1 6.36 .13 .71 .00 
positive relation 10.69 1 10.69 .13 .71 .00 
purpose in life 29.41 1 29.41 .47 .49 .00 
self-acceptance 10.08 1 10.08 .16 .68 .00 
life satisfaction 17.05 1 17.05 .45 .50 .00 
positive affect 2.76 1 2.76 .12 .72 .00 
negative affect 8.57 1 8.57 .40 .52 .00 
extraversion 18.12 1 18.12 .75 .38 .00 
agreeableness .26 1 .26 .00 .92 .00 
conscientiousness 20.83 1 20.83 .68 .41 .00 
neuroticism 141.83 1 141.83 4.07 .04 .03 
openness 54.39 1 54.39 2.02 .15 .01 
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Table 3.7. Correlations of measures for the Iranian sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1
4 
1
5 
1
6 
1
7 
18 19 2
0 
1.Total 
psychological 
well-being 
-                    
2.Autonomy .68
** 
                   
3.Environment
al mastery 
.88
** 
.44
** 
                  
4.Personal 
growth 
.80
** 
.46
** 
.64
** 
                 
5.Positive 
relations 
.85
** 
.52
** 
.71
** 
.52
** 
                
6.Purpose in 
life 
.83
** 
.45
** 
.72
** 
.76
** 
.60
** 
               
7.Self-
acceptance 
.84
** 
.44
** 
.72
** 
.58
** 
.67
** 
.57
** 
              
8.Total 
subjective 
well-being 
.61
** 
.24
* 
.62
** 
.40
** 
.57
** 
.34
** 
.73
** 
             
9.Life 
satisfaction 
.56
** 
.12 
.65
** 
.40
** 
.49
** 
.33
** 
.69
** 
.90
** 
            
10.Positive 
affect 
.53
** 
.27
* 
.48
** 
.33
** 
.56
** 
.25
* 
.65
** 
.87
** 
.67
** 
           
11.Negative 
affect 
-
.48
** 
-
.30
* 
-
.45
** 
-
.30
** 
-
.45
** 
-
.30
** 
-
.53
** 
-
.83
** 
-
.57
** 
-
.68
** 
          
12.Social 
cynicism 
-
.45
** 
-
.23
* 
-
.44
** 
-
.32
** 
-
.45
** 
-
.27
* 
-
.44
** 
-
.60
** 
-
.44
** 
-
.57
** 
.61
** 
         
13.Reward for 
application 
.15 -.05 .22 
.23
* 
-.02 
.24
* 
.20 .14 .15 .11 -.10 -.01         
14.Social 
complexity 
.27
* 
.19 
.26
* 
.27
* 
.08 
.39
** 
.12 -.06 -.02 -.14 .01 .20 
.49
** 
       
15.Fate control 
-.16 
-
.29
* 
.00
8 
-.19 -.18 -.06 -.09 
-
.00
6 
.05 
-
.00
2 
.09 
.36
** 
.17 .16       
16.Religiosity 
.28
* 
.16 
.24
* 
.34
** 
.14 
.29
* 
.24
* 
.22 .09 .21 
-
.33
** 
-
.36
** 
.52
** 
.23
* 
-
.2
2 
     
17.Extraversio
n 
.28
* 
.29
* 
.19 
.27
* 
.32
** 
.14 .20 
.24
* 
.19 
.25
* 
-.21 -.15 -.07 .06 
-
.1
2 
-
.0
3 
    
18.Conscientio
usness 
.50
** 
.22 
.49
** 
.45
** 
.31
** 
.43
** 
.55
** 
.42
** 
.42
** 
.37
** 
-
.30
** 
-
.36
** 
.07 .05 
-
.1
4 
.1
7 
.10    
19.Agreeablen
ess 
.62
** 
.23
* 
.61
** 
.38
** 
.72
** 
.46
** 
.56
** 
.54
** 
.55
** 
.44
** 
-
.37
** 
-
.27
* 
.02 .03 
-
.1
6 
.1
2 
.18 
.41
** 
  
20.Neuroticism 
-
.54
** 
-
.34
** 
-
.51
** 
-
.28
* 
-
.56
** 
-
.26
* 
-
.60
** 
-
.68
** 
-
.57
** 
-
.65
** 
.59
** 
.57
** 
.15 .15 
.0
1 
.0
5 
-
.26
* 
-
.33
** 
-
.41
** 
 
21.Openness 
.34
** 
.26
* 
.22 
.38
** 
.24
* 
.36
** 
.19 .11 .03 .19 -.10 -.16 .11 .04 
.0
1 
.1
2 
.21 
.38
** 
.20 
-
.2
0 
** p< .01 (2-tailed), * p< .05 (2-tailed) 
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Table 3.8. Correlation of measures for the UK students sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1
3 
1
4 
1
5 
16 17 18 1
9 
20 
1.Total 
psychological 
well-being 
-                    
2.Autonomy .62
** 
                   
3.Environment
al mastery 
.75
** 
.32
** 
                  
4.Personal 
growth 
.75
** 
.39
** 
.48
** 
                 
5.Positive 
relations 
.78
** 
.31
* 
.57
** 
.40
** 
                
6.Purpose in 
life 
.71
** 
.16 
.55
** 
.54
** 
.58
** 
               
7.Self-
acceptance 
.80
** 
.47
** 
.56
** 
.62
** 
.60
** 
.42
** 
              
8.Total 
subjective 
well-being 
.41
** 
.16 
.52
** 
.08 
.54
** 
.19 
.46
** 
             
9.Life 
satisfaction 
.34
** 
-.02 
.55
** 
.10 
.39
** 
.24 
.36
** 
.72
** 
            
10.Positive 
affect 
.18 .10 
.25
* 
-.16 
.37
** 
-.01 
.24
* 
.83
** 
.36
** 
           
11.Negativeaff
ect 
-
.48
** 
-
.33
** 
-
.41
** 
-
.32
** 
-
.51
** 
-.22 
-
.49
** 
-
.74
** 
-
.27
* 
-
.50
** 
          
12.Social 
cynicism 
-.23 
.00
5 
-
.30
* 
-.05 
-
.38
** 
-
.29
* 
.06 -.02 -.10 .01 
.00
9 
         
13.Reward for 
application 
.14 .07 .06 .09 -.04 .16 .07 .05 -.10 .17 
.00
8 
.28
* 
        
14.Social 
complexity 
.12 .05 -.04 .11 .03 .10 .16 -.04 -.15 
.00
7 
-.03 .04 
.29
* 
       
15.Fate control -
.38
** 
-
.26
* 
-
.34
** 
-
.35
** 
-
.31
* 
-
.39
** 
-.23 -.12 -.02 .01 
.34
** 
.49
** 
.24 
-
.0
3 
      
16.Religiosity -.12 -.22 -.10 -.17 .06 -.04 -.19 .06 .03 .11 .03 .04 
.31
* 
-
.0
4 
.1
8 
     
17.Extraversio
n 
.21 
.38
** 
.08 .11 
.27
* 
-.01 
.31
** 
.35
** 
.09 
.40
** 
-
.31
** 
.05 
-
.20 
-
.0
7 
-
.1
7 
-
.25
* 
    
18.Conscientio
usness 
.10 -.12 
.40
** 
.01 .01 
.46
** 
.00
8 
.00
3 
.27
* 
-.14 
.14
9 
-.20 .15 
.0
2 
-
.1
2 
-.12 -.24    
19.Agreeablen
ess 
.25 
-
.00
3 
.34
** 
.12 
.35
** 
.35
** 
.19 .08 .20 -.05 -.04 -.21 .07 
-
.1
0 
-
.1
0 
.12 -.02 
.49
** 
  
20.Neuroticis
m 
-
.42
** 
-
.48
** 
-
.37
** 
-
.27
* 
-
.25
* 
-.12 
-
.41
** 
-
.43
** 
-.07 
-
.45
** 
.46
** 
-.11 
-
.14 
.1
0 
.1
6 
.03 
-
.28
* 
-.02 
.0
2 
 
21.Openness .13 
.32
** 
.15 .12 .06 -.12 .14 .10 -.08 .21 -.11 .21 
-
.14 
-
.1
2 
.1
9 
-
.34
** 
.42
** 
-.17 
-
.0
3 
-
.32
** 
**  p< .01 (2-tailed), *  p< .05 (2-tailed) 
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Main analyses 
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 suggested that social cynicism is negatively related to indicators 
of well-being in both nations. This hypothesis was supported by the results of correlation 
analysis in the Iranian sample. As can be seen in Table 3.7, social cynicism was negatively 
correlated with all aspects of psychological well-being as well as life satisfaction and positive 
affect. It was also positively correlated with negative affect. 
This hypothesis was also partially supported by the results of correlation analysis in the UK 
student sample. As can be seen in Table 3.8, social cynicism was negatively correlated with 
environmental mastery, positive relations, and purpose in life in the British sample.  
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 suggested that reward for application is positively related to 
indicators of well-being in both nations. This hypothesis received some support in the Iranian 
sample. As can be seen in Table 3.7, reward for application was positively correlated with 
personal growth and purpose in life. However, contrary to this hypothesis, in the UK student 
sample, reward for application was unrelated to all aspects of subjective and psychological 
well-being (see Table 3.8). 
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 suggested that social complexity was positively related to 
indicators of well-being in both nations. This hypothesis received some support in the Iranian 
sample. As can be seen in Table 3.7, social complexity was positively correlated with 
personal growth, environmental mastery, and purpose in life. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, in the UK student sample, social complexity was unrelated to all aspects of 
subjective and psychological well-being. 
Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 suggested that fate control is negatively related to indicators of 
well-being in both nations. This hypothesis received some support in the Iranian sample. As 
can be seen in Table 3.7, fate control was negatively correlated with autonomy. This 
hypothesis also received support in the UK student sample. As suggested by Table 3.8, fate 
control was negatively correlated with autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, 
positive relations, and purpose in life and positively correlated with negative affect in this 
sample. 
Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 suggested that religiosity is positively related to indicators of 
well-being in both nations. This hypothesis was supported by the results of correlation 
analyses in the Iranian sample. As can be seen in Table 3.7, religiosity was positively 
correlated with environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. 
It was also negatively correlated with negative affect. However, contrary to this hypothesis, 
religiosity was unrelated to aspects of well-being in the UK student sample (see Table 3.8).  
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Hypothesis 6. This hypothesis suggested that social axioms significantly predict subjective 
well-being beyond the role of nation. For testing this hypothesis, a hierarchical regression 
analysis was conducted. Overall subjective well-being (obtained by summing the scores of 
life satisfaction and affect balance) was entered as the outcome variable. In the first step, 
country (1 = Iran, 2 = UK) was entered as one potential predictor. In the second step all social 
axioms were entered as potential predictors. Results of the regression analysis are 
demonstrated in Table 3.9.  
The results indicate that 18.6% of the total variance in subjective well-being was explained 
by the overall model comprising nation and social axioms, R2= .186, adjusted R2 = .145, F (6, 
120) = 4.55, p = .001. In block 1, country (β = .216) significantly predicted subjective well-
being, with UK students reporting higher scores on subjective well-being than Iranian 
students. After controlling for participants’ country, social cynicism significantly explained 
subjective well-being (∆R2= .139, p = .002). This variable was negatively related to 
subjective well-being (β = -.35). These results are partially consistent with hypothesis 6, 
showing that social axioms predict subjective well-being when the influence of country is 
partialled out.  
Table 3.9. Hierarchical regression models testing hypotheses 6 and 7  
Dependent variable Predictors β t R2  ∆R2   
Subjective well-being 
 
 
Step 1 
  
 
.04 
 
nation .21 2.472*   
     
Step 2   .18 .13 
social cynicism -.35 -3.77***   
reward for application .16 1.59   
social complexity -.05 -.61   
fate control .04 .49   
religiosity .03 .32   
Psychological well-being 
 
 
Step 1 
  
 
.03 
 
nation .19 2.22*   
     
Step 2   .25 .21 
social cynicism -.32 -3.45**   
reward for application .16 1.63   
social complexity .22 2.54*   
fate control -.13 -1.46   
religiosity -.00 -.03   
* p< .05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.  
 
 
Hypothesis 7. This hypothesis suggested that social axioms significantly predict 
psychological well-being over and above the influence of country. For testing this hypothesis, 
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a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. Overall psychological well-being (obtained 
by summing all six dimensions of psychological well-being) was entered as the outcome 
variable. In the first step, the dichotomous variable of country was entered as the sole 
predictor. In the second step, all social axioms were entered as potential predictors. The 
results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 3.9.  
The results indicate that 25.7% of the total variance in psychological well-being was 
explained by the overall model comprising nation and social axioms, R2= .257, adjusted R2 = 
.219, F (6, 116) = 6.68, p = .001. In block 1, nation (β = .198) significantly predicted 
psychological well-being, with UK students reporting higher scores on psychological well-
being than Iranian students. After controlling for country, social cynicism and social 
complexity significantly explained psychological well-being (∆R2= .218, p< .001). Social 
cynicism (β = -.32) was negatively and social complexity (β = .22) was positively related to 
psychological well-being. These results are consistent with hypothesis 7, suggesting that 
social axioms predict psychological well-being after factoring out participants’ country.  
Hypothesis 8. This hypothesis predicted that social axioms significantly predict subjective 
well-being over and above the effects of nation and the Big Five. For testing this hypothesis, 
a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. The overall subjective well-being score was 
entered as the outcome variable. In the first step, country was entered as the predictor. In the 
second step, all the Big Five factors were entered as potential predictors. Finally, in the third 
step, all social axioms were entered. The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 
3.10.  
The results indicate that 52.9% of the total variance in subjective well-being was explained 
by the overall model comprising country, the Big Five, and social axioms, R2= .529, adjusted 
R2 = .482, F (11, 110) = 11.22, p< .001. In block 1, country (β = .225) significantly predicted 
subjective well-being, with UK students reporting higher scores on subjective well-being than 
Iranian students. After controlling for nation, in the second block, neuroticism (β = -.538) and 
agreeableness (β =.192) were significant predictors of subjective well-being (∆R2=.418, p< 
.001). In the third block, social cynicism significantly explained subjective well-being (∆R2= 
.060, p = .02). Social cynicism (β = -.185) was negatively related to subjective well-being. 
These results are consistent with hypothesis 8, suggesting that social axioms predict 
subjective well-being over and above nation and personality.  
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Table 3.10. Hierarchical regression model testing hypothesis 8  
Dependent variable Predictors β t R2  ∆R2   
Subjective well-being 
 
Step 1 
  
 
.05 
 
nation .22 2.52*   
     
Step 2   .46 .41 
extraversion .14 1.87   
agreeableness .19 2.44*   
conscientiousness .00 .01   
neuroticism -.53 -7.25***   
openness -.08 -1.09   
     
Step 3   .52 .06 
social cynicism -.18 -2.25*   
reward for application .12 1.60   
social complexity .00 .11   
fate control .10 1.28   
religiosity .11 1.32   
* p< .05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.  
 
 
Hypothesis 9. This hypothesis predicted that social axioms significantly predict 
psychological well-being over and above the effects of country and the Big Five. For testing 
this hypothesis, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. The overall psychological 
well-being score was entered as the outcome variable. In the first step, country was entered as 
the predictor. In the second step, all the Big Five factors were entered as potential predictors. 
In the third step, all social axioms were entered. Results of the regression analysis are 
displayed in Table 3.11.  
Results indicate that 58.3% of the total variance in psychological well-being was explained 
by the overall model comprising country, the Big Five, and social axioms, R2= .583, adjusted 
R2 = .540, F (11, 105) = 13.35, p< .001. In block 1, country (β = .19) significantly predicted 
psychological well-being, with UK students reporting higher scores on psychological well-
being than Iranian students. After controlling for country, in the second block, neuroticism (β 
= -.367) and agreeableness (β =.325) were significant predictors of psychological well-being 
(∆R2=.407, p< .001). In the third block, social complexity significantly explained 
psychological well-being (∆R2= .137, p< .001). Social complexity (β =.284) was positively 
related to psychological well-being. These results are consistent with hypothesis 9, 
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suggesting that social axioms predict psychological well-being over and above participants’ 
country and personality traits.  
 
 
Table 3.11. Hierarchical regression model testing hypothesis 9  
Dependent variable Predictors β t R2  ∆R2   
psychological well-being 
 
Step 1 
  
 
.04 
 
nation .19 2.17*   
     
Step 2   .44 .40 
extraversion .13 1.73   
agreeableness .32 4.00***   
conscientiousness .10 1.27   
Neuroticism -.36 -4.75***   
openness .04 .54   
     
Step 3   .58 .13 
social cynicism -.12 -1.58   
reward for application .10 1.37   
social complexity .28 3.93***   
fate control -.11 -1.50   
religiosity .06 .79   
* p< .05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.  
 
Discussion 
 
Nine hypotheses were developed to guide the analyses. All the hypotheses were supported by 
the data at least in one country. Below, findings related to each hypothesis are summarized 
and discussed.  
Hypothesis 1 
This hypothesis predicted that social cynicism would be negatively related to indicators of 
mental well-being. This hypothesis was supported in both samples, albeit more so in the 
Iranian sample. Social cynicism was negatively correlated with all aspects of well-being and 
positively correlated with negative affect in Iran (see Table 3.7), indicating that this axiom 
dimension is a strong negative correlate of both subjective and psychological well-being in 
this country. Among the UK student sample, social cynicism was negatively correlated with 
environmental mastery, positive relations, and purpose in life (see Table 3.8), suggesting that 
in the UK student sample this axiom dimension harms the eudaimonic well-being of 
individuals.  
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These findings are in line with those of many past studies conducted in different cultures. For 
instance, this axiom dimension has been found to be negatively correlated with subjective 
well-being (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Mak et al., 2010) and job satisfaction (Leung, Ip, & 
Leung, 2010). It has also been found to be positively correlated with some suicide indicators 
(e.g., suicidal ideation, psychache, Lam et al., 2010; Chen et al. 2009). 
Findings of this study along with those of prior research in other cultures consistently suggest 
that this axiom dimension has negative implications for individuals’ subjective well-being 
and optimal functioning. Past research suggests some pathways from social cynicism to 
lowered well-being. For example, it can be suggested that those high in social cynicism are 
more attentive to negative events and ignore positive events in their lives. According to 
Leung et al. (2010), people high in social cynicism tend to attend to and register negative 
events and unfavourable outcomes that occur to other people as well as to them, and this 
leads to a negative attitude towards life, which, per se, can produce negative affect.  
Another pathway might be that those high in social cynicism use ineffective problem-solving 
strategies or coping styles. Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, and Chemonges-Nielson (2004) found 
that those scoring higher on social cynicism rejected collaboration and compromise in 
resolving interpersonal conflicts. Singelis, Hubbard, Her, and an (2003) also found that social 
cynicism was negatively correlated with interpersonal trust and cognitive flexibility. When 
“socially cynical individuals face stressful life events, their lack of interpersonal trust and 
reluctance to collaborate may lead them to detach themselves from their interpersonal world, 
leaving them without interpersonal support and their problems unresolved” (Chen et al., 
2009, p. 135). Ineffective coping styles may be one of the mechanisms through which social 
cynicism harms mental well-being.   
Finally, it can be suggested that self-esteem mediates the relation between social cynicism 
and well-being. In a study in Hong Kong Chinese students, Lai, Bond, and Hui (2007) found 
that social cynicism was negatively correlated with self-esteem. Their longitudinal study 
suggested a possible causal influence of social cynicism on life satisfaction through the 
mediation agency of self-esteem. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
This hypothesis predicted that reward for application would be positively related to indicators 
of well-being in both nations. This hypothesis received support in the Iranian sample. Reward 
for application was positively correlated with personal growth and purpose in life (see Table 
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3.7), suggesting that reward for application is mainly associated with existential aspects of 
eudaimonic well-being in Iran. But, contrary to this hypothesis, in the UK student sample, 
reward for application was unrelated to all aspects of subjective and psychological well-being 
(see Table 3.8). 
That reward for application was positively correlated with some aspects of well-being in Iran 
was in line with the results of past studies. This belief domain has been found to relate 
positively to life satisfaction (Chen et al., 2006; Mak et al., 2010), better social and 
interpersonal functioning (Joshanloo et al., 2010), self-esteem (Lam et al., 2010), and 
negatively to suicidal ideation, depressive cognition, and perceived stress (Chen et al., 2009).   
Surprisingly, reward for application (a belief that effort is instrumental to overcoming 
problems and difficulties) was not significantly correlated with eudaimonic well-being 
indicators like autonomy and environmental mastery, which capture internal locus of control. 
Results of this study and past studies do not seem to help explain this finding. Future studies 
should explore the reasons for this pattern of result in the Iranian sample. 
Reward for application was positively correlated with existential aspects of well-being 
(personal growth and purpose in life) in Iran. Although at first glance, these aspects of well-
being may seem irrelevant to reward for application, these findings can be taken to indicate 
that for Iranian young adults to find meaning and direction in their lives and have a sense of 
continued growth and development in life, a certain level of internal locus of control is 
needed. This is particularly relevant in the Iranian culture, which is relatively more 
collectivistic-traditional than the British culture. In Iran, family structure is more hierarchical 
and the children in the family are supposed to conform to the desires and decisions of their 
parents in important domains of their life (e.g., selection of job, course of study, wife and 
husband, etc.). It is likely that in such a context, those scoring higher on reward for 
application perceive themselves as having more freedom in making their decisions on their 
own and based on their own personal wishes, and this may lead to a sense of purpose in life 
and personal growth.  
Another pathway from reward for application to eudaimonic well-being could be optimal 
coping styles. Safdar et al. (2006) found that reward for application positively predicted 
active coping in Iran. Reward for application has been also found to correlate positively with 
cognitive flexibility (Singelis et al., 2003), and accommodation, compromise, and 
collaboration conflict resolution styles (Bond et al., 2004), which are all related to better 
adaptation and higher well-being.  
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Hypothesis 3 
This hypothesis predicted that social complexity would be positively related to indicators of 
well-being in both nations. This hypothesis received support in the Iranian sample. Social 
complexity was positively correlated with personal growth, environmental mastery, and 
purpose in life in Iran (see Table 3.7), suggesting that there is significant relation between 
this axiom dimension and some aspects of eudaimonic well-being. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, in the UK student sample, social complexity was unrelated to all aspects of 
subjective and psychological well-being. 
Previous findings related to social complexity are mixed and inconclusive. Past studies 
conducted mainly in East Asia have documented a negative link between this belief domain 
and aspects of subjective well-being and functioning. It has been found to be a negative 
correlate of life satisfaction (Chen et al., 2006; Lai, Bond, &Hui, 2007). Moreover, past 
research in East Asia has documented positive links between this variable and psychache and 
perceived burdensomeness (Lam et al., 2010). However, it is also noteworthy that some 
studies in East Asia have found that this variable is unrelated to negative functioning and 
well-being (e.g., Chen et al., 2009). 
However, two past studies in Iran have revealed that social complexity has positive 
consequences for individuals’ well-being. Safdar et al.’s study (2006) demonstrated that 
social complexity positively predicted life satisfaction in Iran. Furthermore, Joshanloo et al. 
(2010) found that this axiom dimension was positively related to gratitude, connectedness to 
nature, perspective taking, and empathic concern. Social complexity has also been found to 
be positively related to empathy and amicability and negatively correlated with hostility 
(Dinca& Iliescu, 2009) in Romania.  
I agree with Hui and Hui (2009) that this variable is likely to have a different effect in 
different situations. For example, in contemporary Iran, considering that the country is 
currently ruled by a theocratic regime, which is generally trying not to consider non-
traditional ways of doing things, and because generally Iranian youths are demanding their 
more traditional parents to demonstrate more tolerance and understanding, endorsing social 
complexity beliefs has a significant role to play. In other words, now that the Iranian society 
is in transition from traditional-hierarchical ways to more democratic and modern ways of 
being, such variables as social complexity (which involves acknowledging complexity and 
difference in views) become more important.  
Social complexity may function through the mediator variable of perspective taking. 
Perspective taking refers to spontaneous attempts to adopt the perspectives of other people 
and see things from their point of view (Davis, 1980). Social complexity refers to the belief in 
68 
 
multiple ways of achieving a given outcome, and agreement that human behaviour is variable 
across situations. Clearly, endorsement of social complexity beliefs facilitates perspective 
taking. Interestingly, consistent with this idea, social complexity has been found to be 
positively associated with such variables as egalitarian political attitudes (Leung & Bond, 
2002). Thus, it can be suggested that in the Iranian context, social complexity contributes to 
well-being through perspective taking. This idea deserves to be further investigated in future 
studies.  
Joshanloo et al. (2010) showed that social complexity beliefs are positively correlated with 
gratitude in Iran. Emmons et al. (2003) point out that the expression of gratitude is beneficial 
for the health and vitality of both citizenry and society. Positive psychologists believe that 
gratitude is a human strength in that it enhances one’s personal and relational well-being and 
is possibly beneficial for society as a whole (Emmons & Shelton, 2002). Considering that 
Iran is a Muslim country where gratitude towards God and others is considered a virtue 
contributing to positive mental well-being and functioning, gratitude also can be considered 
as one of the potential mediators of the relation between social complexity and eudaimonic 
well-being in Iran.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
This hypothesis predicted that fate control would be negatively related to indicators of well-
being in both nations. This hypothesis was supported in the Iranian sample. Fate control was 
negatively correlated with autonomy (see Table 3.7). This hypothesis was also supported in 
the UK student sample. Fate control was negatively correlated with autonomy, environmental 
mastery, personal growth, positive relations, and purpose in life in the UK sample. It was also 
positively correlated with negative affect in the UK student sample (see Table 3.8). 
The results are at odds with those of past studies. Whereas past research has generally 
documented a non-significant correlation between fate control and indicators of social and 
interpersonal functioning (Joshanloo, et al., 2010), life satisfaction, and suicidal ideation 
(Lam et al., 2010), in this study, this belief domain was found to be significantly and 
negatively correlated with multiple aspects of functioning in both nations. It is likely that the 
use of different outcome variables used in the present study and the previous studies explain 
the inconsistent findings regarding fate control. Moreover, past research has been conducted 
mainly in East Asian cultures, but this study used one sample from Middle East and one from 
Europe. Nevertheless, the conclusion that fate control has more pronounced negative 
consequences in Iran and England (or generally in non-East Asian cultures) seems to be 
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premature as some of the outcome variables used in this study have not been used in East 
Asian cultures before.    
A person who endorses fatalistic beliefs believes that he or she can do little to change a 
situation. However, in “fate control, there is also the proactive component that fate can be 
improved by the individual's active and judicious intervention, which is adaptive in meeting 
the challenges of difficult living construed as imposed by fate” (Zhou, Leung, Bond, 2009, p. 
367). The results of this study indicate that, in the two samples used here, the control 
component of the fate control apparently cannot neutralize the fatalistic component’s 
negative consequences, and this leads to lower well-being. As expected, fate control was 
negatively correlated with autonomy (in both nations) and environmental mastery (in 
England), indicating that this axiom dimension is associated with external locus of control in 
these two nations.   
The findings revealed that fate control has more pronounced negative effects in the UK 
students than in Iranian students. This difference might be explained considering the 
differences between religious affiliations of the two samples. Whereas almost all the Iranian 
participants were Muslim, most of the UK students were not Muslim. According to Islam, all 
events happening in the universe (including human being’s actions) are predetermined: 
 
“And with Him are the keys of the unseen; none knoweth them but he. 
And He knoweth whatsoever is in the land and the sea. Not a leaf falleth 
but he knoweth it, nor a seed-grain groweth in the darkness of the earth, 
nor aught of fresh or dry but is in a Book luminous.” (Quran, 6:59)2 
 
“And ye shall not will unless it be that Allah, the Lord of the worlds, 
willeth.” (Quran, 81:29). 
 
In Muslim cultures, acceptance of everything that happens and not complaining about 
negative events in one’s life are considered virtuous. A Muslim is taught to rely on and 
accept God’s will in all aspects of his life. In contrast, in the Western cultures (like England), 
where independence, goal-orientation as well as instrumental practices and ideas in 
organizing social relations are emphasised, a predominant form of action tends to be using 
one’s individual goals, desires, judgments, and other internal attributes to cause changes in 
the environment. This form of action is called primary control, which is supposed to be the 
                                                          
2 . Obtained from: http://quranexplorer.com 
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opposite of the secondary control which is prevalent in non-Western countries (Kitayama, 
Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984).  
In sum, Muslim cultures are much more likely than Western cultures to accept fatalism and in 
general accepting one’s fate and staying grateful to God in all situations is socially 
prescribed. Thus, in Iranian culture although fatalism undermines the person’s autonomy, it 
may not have any significant effects on other aspects of psychological functioning, whereas 
in the British culture it may have more far-reaching effects on more dimensions of well-
being. As mentioned before, findings of this study also showed that Iranian students scored 
significantly higher than UK students on fate control, which is consistent with this line of 
reasoning.  
 
 
Hypothesis 5 
This hypothesis predicted that religiosity would be positively related to indicators of well-
being in both nations. This hypothesis was supported by the results of the correlation analyses 
in the Iranian sample. Religiosity was positively correlated with environmental mastery, 
personal growth, purpose in life, and self-acceptance (see Table 3.7). It was also inversely 
correlated with negative affect. But contrary to this hypothesis, religiosity was unrelated to 
aspects of well-being in the UK student sample (see Table 3.8). 
The patterns of results obtained in the UK student sample were in line with those of past 
studies conducted in East Asia. Empirical studies, conducted mainly in China, generally 
indicate that this belief domain is unrelated to aspects of well-being (Mak et al., 2010), 
perceived stress, depressive cognition, self-esteem (Chen et al., 2009), and suicidal ideation 
(Chen et al., 2009; Lam et al., 2010). However, in the present study, it was found that 
religiosity was positively and significantly correlated with multiple aspects of well-being in 
the Iranian sample.  
These findings might be interpreted in view of the dominant religious influence in the Iranian 
sample. Islam “is not merely a religion, but a code of life. On the one hand, it establishes a 
relationship between the individual and his or her Creator and, on the other hand; it postulates 
one’s relationship with the community and this world” (Murken & Shah 2002, p. 249). In a 
theocratic society like Iran, socio-political arrangements formally organise daily life around 
Islamic principles. Obviously, living in a Muslim country is different from living in secular 
countries (like England). In a country like Iran where all the religious laws are enforced by 
the government in the public domains of life and nonconformity with Islamic rules may be 
harshly punished, religious people are likely to be better off. Indeed, prior studies have 
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documented strong correlations between religiousness and mental well-being in Iranian 
samples (e.g., Hadianfar, 2005). Since the Iranian population is religiously homogeneous and 
is ruled by a theocracy, which actively tries to enforce Islamic laws, it can be suggested that 
low religiosity would lead to higher levels of cultural estrangement in Iran. Cultural 
estrangement is conceptualized as discrepancies between personal value priorities and 
perceived societal values, which may lead to lowered well-being (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 
1998).  
Another possible mediator between religiosity and well-being in Iran might be gratitude. 
Joshanloo et al., (2010) showed that religiosity was positively associated with gratitude in 
Iran. As mentioned earlier, gratitude towards God and others is one of the most fundamental 
aspects of Islam. Gratitude has been suggested to be a positive predictor of well-being across 
cultures (Wood et al., 2009). 
Hypotheses 6-7 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 predicted that social axioms would predict subjective and psychological 
well-being over and above nation. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test these 
hypotheses. Results supported these two hypotheses. Findings showed that after controlling 
for country, social cynicism significantly predicted subjective well-being, indicating that this 
variable is a significant predictor of subjective well-being over and above the influence of 
country. Findings also showed that after controlling for nation, social cynicism (negatively) 
and social complexity (positively) predicted psychological well-being, suggesting that these 
two variables are predictive of psychological well-being in both samples. 
The present study extended prior research by showing that social complexity can be a 
positive predictor of well-being in some cultures. Prior research (conducted mainly in East 
Asia) has documented a negative relation between this variable and well-being. However, this 
study together with two past studies in Iran (Joshanloo et al, 2010; Safdar et al., 2006) and a 
study in Romania (Dinca & Iliescu, 2009) show that this variable can be a positive predictor 
of well-being in cultures other than East Asian.  
Although the bivariate correlation between this variable and individual aspects of 
psychological well-being was not statistically significant in England, in the regression 
analysis this variable significantly predicted psychological well-being over and above 
country. This is probably due to using the aggregate score of psychological well-being in the 
regression analysis, compared to using individual well-being dimensions in the correlation 
analyses. Moreover, it is noteworthy that although the correlations between this variable and 
aspects of psychological well-being are not significant in England they are positive. For 
instance, this variable is positively correlated with personal growth (r= .11) and self-
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acceptance (r= .16) in the UK student sample. At any rate, social complexity is a stronger 
predictor of well-being in Iran than in England.  
 
 
Hypotheses 8-9 
Hypotheses 8 and 9 predicted that social axioms would predict subjective and psychological 
well-being over and above the country and the Big Five personality factors.  The results of 
the present study showed that social axioms predicted subjective and psychological well-
being over and above country and the Big Five. Social cynicism predicted subjective well-
being after controlling for the influence of country and the Big Five. And social complexity 
predicted psychological well-being after factoring out the influence of country and the Big 
Five.  
Social axioms are distinct constructs that can add predictive power in psychological 
investigations, over and above that provided by personality constructs. Past studies show that 
social axioms make unique contribution to explaining individual differences in some 
variables over and above the role of personality, values, and self-esteem. For example, Lam 
et al. (2010) found that social axioms made unique contributions to explaining individual 
differences in suicidal ideation over and above those of Big Five personality factors. They 
suggested their findings support the position that beliefs and personality traits are 
conceptually and functionally distinct individual differences.  
Chen et al. (2006) found that social axioms added predictive power over and above the 
effects of self-esteem and personality on life satisfaction among Chinese respondents. They 
argued that one’s assessment of the social world ‘out there’ can explain variance in addition 
to self-evaluation as measured by self-esteem and personality in one’s overall judgment about 
life. In another study, Bond et al. (2004) used hierarchical regression to establish that social 
axioms added predictive power over and above that provided by basic human values on styles 
of conflict resolution, vocational choice, and coping styles. They found that many specific 
relationships between social axioms and the behavioural tendencies examined were 
significant, after the effects of value orientations were factored out in the hierarchical 
regression.  
The point should be taken into consideration that on the one hand, the results indicated a 
relationship between all aspects of social axioms and well-being in the Iranian sample, but 
only the two aspects of social cynicism and fate control had significant relationships with 
some aspects of well-being in the UK student sample. On the other hand, the results showed 
that students living in the UK are more extroverted and emotionally stable compared to the 
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Iranian sample. The question is how these personality traits explain the variation in the 
results?  
In Study 1 (Chapter 3), the roles of personality and country were statistically controlled, and 
the results revealed that there was a significant relationship between some components of 
social axiom and subjective and psychological well-being even after controlling the effects of 
country and personality traits.  
On this basis the differences in personality traits between different cultural groups seemingly 
cannot explain the variation, but it can be attributed to other factors. 
The findings of the present study are consistent with past research and add to the literature by 
showing that social axioms can add unique contribution to explaining aspects of hedonic and 
eudaimonic well-being over and above personality factors in Iranian and British students. 
 
Summary of the Findings 
This study examined the relationship between social axioms and both hedonic and 
eudaimonic aspects of well-being in an Iranian and a UK students sample. Two main 
strengths of the present study are: 
1- In this study, a comprehensive set of well-being scales were used to assess multiple aspects 
of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Prior research is limited in that it has only focused on 
the relation between social axioms and a few aspects of well-being (mainly life satisfaction), 
and the distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic well-being has been ignored by 
researchers. Specifically, this study has added to the literature by showing that social axioms 
have significant associations with aspects of eudaimonic well-being, which have been largely 
neglected in previous research. 
2- This study included samples from two nations which are noticeably different from each 
other in terms of cultural, religious, economic, social, and political characteristics. This 
allowed examining if country can influence the relationship between social axioms and 
aspects of well-being. 
All the hypotheses of the study were supported by the data at least in one of the countries. 
The relationship between social axioms and aspects of well-being was stronger in Iran than 
the England. That is, the hypotheses were more strongly supported in Iran than England. I 
will try to partly explain this difference in the General Discussion (Chapter 7) of the present 
thesis.  
It is important to note that the present findings highlight the fact that in some cases axiom 
dimensions relate differentially to various aspects of well-being. For example, it turns out that 
social complexity is more strongly related to eudaimonic well-being than hedonic well-being. 
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Such findings further attest to the fact that the distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic 
aspects of well-being is empirically and conceptually warranted in Iranian and UK students 
samples. This issue will be elaborately discussed in the General Discussion (Chapter 7) of 
this thesis.  
In the present study, I found that social cynicism was the most important and robust predictor 
of subjective well-being when the contribution of nation and personality was partialled out. I 
also found that social complexity was the strongest and most robust predictor of 
psychological well-being over and above the role of nation and personality. I was interested 
in further examining the mechanisms of these relationships. Study 2 (the next chapter) of this 
thesis was designed towards this end. Two variables were chosen as candidate mediators of 
these relationships: mindful acceptance and perspective taking. More specifically, Study 2 
examined whether mindful acceptance would mediate the relationship between social 
cynicism and subjective well-being, and whether perspective taking would mediate the 
relationship between social complexity and psychological well-being.   
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Chapter 4 
Study 2 
Mediators of the Relationship between Social Axioms and Well-
Being 
 
Introduction 
The findings of Study 1 revealed that social cynicism and social complexity were significant 
predictors of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being over and above the Big Five personality 
factors both in England and Iran. More specifically, based on the previous findings social 
cynicism can be considered the strongest predictor of subjective well-being, and social 
complexity can be considered the strongest predictor of eudaimonic well-being in both 
Iranian and UK student samples.  
Study 1 and previous studies conducted by other researchers have largely focused on the 
effects of social beliefs on certain outcomes. Another important question is what the 
underlying mechanisms of these effects are. In explaining the findings of Study 1, I 
speculated about some of these mechanisms. For example, I suggested that the relationship 
between social cynicism and mental well-being may be partially mediated by mindfulness, 
and that the relationship between social complexity and well-being may be partially mediated 
by perspective taking.  The relationship between social cynicism and well-being may be 
affected by mediator variables. One of these mediator variables could be mindfulness. 
Mindfulness is commonly defined as the process of ‘paying attention in a particular way: on 
purpose, in the present moment, nonjudgmentally’ (Kabat-Zinn 1994, p. 4). 
The mediating role of mindfulness can be assessed by considering its components. A basic 
component of mindfulness is acceptance without judgment and reaction. This non-judging 
acceptance paves the way for acquiring vitality (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, pp. 4-5) and could affect 
well-being (Bear, 2006). 
Mindfulness is influenced by social factors both theoretically and empirically. In theory, it 
seems that those people who tend to social cynicism have a social evaluation and judgment, 
which is in contradiction with the emphasized non-judgment in mindfulness, and then will 
experience negative thoughts. The lower the social cynicism the higher the non-judging 
acceptance, meaning that an individual is subject to higher mindfulness and less likely to 
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non-adaptive coping mechanisms which impair his/her well-being. In contrast, individuals 
with higher social cynicism tend less to non-judging acceptance or mindfulness and they are 
subject to the abovementioned mechanisms (Herbert & Cardaciotto, 2005). 
When mindfulness increases, our ability to stand back and observe conditions like anxiety 
increases as well. Therefore, not only can we break up our automatic behavioural patterns and 
not be any longer under the control of conditions such as anxiety and fear through re-
comprehension, but also, we can use the information arising from these conditions and 
associate ourselves with emotions and thus improve our psychological well-being (Shapiro, 
2006). 
Also, I suggested that the relationship between social complexity and well-being may be 
partially mediated by perspective taking. Retaining behavioural flexibility in different 
situations (social complexity), especially interpersonal situations, may require that a person 
can understand others’ situations and motives and see the situation from others’ points of 
view and perspectives (perspective taking) because interpreting their actions is not possible 
without this ability (Wu & Keysar, 2007). Perspective taking helps those who are socially 
excluded to ask themselves at the first step why they were excluded (Knowles, 2014) or 
failed to face a social situation correctly. Hence, the relationship between social complexity 
and perspective taking is predictable and previous studies have confirmed it (e.g. Joshanloo, 
Afshari, and Rastegar, 2010).  
On the other hand, the relationship between perspective taking and variables like satisfaction 
with life (Gaderman, Schonert-Reichl, and Zumbo, 2010), that will be reviewed later, 
nominates it as a candidate for the mediator role in the relationship between social 
complexity and well-being although other variables, e.g. achievement, could play the 
mediator role in the relationship between social beliefs and well-being. 
Given that these hypotheses have not been tested to date, the present study was designed to 
test them. The reason the present study focused on the underlying mechanisms of the effects 
of social complexity and social cynicism, and not other social axiom domains, was that in 
Study 1 these two variables were found to be the strongest predictors of well-being when 
partialling out the effects of country and the personality traits.   
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Mindfulness and its Relationship with Mental Well-being 
 
In the last decade, there has been increased interest in the concept of ‘mindfulness’, with a 
growing number of psychologists demonstrating an enthusiasm to study it. Psychotherapists 
have become very keen on using the techniques of mindfulness, and to integrate them into 
their therapeutic work. Salmon, Santorelli, and Kabat-Zinn (1998) documented that there 
were more than 240 therapeutic programmes using mindfulness-based techniques up to 1998, 
and this number has increased by now. Examples include mindfulness-based stress reduction 
(MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 1999), and dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993). 
The construct of mindfulness dates back to Buddha’s teachings. In the Buddhist tradition, 
mindfulness has been referred to as “bare attention” or “a nondiscursive registering of events 
without reaction or mental evaluation, which emphasizes the process of sustained attention 
rather than the content to what are attended” (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & 
Farrow, 2008, p. 205). The fact that the concept has its roots in the Buddhist tradition, 
however, does not mean that it can only be applied to Buddhists. In contemporary 
psychology, the training and practice of mindfulness can be effectively adopted by all 
individuals no matter what their religious, philosophical, or cultural background is 
(Melbourne Academic Mindfulness Interest Group, 2006).  
In contemporary psychology, many psychologists have tried to conceptualise mindfulness. 
Mindfulness is typically regarded as a particular way of paying attention in the present 
moment. Kabat-Zinn (2003) defines mindfulness as "the awareness that emerges through 
paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of 
experience, moment by moment” (p. 145). Likewise, Marlatt and Kristeller (1999) described 
mindfulness as “bringing one’s complete attention to the present experience on a moment-to-
moment basis” (p. 68). More recently, Cardaciotto et al. (2008) conceptualized mindfulness 
as “the tendency to be highly aware of one’s internal and external experiences in the context 
of an accepting, nonjudgmental stance toward those experiences” (p. 205, italics in the 
original). In a state of mindfulness, thoughts and feelings are considered events, and the 
person does not react to them automatically and habitually. Rather, this kind of self-
observation introduces a ‘space’ between one’s perceptions and responses, and accordingly 
the person can respond to the situations more reflectively (Bishop, et al., 2004).  
Two components of mindfulness have been emphasised in the literature: awareness and 
acceptance (for reviews see Bishop, 2004; Cardaciotto et al., 2008). Below, these two 
components are briefly introduced. 
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Awareness. Awareness is characterised as a continuous monitoring of experience with a 
focus on current experience rather than preoccupation with past or future events (Cardaciotto 
et al., 2008; Deikman, 1996). This involves successful regulation of attention and 
concentration (Astin, 1997; Bishop, 2004). A core process of mindfulness is a state of 
“psychological freedom” that occurs when attention remains unfocused, without attachment 
to any particular thing or point of view (Martin, 2002). This unbiased receptivity of mind 
facilitates insight into reality, wherein phenomena that would otherwise remain hidden are 
noticed (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). Rather than getting caught up in ruminative, 
elaborative thought streams about one’s experience, awareness facilitates non-elaborative 
awareness of thoughts, feelings, and sensations as they arise. Mindfulness thus involves a 
direct experience of events in the mind and body (Bishop, 2004; Teasdale, Segal, Williams, 
& Mark, 1995). 
Acceptance. In a state of mindfulness, present-moment awareness is conducted 
nonjudgmentally, with an attitude of acceptance, openness, and compassion toward one’s 
experience (Cardaciotto et al., 2008). In this state, one should act as an impartial witness to 
one’s own experience (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), that is, to abandon one’s tendency to categorise 
and judge one’s experiences. In other words, acceptance involves letting go of one’s intention 
to have a different experience and involves an active process of staying experientially open to 
current thoughts, feelings, and sensations (Bishop, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). 
The mindful mode of processing is pre- or para-conceptual (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Brown, 
Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Teasdale, 1999), that is, “it does not compare, categorize, or 
evaluate, nor does it contemplate, introspect, reflect, or ruminate upon events or experiences 
based on memory” (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007, p. 213). 
Acceptance allows for increased contact with distressing stimuli (Cardaciotto et al., 2008), 
and facilitates a direct contact with uncomfortable realities or experiences (Brown, Ryan, 
Creswell, 2007). This is mainly because adopting a stance of curiosity and acceptance 
eventually leads to a reduction in the use of cognitive and behavioural strategies to avoid 
aspects of experience and therefore contributes to improved affect tolerance (Bishop, 2004). 
Mindfulness and well-being. Mindfulness has been consistently found to be associated with 
positive mental health. Brown and Ryan (2003) found that mindfulness was correlated 
positively with positive affect, self-esteem, life satisfaction, and optimism and negatively 
with negative affect, anxiety, and depression. Using the Symptom Checklist (SCL-90; 
Derogatis, 1977) to assess psychological distress, Walach et al. (2006) found that 
mindfulness was negatively correlated with global psychological distress. Cardaciotto et al. 
(2008) reported a negative correlation between mindfulness and anxiety and depression. They 
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also found that a nonclinical student sample scored significantly higher on mindfulness than a 
clinical sample.  
Past research has also documented a negative correlation between mindfulness and 
neuroticism (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer et al., 2006), which is associated with 
negative affectivity and mental illness. Two meta-analyses (Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & 
Walach, 2004; Baer, 2003) have found significant relationships between mindfulness and 
mental health indicators as well. Finally, mindfulness has also been found to have positive 
implications for mental health in Iran. For example, Ghorbani, Watson, and Weathington 
(2009) revealed that mindfulness predicted greater self-esteem and subjective well-being and 
lower levels of anxiety, depression, perceived stress, and impaired control over mental 
activities in Iranian university students. 
Brown and Ryan (2003) argue that mindfulness can add clarity and vividness to current 
experience and encourage closer, moment-to-moment sensory contact with life. Apart from 
this, it has been suggested that mindfulness boosts mental health indirectly and through some 
intervening variables. For example, Brown, Ryan, and Creswell (2007) suggest that 
mindfulness may operate through the enhancement of “self-regulated functioning” associated 
with ongoing attentional sensitivity to psychological, somatic, and environmental cues. 
Another mechanism suggested by the researchers is ruminative thinking. Ruminative thinking 
is associated with depression and anxiety (Siegle, Moore, & Thase, 2004). The ability to 
control effectively the focus of attention, and attention to the present moment (i.e., high 
mindfulness) are believed by some researchers to prevent ruminative thinking (Baer, 2003), 
which in turn contributes to positive mental health.  
 
Perspective Taking and its Relationship with Mental Well-Being 
 
Perspective taking is defined as a tendency or ability of the respondent to adopt the 
perspective, or point of view, of other people (Davis, 1980). In other words, perspective 
taking is a process where a person places himself or herself in another person’s shoes to 
obtain an understanding of that person’s thoughts and feelings. It is an interpersonal process 
that involves “decentering” or a conscious effort to differentiate one’s personal view from the 
view of another (Hogan 1969, Lobchuck, 2006). Perspective taking is considered to be the 
cognitive dimension of empathy (Williams, 1990; Stephen & Finlay, 1999, see also Davis, 
1980). In a study involving twins, it was found that emotional components of empathy (such 
as emphatic concern) are more heritable than perspective taking (Davis, Luce, & Karus, 
1994), which is a basically learned cognitive skill.  
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Perspective taking has been shown to be associated with lower interpersonal aggression 
(Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, & Signo, 1994), higher relationship satisfaction 
(Franzoi, Davis, & Young, 1995), more valuing of outgroup members (e.g., Galinsky, Ku, & 
Wang, 2005), and less stereotyping and stigmatising attitudes towards many minorities and 
groups (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). It is also associated 
with successful conflict resolution (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008) and greater 
cooperation (Parker & Axtell, 2001). Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, and Galinsky (2011) 
found that perspective taking attenuated automatic expressions of racial bias. 
Perspective taking has been found to correlate positively with life satisfaction, self-efficacy, 
and optimism in children (Gadermann, Schonert-Reichl, & Zumbo, 2010). Past research has 
also documented a positive link between perspective taking and connectedness to nature in 
American samples (Mayer & Frantz, 2004). Finally, in an Iranian university student sample, 
Joshanloo, Afshari, and Rastegar (2010) found that perspective taking was positively 
correlated with gratitude, connectedness to nature, and emphatic concern. It can be concluded 
that perspective taking, as a cognitive skill, contributes to different aspects of mental well-
being.  
In sum, both mindfulness and perspective-taking have been found to be positively associated 
with mental well-being. I will outline below why these two variables may mediate the 
relationship between social cynicism and mental well-being as well as social complexity and 
well-being, respectively. 
 
Hypotheses 
Social cynicism refers to a negative view of human nature, a view that life produces 
unhappiness, that people exploit others, and a mistrust of social institutions. Prior research 
suggests that those high in social cynicism are more attentive to negative events and ignore 
positive events in their lives. According to Leung et al. (2010), people high in social cynicism 
attend to and register negative events and unfavourable outcomes that occur to other people 
as well as to themselves. Those high on social cynicism tend to stick to their pessimistic 
beliefs even in the face of events disproving those beliefs. Such a tendency suggests that the 
individual does not view the world mindfully and non-judgmentally. In view of this, it can be 
suggested that social cynicism is negatively related to mindfulness.  
 As suggested above, mindfulness can be defined as a receptive attention to and awareness of 
present events and experiences (Brown & Ryan, 2003). In other words, it is “the awareness 
that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-
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judgmentally to the unfolding of experience, moment by moment” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 
145). Social cynicism seems to be more connected to the acceptance component of 
mindfulness than the awareness component. The acceptance component of mindfulness refers 
to abandoning one’s tendency to categorise and judge one’s experiences. In other words, 
acceptance involves abandoning one’s intention to have a different experience and an active 
process of staying experientially open to the current thoughts, feelings, and sensations 
(Bishop, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Given that cynicism comes with a high 
level of judgementality, it seems to be at odds with mindful acceptance. On this basis, it can 
be suggested that lowered mindfulness is one of the mechanisms through which social 
cynicism harms mental health. In other words, it is suggested here that mindful acceptance 
mediates the relationship between social cynicism and well-being. Given the more intuitive 
conceptual link between social cynicism and the acceptance component, the present study 
included only a measure of mindful acceptance.   
Prior empirical findings support this mediation hypothesis. Mindfulness has been found to 
correlate negatively with neuroticism (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Baer et al., 2006), which 
is a positive correlate of social cynicism (Chen et al., 2006). Mindfulness has also been found 
to correlate positively with optimism (Brown & Ryan, 2003), which is roughly the opposite 
of social cynicism. Past research also shows that a lower negativity bias (i.e., the tendency to 
weight negative information, events, or emotions more than positive ones) is associated with 
higher mindfulness (Kiken & Shook, 2011). Mindfulness is also associated with fewer 
cognitive errors (Herndon, 2008). Therefore, it can be hypothesised that the acceptance 
component of mindfulness mediates the relationship between social cynicism and subjective 
well-being. Since social cynicism was the strongest predictor of subjective well-being (see 
Study 1), this hypothesis can be stated as the following: 
 
1- Mindful acceptance partially mediates the relationship between social cynicism and 
subjective well-being. 
As mentioned earlier, perspective taking refers to spontaneous attempts to adopt the 
perspectives of other people and see things from their point of view (Davis, 1980). This 
concept seems to be clearly associated with the concept of social complexity, which refers to 
the belief in multiple ways of achieving a given outcome, and the belief that human 
behaviour is variable across situations. It can, therefore, be suggested that endorsement of 
social complexity beliefs facilitates perspective taking. Past empirical research in Iran 
supports this prediction. Using a sample of Iranian students, Joshanloo et al. (2010) 
documented a positive correlation between social complexity and perspective taking.  
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We also know that perspective taking is generally related to positive well-being (e.g., 
Gadermann et al., 2010). Therefore, it can be hypothesised that social complexity contributes 
to eudaimonic well-being through the mediation agency of perspective taking. Since 
perspective taking was the strongest predictor of psychological well-being (see Study 1), this 
hypothesis can be stated as the following: 
 
2- Perspective taking partially mediates the relationship between social complexity and 
psychological well-being.  
 
As a secondary aim, this study applied a measure of social desirability to exclude the 
possibility that the correlations between the two belief domains (i.e., social cynicism and 
social complexity, respectively) and aspects of well-being are affected by participants’ 
tendency to respond to questions in a socially desirable manner. Social desirability has been 
defined as "a need for social approval and acceptance and the belief that this can be attained 
by means of culturally acceptable and appropriate behaviours" (Marlowe & Crowne, 1961, p. 
109). A socially desirable style of response is used either to unconsciously repress thoughts 
and feelings that are psychologically threatening, or to consciously distort responses in order 
to self-enhance (Paulhus, 1984, 1989). A high correlation between social desirability 
measures and any psychological scale raises concern about the validity of that scale. 
Considering that all of the measures in this study and Study 1 were based on the self-report of 
participants, in the present study, the contribution of social desirability was partialled out to 
see if the correlation between the predictors (i.e., social cynicism and social complexity, 
respectively) and the hypothesised outcomes (subjective well-being and psychological well-
being) would remain significant.  
 
Method 
Participants 
  The participants in this study were 72 Iranian university students, because from the outset, 
the basis and purpose of the study was to compare Iranians living in Iran with Iranians living 
in the UK.  
As mentioned in Study 1, convenience sampling was used for the students at the University 
of Tehran, and those who were randomly available at the moment of sampling were selected 
as the sample. For this purpose, the sample included those students having both 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees who were visiting the university's campus and 
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library, or those who had volunteered to participate in the study in response to a talk with 
them.  
Of the sample, 34 were female students (47.2%) and 38 were male students. Sixty-nine 
participants were undergraduates and the remaining two participants were graduate students 
(one student did not answer this question). Age ranged from 18 to 27, with a mean of 21.10 
(SD = 2.05). Forty-four students reported that they had no partner, 24 reported that they were 
“in a relationship but not living with partner”, one reported that he was “in a relationship and 
living with partner”, one reported that her partner was dead, and one student did not answer 
this question. Sixty-eight students reported that they had no jobs and two students reported 
that they had part-time jobs.  
Forty-two, six, 17, and four reported their ethnicity to be Fars, Kurd, Turk, and Lor, 
respectively, and three students chose “others”. Seventy students reported being Muslims and 
two students did not self-report their religion. In response to the question: “Do you consider 
that you are actively practising your religion?”, 34 chose “no” and 35 chose “yes”. Three 
students did not answer this question.  
Four of the students reported that their fathers were illiterate. Twelve reported their fathers’ 
highest educational qualification to be elementary school diploma, four secondary school 
diplomas, 22 high school diplomas, 10 junior college diplomas, 10 bachelor’s degrees, and 
eight master’s degree. One student did not know the answer to this question, and one student 
did not report his or her father’s educational qualification. Six of the students reported that 
their mothers were illiterate. Ten reported their mothers’ highest educational qualification to 
be elementary school diploma, 11 secondary school diplomas, 24 high school diplomas, five 
junior college diplomas, 13 bachelor’s degrees, one master’s degree, and one PhD. One of the 
students did not report his or her mother’s educational qualification. 
 
 
Measures 
In addition to social cynicism, social complexity, affect balance, life satisfaction, and 
psychological well-being scales (as described in Study 1), three other scales were applied.  
Perspective taking. The perspective taking subscale of the Empathy Questionnaire (Davis, 
1980) was used to measure this construct in the current study. This scale contains seven items 
(e.g., “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.”), which 
assess spontaneous attempts to adopt the perspectives of other people and see things from 
their point of view. Respondents indicated for each question how well the items described 
them on a 5-point scale anchored by 1 “does not describe me well” and 5 “describes me very 
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well”. The questionnaire content including the aforementioned sub-scale was fully validated 
in an Iranian (Farsi speaking) sample and the validity and reliability were confirmed. 
Feizabadi, Farzad, and Shahraray (2008) also examined and confirmed the validity in their 
study on a large group of male and female students at state universities in Tehran. The 7-item 
version of the subscale used in this study was previously involved in many other studies (e.g. 
Allah Qolilu, 2009; Zahid, Allah Qolilu, Abolghasemi, and Narimani, 2009; Feizabadi, 
Farzad, and Shahraray, 2007). 
 
Mindfulness. The acceptance subscale of the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto et 
al., 2008) was employed to assess mindful acceptance. Items (e.g., “I tell myself that I 
shouldn’t have certain thoughts.”) of this 10-item scale were rated on a 5-point scale with 
endpoints of 1 = never and 5 = very often. Cardaciotto et al. reported good levels of internal 
consistency for this scale. Convergent and discriminant validity of the subscales of the 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale have been established in prior research (Cardaciotto et al., 
2008), the questionnaire was validated in an Iranian student sample (e.g. Parto & Besharat, 
2011) and appropriate psychometric properties were reported (e.g. Parto, 2010). 
 
Social desirability. Paulhus’s Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 
1984) was applied for assessing social desirability. The BIDR consists of 40 items developed 
to assess a participant's tendency to give socially desirable responses. The items are rated on 
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not true to 7 = very true. Two subscales include self-
deception (e.g., “I am a completely rational person.”) and impression management (e.g., “I 
have never dropped litter on the street.”). The self-deceptive enhancement subscale measures 
honest but inflated self-descriptions that reflect an unconscious bias toward favourable self-
portrayal. The impression management subscale measures conscious inflated self-
descriptions, faking, or lying. Item No. 13 (“The reason I vote is because my vote can make a 
difference.”) of the self-deceptive enhancement was eliminated before administration of the 
questionnaire because of its political content (considering the unresolved post-election 
political crisis in Iran after the presidential election in 2009). According to its manual, this 
scale is dichotomously scored (Paulhus, 1991). After inversely keyed items were reversed, 
only extreme responses were counted. That is, 1 point was awarded for each "6" or "7" 
response on both self-deceptive enhancement and impression management items. The total 
score was computed by summing up scores of both subscales (Paulhus, 1984). 
Typical alphas are .67-.77 for self-deception enhancement, and .77-.85 for impression 
management (Paulhus, 1991). Test-retest correlations over a 5-week period were reported by 
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Paulhus (1991) to be 0.69 for self-deceptive enhancement, and 0.65 for impression 
management. This scale thus has satisfactory structural, concurrent, and discriminant validity 
(Paulhus, 1991). 
          Although a Farsi version is available, this has not been published. Therefore, to ensure 
accuracy, the English version was translated into Farsi by the researcher and a Farsi language 
expert. Examining the similarity between the new translation and the previous version 
showed that they were largely similar. The Farsi translated version was again translated back 
into English by a bilingual person, and the researcher was assured of the similarity. After 
ensuring the translation accuracy, a pilot study was conducted on a small sample of Iranian 
students, and none of the items were recognized as unacceptable or needing to be removed or 
modified. The questionnaire was then considered as the final questionnaire. In the study, the 
Cronbach's alpha obtained was 0.75, which was favourable. 
 
Results 
Statistical analysis revealed that the Cronbach’s alpha value for the perspective taking scale 
could be improved by omitting two of the items (items 1 and 4). By omission of these items, 
the Cronbach’s alpha value for the scale increased from .38 to .60. Joshanloo et al. (2010) 
report an alpha of .72 for this scale in an Iranian sample. They also needed to omit the first 
item to improve the internal consistency of the scale. 
Table 4.1 shows means, standard deviations, Cronbach alpha values, skewness and kurtosis 
scores of all variables of the study for both sexes. Prior to the analyses, all the variables of the 
study were examined for accuracy of data entry, missing values, outliers, and normality. 
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Table 4.1. Cronbach’s alpha values and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study 
 
   Total  
 
Females 
 
Males 
 
   
α 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Skewnes
s 
 Kurtosis 
PWB            
 Autonomy .6
1 
 
40.1 (7.3)  40.5 (8.6)  39.8 
(5.9) 
 .37  .16 
 Environmental mastery .7
3 
 
41.2 (8.0)  43.1 (8.1)  39.6 
(7.7) 
 -.24  .29 
 Personal growth .6
9 
 
44.1 (7.7)  46.2 (7.0)  42.1 
(7.9) 
 -.16  -.53 
 Positive relations .7
9 
 
45.5 (8.8)  48.7 (8.1)  42.8 
(8.6) 
 -.09  -.91 
 Purpose in life .7
5 
 
43.3 (8.7)  45.2 (7.8)  41.5 
(9.2) 
 -.24  -.06 
 Self-acceptance .7
7 
 
41.0 (8.8)  43.0 (8.2)  39.3 
(9.0) 
 -.23  .89 
 Total PWB .9
1 
 
253.8 
(36.4) 
 267.5 
(34.3) 
 241.6 
(34.1) 
 .06  -.41 
SWB            
 Life satisfaction .7
8 
 
22.1 (5.7)  24.4 (4.3)  20.0 
(6.1) 
 -.67 
 
.60 
 Positive affect .8
3 
 
19.33 (4.1)  19.9 (4.4)  18.7 
(3.9) 
 -.16  -.20 
 Negative affect .8
7 
 
14.8 (5.4)  14.4 (5.4)  15.1 
(5.4) 
 .35  -.70 
 Overall SWB -  00 (1.7)  .52 (1.3)  -.48 
(1.8) 
 -.55  -.04 
Social axioms            
 Social cynicism .7
8 
 
54.6 (8.8)  54.0 (9.8)  55.2 
(7.8) 
 .44 
 
.65 
 Social complexity 
.5
3 
 
44.1 (4.0)  45.4 (2.6)  43.0 
(4.7) 
 -.93  1.50 
Social desirability            
 Self-deceptive enhancement 
.6
1 
 
4.7 (2.7)  4.5 (2.4)  4.9 (3.0)  .42  -.26 
 Impression management 
.7
0 
 
6.2 (3.3)  6.5 (2.7)  6.0 (3.9)  .89  1.21 
 Overall social desirability 
.7
4 
 
11.0 (5.0)  11.1 (4.1)  11.0 
(5.8) 
 .36  -.01 
Mindfulness            
 Acceptance 
.6
2 
 
31.7 (5.3)  31.2 (5.3)  32.1 
(5.3) 
 -.21  
.44 
Empathy            
 Perspective taking 
.6
1 
 
16.8 (4.1)  17.2 (3.8)  16.5 
(4.3) 
 .17  
-.07 
Note. PWB = Psychological well-being; SWB = Subjective well-being 
 
 
Missing data. As a general rule, missing data on 5% or fewer of the cases can be ignored 
(Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). Analyses showed variables contained missing data on 
1.4% or fewer of the cases (ranging from 0 to 1.4%) in the sample. In view of this low rate of 
missing data, missing data does not appear to be a serious problem in this study. Therefore, 
no extra measures were taken. 
Outliers. To identify the univariate outliers, the variable score distributions were examined. 
One univariate outlier was detected. This case had an extremely low z score on social 
complexity (the criterion used for identifying of outliers was z scores in excess of the 
absolute value of 3.29, as proposed by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Based on the procedure 
proposed by Tabachnick and Fidell, to reduce the impact of this case on the analyses, a new 
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score was assigned to the outlying case on the variable in question that was one unit larger 
than the next most extreme score in the distribution. One multivariate outlier was also 
detected by means of inspection of Mahalanobis distances with p< .001. This case was 
excluded from the analyses. The final sample used for analyses, therefore, consisted of 71 
students.  
Normality. A further step was taken to examine the normality of the variables. For this 
purpose, the skewness and kurtosis scores of the variables were calculated. Skewness and 
kurtosis of all variables are demonstrated in Table 4.1. The results revealed that skewness and 
kurtosis scores of all variables were well within the generally accepted range of -2 to +2, 
indicating that deviation from normality was not considerable. Therefore, no extra corrective 
measures were needed.  
Gender differences. Gender differences for all variables of the study were examined using 
independent t tests. Results of the t tests showed that there were several significant gender 
differences: female students scored significantly higher than male students on social 
complexity, t (68) = 2.7, p = .009, overall psychological well-being, t (65) = 3.29, p = .002, 
life satisfaction, t (64.3) = 3. 4, p = .001, subjective well-being, t (68) = 2.69, p = .009, 
personal growth, t (68) = 2.44, p = .01, positive relationships, t (69) = 3.01, p = .004, and 
purpose in life t (68) = 2.04, p = .04.  
 
Bivariate intercorrelations. Table 4.2 shows the Pearson’s r intercorrelations for all 
variables measured in the study.  
Table 4.2. Pearson’s r intercorrelations for all study variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.Total psychological well-being 1               
2.Autonomy .48** 1              
3.Environmental mastery .82** .37** 1             
4.Personal growth .83** .35** .57** 1            
5.Positive relations .68** .11 .48** .58** 1           
6.Purpose in life .77** .26* .60** .65** .38** 1          
7.Self-acceptance .81** .25* .71** .54** .52** .61** 1         
8.Total subjective well-being .54** .09 .46** .33** .23* .51** .66** 1        
9.Life satisfaction .33** -.03 .26* .23* .11 .43** .47** .85** 1       
10.Positive affect .39** .09 .31** .15 .18 .31** .47** .70** .39** 1      
11.Negative affect -
.58** 
-
.23* 
-
.55** 
-
.38** 
-
.28* 
-
.43** 
-
.63** 
-
.74** 
-
.38** 
-
.45** 
1     
12.Social cynicism -
.43** 
-.09 
-
.47** 
-
.37** 
-
.40** 
-
.33** 
-
.46** 
-.17 -.03 -.09 .33** 1    
13.Social complexity .42** .23 .41** .41** .42** .27* .18 .18 .17 -.05 
-
.23* 
-.10 1   
14.Social desirability .16 .11 .21 .16 .15 .27* .12 .13 .09 .02 -.20 
-
.26* 
.06 1  
15.Perspective taking .25* .04 .28* .19 .33** .18 .23* .08 .01 .05 -.16 -.11 .27* .46** 1 
16.Mindful acceptance .06 .20 -.00 .01 -.02 .08 .03 .15 .01 .27* -.17 -.18 -.19 .05 
-
.17 
 
*  < 0.05 ** < 0.01 
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Main analyses 
 
The two hypotheses of the present study concern meditational relationships between certain 
variables. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), mediating factors are those that explain the 
relationship between predictor and outcome variables. “Mediators explain how external 
physical events take on internal psychological significance. Whereas moderator variables 
specify when certain effects will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur” (p. 
1176). In the present study, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method for mediation analysis was 
used to test the mediating relationships. Baron and Kenny introduced their method for 
mediation analysis in a landmark and far-reaching article, which is one of the most highly 
cited articles in the history of social sciences. According to Google Scholar, this article has 
been cited about 40000 times3. Baron and Kenny’s method posits that a variable may be 
considered a mediator if it meets the following conditions: 
 
a) The independent variable should be correlated with the outcome. 
b) The independent variable should be correlated with the mediator.  
c) The mediator should be correlated with the outcome.  
d) Lastly, a full mediation requires that the previously significant relationship between 
the outcome and independent variable is no longer significant when the mediator is controlled 
in a separate hierarchical regression. Partial mediation is the case in which the relationship 
between the predictor and the outcome is reduced in absolute size but is still different from 
zero when the mediator is controlled for.  
Baron and Kenny’s method for examining mediation was used to test the two meditational 
hypotheses of the present study. For each hypothesis, a separate set of analyses were 
conducted. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 suggested that mindful acceptance partially mediates the 
relationship between social cynicism and subjective well-being. As explained before, Baron 
and Kenny’s (1986) method posits that a variable may be considered a mediator if it meets 
the following conditions: 
 
                                                          
3 Last checked on 9/6/2013 
http://scholar.google.co.nz/scholar?cites=8691983795575065024&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en 
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a) The predictor variable should be correlated with the outcome variable. For the present 
hypothesis, this would entail establishing a significant relationship between the predictor 
variable of social cynicism and the outcome variable of subjective well-being. 
b) The predictor should be correlated with the mediator. For the present hypothesis, this 
would involve formulating a regression analysis. social cynicism is the predictor of the 
mediator variable of mindful acceptance.  
c) The mediator should be correlated with the outcome. For the present hypothesis, this 
would involve showing that mindful acceptance significantly predicts subjective well-being.  
d) Lastly, for a mediation effect to be significant, it is required that the previously 
significant relationship between the dependent (social cynicism) and outcome variable 
(subjective well-being) is no longer significant when the mediator (mindful acceptance) is 
controlled for in a separate hierarchical regression.  
 
Following these guidelines, three regression analyses were conducted. In the first regression 
analysis, social cynicism (the predictor) (β = -.17) failed to predict subjective well-being (the 
outcome), R2= .03, adjusted R2 = .016, F (1, 67) = 2.11, p = .151. This finding was surprising, 
as social cynicism was found to be a strong predictor of subjective well-being in Study 1. In 
the second regression analysis, social cynicism (β = .15) failed to predict mindful acceptance 
(the mediator), R2= .035, adjusted R2 = .021, F (1, 67) = 2.43, p = .123. In the third regression 
analysis, mindful acceptance (β = .15) failed to predict subjective well-being, R2= .024, 
adjusted R2 = .009, F (1, 67) = 1.61, p = .208. Considering that the first three criteria for a 
significant mediation were not met, there was no point in testing the fourth criterion. Based 
on the results of the mediation analysis, therefore, the first hypothesis of this study was not 
supported.  
Hypothesis 2. Four regression analyses were conducted. In the first regression analysis, 
social complexity (the predictor) (β =.42) significantly predicted psychological well-being 
(the outcome), R2= .182, adjusted R2 = .17, F (1, 65) = 14.49, p = .000. In the second 
regression analysis, social complexity (β = .27) significantly predicted perspective taking (the 
mediator), R2= .07, adjusted R2 = .06, F (1, 68) = 5.32, p = .02. In the third regression 
analysis, perspective taking (β = .25) significantly predicted psychological well-being, R2= 
.06, adjusted R2 = .05, F (1, 66) = 4.70, p = .03. And finally, a hierarchical regression analysis 
was conducted to examine if the predictor’s contribution to the outcome would be reduced 
after controlling for the mediator. Psychological well-being was entered as the outcome 
variable. Perspective taking was entered in the first step and social complexity was entered in 
the second step. Twenty percent of the total variance in psychological well-being was 
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explained by the overall model comprising perspective taking and social complexity, R2= .20, 
adjusted R2 = .18, F (2, 64) = 8.22, p = .001. After controlling for perspective taking (β = 
.15), social complexity (β = .38) significantly explained psychological well-being (∆R2= .142, 
p = .001). No multicollinearity was found between the predictors. Results of the hierarchical 
regression are demonstrated in Table 4.3. The relationship among the variables of this 
hypothesis is schematically demonstrated in Figure 4.1. These findings show that perspective 
taking accounts for about 4% of the shared variance between social complexity and 
psychological well-being. This finding is consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 2, 
verifying the prediction that perspective taking partially mediates the relationship between 
social complexity and psychological well-being.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Standardised regression coefficients for the relationship between social 
complexity and psychological well-being, as mediated by perspective taking. The 
standardised regression coefficient controlling for perspective taking is presented in 
parentheses. 
* p< .05 ** p< .01 
 
Table 4.3. Hierarchical regression models for testing 
Hypothesis 2 
 
 β t R2 ∆R2 . 
 
Step 1 
  
 
.06 
 
- 
 
  Perspective taking .24 2.07*    
      
Step 2   .20 .14  
  Social complexity .38 3.38**    
* p< .05; ** p<.01 
Note. In a separate regression analysis, social complexity 
predicted psychological well-being significantly β =.42, R2= 
.182, F (1, 65) = 14.49, p = .000 
 
 
 
 
Post Hoc Analyses 
The pattern of relationships in this study was somewhat different from that in the first study. 
The most surprising finding is that, while social cynicism was strongly correlated with 
subjective well-being in Study 1, it was not significantly correlated with it in the second 
Social 
Complexity 
Psychological 
Well-being 
Perspective 
taking .07* .06* 
.18** (.14**) 
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study. I was also interested to see if there have been any differences in the average scores of 
central variables between the samples of Study 1 and that of Study 2. Examining the cross-
sample differences in the scores of the variables might provide insights that help explain 
some of the differences. For example, dramatic mean level differences between the two 
samples, may lead to different correlation patterns. On this basis, several independent sample 
t tests were conducted to examine if there were any differences in variable scores between the 
Iranian samples used in Study 1 and Study 2. These variables included age, autonomy, 
environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations, self-acceptance, purpose in life, 
social complexity, social cynicism, and satisfaction with life, positive affect, and negative 
affect. The results of the t tests are reported in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4. t tests between Iranian samples of study 1 and 2 
Variable Study 1 Study 2 t df p 
M SD M SD 
age 21.97 1.95 21.13 2.052 -2.47 138 0.01 
Social cynicism 53.46 6.47 54.68 8.88 -.93 139 .35 
Social complexity 44.17 3.83 44.18 4.06 -.01 141 .99 
Autonomy 41.67 7.28 40.18 7.30 1.22 142 .22 
Environmental mastery 41.53 8.20 41.27 8.10 .192 139 .84 
Personal growth 43.35 6.73 44.18 7.80 -.68 141 .49 
Positive relations 40.95 10.52 45.59 8.93 -2.83 141 .00 
Purpose in life 43.39 8.42 43.38 8.80 .00 141 .99 
Self-acceptance 41.07 9.42 41.09 8.87 -.01 140 .98 
Negative affect 14.76 4.82 14.81 5.44 -.05 141 .95 
Positive affect 18.78 4.27 19.44 4.26 -.92 141 .35 
Life satisfaction 22.02 7.10 22.09 5.77 -.06 137.66 .94 
 
The two samples were found to be significantly different only on positive relations, t (141) = 
-2.83, p = .01, and age, t (138) = -2.47, p< .05. Moreover, the results of a χ² test showed that 
there was no significant relationship between the gender ratio and sample χ² (1) = .25, p = 
.61. Therefore, in terms of mean differences on the focal variables of this thesis, similarities 
between the samples seem to outweigh differences.  
Considering that mindful acceptance failed to mediate the relationship between social 
cynicism and subjective well-being, a moderation analysis was conducted to see if it 
moderated this relationship. Moderation effects concern the effect of a third variable 
(moderator) on the strength or direction of a predictor–outcome correlation. When mediation 
does not hold, it is worthwhile to examine if moderation holds. Indeed, sometimes, 
counterintuitive or conflicting findings motivate researchers to re-examine their underlying 
theoretical models, which is justifiable. “For example, the researchers may attempt to specify 
the conditions under which the hypothesized predictor–criterion relationship will hold true” 
(Beaubien, 2005, p. 1256). 
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The fact that, in the present study, the correlation between social cynicism and mindful 
acceptance was weak and non-significant (r = -.18), shows that the respondents, scores on 
social cynicism and mindful acceptance were to a large extent independent. As an alternative 
to the mediation hypothesis tested above, one could hypothesise that social cynicism would 
be associated negatively with subjective well-being when a respondent’s score on mindful 
acceptance is low, but not when he or she is high on mindful acceptance. In a sense, this post-
hoc hypothesis suggests that acceptance could serve as a protective factor. That is, a high 
score on mindful acceptance may compensate for the negative effects of social cynicism. This 
makes sense considering the finding that social cynicism and mindful acceptance had a small 
amount of shared variance in the present study.  
For testing this hypothesis, regression analysis was used (Baron & Kenny, 1986). For this 
purpose, the predictor and the moderator as well as the interaction term of the predictor and 
moderator are entered in a regression analysis to predict the outcome. It is necessary to centre 
the scores on the predictor and moderator before forming the interaction term. The aim of 
centring is to decrease the correlation between the interaction term and the predictor and 
moderator, in order to keep the product term distinguishable from the two original variables 
(Warner, 2012). To centre a variable, the sample mean is subtracted from a variable’s scores.   
Subjective well-being was used as the criterion variable. The predictor variable (social 
cynicism), the moderator (acceptance), and the interaction term between the predictor and 
moderator were entered as predictors. A significant interaction term indicates a significant 
moderating effect (Warner, 2012). The results of the hierarchical regression are demonstrated 
in Table 3.5. As can be seen in the table, the interaction term was not a significant predictor 
of subjective well-being after controlling for the moderator and predictor’s unique 
contributions. Therefore, it can be concluded that acceptance does not moderate the 
relationship between these two variables.  
 
Table 4.5. Hierarchical regression model for testing the moderating role of 
acceptance on the relationship between social cynicism and subjective well-
being 
 β t p R2  ∆R2   
  Social cynicism -.173 -1.425 .159 2.28 .08 
  Acceptance .176 1.440 .155   
  Social cynicism × acceptance .207 1.715 .091   
 
 
Social Desirability 
Because of potential susceptibility of self-reports to social-desirability response bias (Fisher, 
1993), a measure of social desirability was also included in this study to investigate whether 
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such bias was present. Table 4.6 demonstrates the bivariate and partial correlations between 
the predictors, mediators, and outcome variables (overall social desirability partialled out). 
The results reveal that social desirability is not a serious threat in the context of this study. 
First, social desirability is not significantly correlated with subjective and psychological well-
being, indicating that participants’ self-reports of well-being are largely unaffected by social 
desirability tendencies. Secondly, the correlation estimates between social cynicism, social 
complexity, and mindful acceptance with the two aspects of well-being are largely unaffected 
when social desirability is partialled out, as indicated by the lack of substantial change in the 
direction and size of these correlations.  
However, the correlation between perspective taking and psychological well-being turns out 
to be non-significant when social desirability is partialled out. Although the difference in size 
between the two correlation estimates is slight, this finding deserves more attention. If similar 
effects are replicated in future studies, researchers might want to choose another scale to 
assess perspective taking that is unaffected by social desirability tendencies (which, given the 
dearth of scales for measuring perspective taking, seems to be a difficult task). It is also 
noteworthy that social cynicism was negatively correlated with social desirability, which will 
be discussed in the Discussion. However, in the context of this study, the effect of social 
desirability seems to be limited, and the findings are largely unaffected by this variable. 
Table 4.6. Bivariate Pearson’s r and partial correlations between the variables. 
 Subjective WB Psychological WB 
 r partial r partial 
Social cynicism -.17 -.15 -.44** -.41** 
Social complexity .18 .18 .42** .43** 
Mindful acceptance .15 .16 .06 .06 
Perspective taking .08 .02 .25* .18 
Self-deceptive enhancement .13 - .08 - 
Impression management .09 - .15 - 
Overall social desirability .13 - .16 - 
 
*  < 0.05 ** < 0.01  
Note: Partial correlations show correlations after social desirability has been 
partialled out 
 
 
Discussion 
The present study sought to further explain the relationship between social axioms and well-
being by use of mediation analysis. This study followed up on Study 1 by examining whether 
mindful acceptance was a potential mediator of the relationship between social cynicism and 
subjective well-being, and perspective taking was a potential mediator between social 
complexity and psychological well-being. Findings indicate that acceptance does not mediate 
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or moderate the relationship between social cynicism and subjective well-being. Hypothesis 1 
was rejected by the findings of this study. It was found that the predictor (social cynicism) 
and the mediator (mindful acceptance) were not significantly correlated with the outcome 
(subjective well-being). Therefore, fundamental criteria for a significant mediating 
relationship were not met. The fact that mindful acceptance was not significantly correlated 
with subjective well-being is inconsistent with past findings in Iran (e.g., Ghorbani, Watson, 
& Weathington, 2009) and other countries (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Baer, 2003; 
Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004).  
Also, the fact that social cynicism was not significantly correlated with subjective well-being 
was surprising, considering that it did correlate strongly with subjective well-being in Study 1 
(see Table 2.6). Prior research in other cultures has documented negative associations 
between social cynicism and subjective well-being (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Mak et al., 2010) 
and job satisfaction (Leung, Ip, & Leung, 2010) as well.  
That social cynicism was associated with subjective well-being in Study 1 and was not 
associated with subjective well-being in Study 2 may be explained considering some societal 
changes that have occurred in Iran in the interval between the two data collection times. The 
first data was collected in 2008 before the disputed presidential election in Iran and the 
second was collected in 2011. Iranian society was facing major economic and social 
problems in the period between 2009 to 2011 due to post-election issues and international 
political and economic sanctions. Iranians voiced doubts about the authenticity of the results 
of Iran's tenth presidential election held on 12 June 2009. Protests following the election 
against the disputed victory of President Mahmoud and in support of opposition candidates 
occurred in major cities in Iran and around the world starting on June 13, 20094. Iranian 
police forces and militia suppressed riots as well as peaceful demonstrations and protests 
using force and firearms1. Protests erupted again several times through 2010 and 2011. 
Furthermore, the government had intensively militarised critical areas of the cities (where 
protests generally took place).  
This has weakened Iran’s economy. The official unemployment rate in Iran has recently been 
about 30% for the under 25s, which is considered to be seriously problematic (Ottolenghy, 
2012). Iran’s inflation rate was constantly rising and reached its highest level (27.1%) in 
recent years (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). These economic problems are partly due to 
the lifting of governmental subsidies and the resulting rising in the prices.  
There are other sources of dissatisfaction in recent years. For example, the internet speed in 
Iran is deliberately kept low and many websites and social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, 
                                                          
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Iranian_election_protests 
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etc.) are blocked by the state to control the flow of information in the country. In consumer 
download speed, Iran ranks 169 among 172 countries4, which is not at all accepted by the 
general population, especially young people. The current situation has led to an increased 
dissatisfaction among Iranians, and their lack of trust in social institutions. It is not surprising 
that according to the world happiness report, Iranians’ level of self-reported happiness has 
shown a decrease between 2007 and 20125.  
From all these data, one can conclude that Iranians’ quality of life has declined over this 
period. This change may help us speculate about the reasons causing the differences between 
the two samples in the relationship between social cynicism and mental well-being. Below, I 
will elaborate on this possibility, drawing on culture-level studies on social cynicism.   
Bond et al. (2004) analysed the dimensionality of social axioms at the culture level, using 
item means from groups of college students from 41 countries as the input data. This factor 
analysis revealed a 2-dimensional structure. One of the factors extracted was labelled societal 
cynicism (see also Leung & Bond, 2008). Societal cynicism is associated with indicators of 
financial hardship and social and political dissatisfaction.  
 
“Bond et al. (2004) reported that after controlling for economic 
development, societal cynicism is associated with lesser voter turnout in 
a nation, a lower average  satisfaction with one’s company or work 
organization, citizens’ lower life satisfaction, a lower average level of 
conscientiousness (a factor in the big five personality model), a general 
rejection of the view that leadership is based on charisma and values, 
generally more disagreement within in-groups, and a stronger belief 
among the citizenry in exerting an amount of effort that is proportional 
to the pay received. This pattern of national characteristics suggests a 
disengagement of a nation’s citizenry, its human capital, from 
investment of their resources into their own society.” (Leung & Bond, 
2008, p. 212) 
 
As noted earlier, it is believed that social axioms serve some function for our survival. 
Empirical findings support this prediction. For instance, in a study by Kurman and Ronen-
Eilon (2004), it was found that immigrants adapted better if they had accurate knowledge 
about social axioms characterizing their host cultures (see more empirical evidence in Hui & 
Hui, 2009). Based on such empirical evidence, Hui and Hui (2009) argue that social axioms 
serve as psychological tools to help individuals to understand, relate to, and control the social 
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world. Hui and Hui further argue that social axioms serve as guiding principles steering 
progress towards the attainment of important goals in life.  
Based on this line of reasoning, it can be suggested that the functions of social cynicism 
might have changed in Iran after the election. That is, given that life conditions have become 
tougher and less pleasant in recent years, the negative implications of social cynicism have 
decreased in the context of Iran.  
People often think that the world is safe, predictable, benevolent, and meaningful. In fact, this 
set of beliefs is the core of our basic assumptions about humanity and the world (Janoff-
Bulman, 1992). Regarding the cosmos and creation, Muslims believe that there are rules, 
procedures or traditions based on which almighty God rules the universe, including human 
social life (Sadri, 2007). When things happen and progress in our daily life as we expect 
beliefs in the benevolence and meaningfulness of the world help people to maintain a balance 
between what they do and what they achieve as outcomes. But when this routine is disrupted, 
for example by trauma, the balance is upset, and the condition could cause devastating effects 
on inherent assumption about the world’s benevolence and meaningfulness (Janoff-Bulman, 
1989) and, moreover, on beliefs in the sovereignty of God in ruling the universe, which may 
lead to social cynicism and distrust. On this basis, we can conclude that people’s view on the 
benevolence, fairness, and reliability of the world depends on their response to and 
interpretation of traumatic events. However, few studies have addressed this issue.  
Biruski, Ajdukovic, and Low Stanic (2014) studied the role of negatively-changed worldview 
in the relationship between traumatization and readiness for social reconstruction, including 
three processes: intergroup rapprochement, rebuilding trust, and need for apology. Mediation 
analyses showed that the worldview change fully mediated between traumatization and all 
three aspects of social reconstruction .More severe war-related trauma symptoms were linked 
to a more profound worldview change, which was in turn associated with people being less 
ready to become closer with the members of the group with which they had been in violent 
conflict, less engaging in trustful relations and more demanding of an apology from the ‘other 
side.’ The mediating effect of the worldview change was the largest between war-related 
trauma symptoms and intergroup trust. This may indicate that (intergroup) trust is most 
seriously violated by trauma inflicted during intergroup violence, as suggested by intergroup 
reconciliation literature (Ajdukovic, 2004; Bar-Tal, 2013; Nadler, 2002). 
Nonetheless, Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, and McMilan (1998) examined the relationship 
between traumatic events, the difference between generations, and assumptions about the 
fairness of the universe. In their study, critical life events were considered as a covariate, 
gender and generation as predictors, and the perception of the fairness of the universe as a 
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criterion variable. The results revealed that the generational main effect was significant for 5 
of the 10 subscales, and the world view that emerged was consistent across these differences. 
The youngest group tended to view the world as less just and less benevolent, and the oldest 
group tended to view the world as luckier and more controllable. The results somewhat 
confirmed the effects of negative life events on worldview. The effects seemingly vary 
according to age. This issue should be considered in future studies, i.e. the mechanism of the 
effects. 
Consistent with this argument, Leung and Bond (2008) argue that 
 
“Social cynicism has survival value for the individual. At the culture 
level, societies higher in societal cynicism are usually associated with 
political or economic turmoil triggered by rapid social changes over 
the past decades. Perhaps cynicism is also adaptive in a society 
marked by a history of disruptive events, working to demobilize 
citizens, to focus their attention onto personal matters, and to resist 
personal investment in social institutions. The survival value of 
cynicism at both levels seems to be able to account for the cross-level 
invariance of this axiom dimension.” (p. 214) 
 
Therefore, it makes sense to suggest that in the face of poor social and financial situations in 
current Iran, social cynicism is less of a negative belief domain to endorse for citizens. Under 
such conditions, social cynicism may turn out to be sometimes useful, and this may 
compensate for parts of its negative consequences. In other words, a negative bias and 
pessimism seems to be more useful in the current Iranian society than it was a few years ago, 
and this might have led to a non-significant correlation between social cynicism and 
subjective well-being in the current study. These are, however, only mere speculations, which 
need to be empirically tested in future research.  
The level of social cynicism has not in fact changed in Iranian society after the disputed 
election, since the result of a t test (as reported above) involving samples from Study 1 and 
Study 2 did not show any significant difference between the samples on social cynicism. 
However, the t test merely reveals changes in the levels of a variable not in its functions. My 
argument centres on changes in the function of social cynicism, which is consistent with the 
correlation patterns found in the two samples.  
Another aspect of my argument is that the quality of life and mental well-being has decreased 
between the two data collection times. The results of a t test reported above indicate no 
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significant change in the levels of mental well-well-being between samples of Study 1 and 
Study 2. However, it should be noted that two small samples of Iranians may not reflect the 
whole set of socio-political changes occurring in the whole Iranian population. The world 
happiness report does show that Iranians’ level of happiness has shown a noticeable decrease 
between 2007 and 2012.  
Moreover, a Leven’s test for equality of variances (F = 4.41, p = .03) shows that variation of 
life satisfaction scores was significantly smaller in Study 2 (SD = 5.77) than in Study 1 (SD = 
7.10). This may indicate actual differences between the samples; however, this also indicates 
that the life satisfaction scale is a less sensitive scale in Study 2, which does a poorer job at 
capturing individual differences.  
Findings of this study supported the predictions of Hypothesis 2. That is, the results of the 
mediation analysis revealed that perspective taking mediates the relationship between social 
complexity and psychological well-being. This study was the first to examine the role of 
perspective taking as a mediator of the relationship between social complexity and 
psychological well-being and, therefore, this finding can be considered a unique contribution 
of this study to the literature.  
The fact that perspective taking was positively correlated with psychological functioning was 
in line with past studies. As noted earlier, perspective taking has been found to correlate 
positively with multiple aspects of successful functioning such as higher relationship 
satisfaction (Franzoi, Davis, & Young, 1995), successful conflict resolution (Galinsky et al., 
2008), life satisfaction, self-efficacy, and optimism in children (Gadermann, Schonert-Reichl, 
& Zumbo, 2010). It also has been found to be positively correlated with gratitude, 
connectedness to nature, and empathic concern in Iran (Joshanloo et al., 2010). That social 
complexity was positively correlated with perspective taking is also in keeping with my 
reasoning in the introduction and past empirical findings in Iran (Joshanloo et al., 2010).  
The findings related to the second hypothesis however should be interpreted with caution 
because when controlling for social desirability, the correlation between perspective taking 
and psychological well-being becomes non-significant (although still positive and marginally 
significant, see Table 4.7). Therefore, future studies should replicate these findings using a 
different measurement of perspective taking before any firm conclusion can be made. 
However, considering that the findings are consistent with those of past studies in Iran and 
other cultures and the mediating relationship is theoretically justified, it is also possible that 
using a more reliable perspective taking scale and larger samples in future studies will lend 
more support to the second hypothesis of this study.  
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Another noteworthy finding was that social desirability had no influence on the relationship 
between social axioms dimensions and aspects of well-being (see Table 4.7). That is, 
partialling out the influence of social desirability leaves the correlations between social 
complexity and social cynicism and the aspects of well-being almost unchanged. This finding 
supplements the findings of the first study by showing that the relationship between the two 
belief domains and aspects of well-being are not affected by participants’ tendency to 
respond to questions in a socially desirable manner. 
However, social cynicism was found to correlate negatively with social desirability. This 
finding cannot be considered a validity issue for the social cynicism scale as the two concepts 
are conceptually opposite. That is, social desirability involves some degrees of positivity bias 
whereas social cynicism involves some degrees of negativity bias. Singelis, Hubbard, Her, 
and an (2003) also found a negative and significant correlation between social cynicism and 
social desirability (r = -.21) in the USA. They did not find this result surprising “as cynicism 
is not generally compatible with wanting to do the socially proper actions” (p. 280). 
However, this significant correlation may cast doubt on the findings related to the first 
hypothesis of this study, which was not supported by the data. Future studies should try to 
test this hypothesis using cynicism scales that are not at all affected by social desirability. 
Currently, other social cynicism scales are not available though.   
Finally, the fact that overall subjective and psychological well-being scales used in this study 
did not correlate significantly with social desirability is promising for Iranian well-being 
studies. Interestingly, several past studies have documented positive correlations between 
social desirability as assessed by the BIDR and self-perceptions of mental health in other 
cultures (e.g., Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002; Nichols & Greene, 1997; 
Paulhus, 1998; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). This cross-national difference is not surprising as 
most of these studies are done on Western samples and past research shows that the self-
enhancement bias (striving to feel good about oneself, a concept clearly related to desirable 
responding) is more prevalent in Western cultures than non-Western ones (for a review, see 
Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999).  
Altogether, the findings of the present study demonstrate that it is beneficial to test 
hypotheses regarding the mediators of the relationship between social axioms and real-life 
outcomes. That perspective taking significantly mediates the relationship between social 
complexity and psychological well-being indicates that general beliefs (which are in fact 
certain ways of seeing the world) may be translated into certain ways of being (such as 
perspective taking), which then lead to certain outcomes (such as higher mental well-being). 
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That the findings did not support the first hypothesis of the study is rather surprising. There 
seems to be considerable change in the function of social cynicism beliefs in Iranian society 
(at least among the younger generation) in a rather short amount of time. That is, social 
cynicism, which was negatively correlated with subjective well-being in the first study, 
turned out to be uncorrelated with it in the second study. Although, this unexpected change 
between the two Iranian samples invalidated the first hypothesis of the study, the hypothesis 
may receive better empirical support in more stable Iranian subsamples (such as groups 
unaffected by the recent socio-political clashes), and other national contexts. Therefore, it 
would be useful to test this hypothesis in other samples before completely dismissing it.  
Study 1 in the present thesis showed that social axioms may play different roles in various 
national contexts. For example, some social beliefs are related to well-being in Iran but not 
related to well-being in the UK. Study 2 focused on the mechanisms of the relationships 
between two axiom dimensions and aspects of mental well-being. One interesting avenue for 
expanding the findings of the previous two studies is to investigate differences between social 
axiom scores and their relationships with well-being among the Iranian and UK student 
samples as well as an Iranian immigrant sample living in England. Would the levels of social 
axioms and the relationships between social axioms and well-being in the immigrant sample 
be more like those in Iranians or more like those in the UK sample? In other words, do 
Iranian immigrants take with them their social beliefs when emigrating to England, or leave 
their beliefs in Iran and try to embrace new ways of looking at the world? Study 3 (next 
chapter) will try to partially respond to these questions.  
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Chapter 5 
Study 3 
Social Axioms and Mental Well-Being in Iranian Immigrants in 
the UK 
Introduction 
 
It is believed that social beliefs help a person make sense of what happens around him/her, 
and to function effectively in the culture in which he/she lives. Therefore, social beliefs that 
are functional in a specific cultural context may turn out to be not useful or even 
dysfunctional in another cultural context. These widely accepted assumptions formed the 
basis for Study 1, where I investigated which social beliefs were functional in Iran and which 
ones were functional in the UK, in the sense of predicting subjective and psychological well-
being. The findings indicated that some social axioms such as social complexity were 
significant positive predictors of well-being in both Iran and the UK. In contrast, I found that 
some social beliefs (such as fate control) had differential relationships with mental well-being 
in the two nations. However, the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 merely speak to individual 
and country-level differences in the levels of endorsing certain social axioms and mental 
well-being as well as the relationship between these variables.  
One fruitful avenue for expanding the findings of the previous studies is to investigate what 
happens to individuals who have been raised in one country and live in another one. These 
individuals are likely to be subject to two sets of social beliefs. For these people, the sets of 
beliefs that they habitually apply to make sense of their surroundings and function effectively 
in their original country may turn out to be not that useful within the new environment, or 
even may turn out to be dysfunctional in some ways. Study 3 sought to answer several 
questions in this regard. 
 
Immigration of Iranians 
The last decades have seen an upsurge in the number of Iranian immigrants to Western 
countries including the United States of America and the UK. Starting with the Islamic 
revolution of 1979, many Iranians have left Iran for more democratic and developed 
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countries. International immigration has been described as an especially stressful experience 
(Berry & Annis, 1974). This is especially true about Muslims emigrating to Western nations, 
as these individuals generally move from a religious context to a much more secular context. 
What complicates the situation for Muslims emigrating to secular countries is that they are 
generally raised in nations where religion is a strong part of individuals’ identity (Saroglou & 
Mathijsen, 2007).  
Furthermore, there is evidence that Muslim immigrants value religion and involvement in 
religious practice more than many other groups of immigrants to Western nations (Saroglou 
& Galand, 2004). They also show evidence of a more traditional version of religiosity, which 
largely lacks religious doubt and questioning. Sartawi and Sammut (2012) present data 
showing that negotiating Muslim identities in the British context involves a host of pragmatic 
problems. They also show that Orthodox and more traditional Muslims are more vulnerable 
to these difficulties. Therefore, for Muslim immigrants, integration into more or less secular 
cultures of Europe may be more difficult than for many other groups of immigrants. For these 
reasons, acculturation involves high levels of stress for Muslims (Wrobel, Farrag, & Hymes, 
2009).  
It can be expected that Iranian immigrants are not an exception. Western culture is very 
different from Iranian culture. Whereas Iran has a religious and traditional culture, Western 
cultures are more secular and less traditional. Whereas Iran has a strongly Islamic culture, 
Western cultures generally are affected by Christian heritage. Iran is a developing nation 
struggling with problems such as poverty, slow economic progress, and overpopulation in 
certain cities, while the Western countries are developed and wealthy. Iran has a theocratic 
government, while governments in Western Europe are generally democratic (Brown & 
Landreth, 1983; Ghaffarian, 1998).  
Representations of Muslims and Islam in the British media are generally negative (Ameli & 
Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2007). In Europe, there is evidence of public hostility 
against Islam and Muslims, especially after the events of 11 September 2001, which led to 
stronger anti-Muslim sentiments shown in Westerners (Ahmad, 2006; Allen & Nielsen, 2002; 
Güngör, Fleischmann, & Phalet, 2011; Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney, & Trevino, 2008). Given 
reported cases of direct and institutional discrimination against Muslims, and the negative 
images of Islam and Muslims shown in the Western media, Muslims in the UK generally 
perceive themselves as discriminated against, undervalued, and threatened (Sartawi & 
Sammut, 2012). Jamil et al. (2008) found that in a large sample of immigrants of Arab, 
Chaldean, and African ethnic backgrounds in the USA, the highest rate of depression was 
found in Arab American participants (23.2%), who were mainly Muslims.  
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Therefore, Iranian immigrants may have special difficulties in adjusting to Western cultures. 
Difficulty in adjusting to the host culture may lead to psychological problems (Ghaffarian, 
1998). Lipson’s (1992) study on Iranian immigrants in the USA revealed that a good number 
of Iranian immigrants were indeed highly stressed. Major sources of stress among these 
Iranians were found to be culture shock, a poor command of English, and perceived loss of 
socio-economic status in the host culture compared to Iran, perceived lack of social support, 
occupational and financial difficulties, and perceptions of ethnic bias towards Iranians 
(Lipson, 1992).  
Part of the maladjustment experienced by immigrants may be caused by differences in social 
beliefs in the original and host culture, which may be one of the main reasons for culture 
shock. As Lipson’s (1992 see above) study shows, culture shock is one of the main stressors 
in Iranian immigrants. Past research and the results of the first study in this thesis indicate 
that social axioms have consequences for people’s psychological adjustment (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2006; Lai et al., 2007; Mak et al., 2010; Safdar et al., 2006). It can be argued that 
endorsing certain social beliefs may have significant consequences for immigrants in 
adjusting to the new environment.   
 
Ethnic identity and adjustment 
Previous research makes it clear that ethnic identity (Phinney, 1992; Phinney & Ong, 2007) is 
also an important factor in the adjustment of immigrants. This concept can be defined as the 
strength of the subjective sense of belonging to one’s original ethnic group (Clément & 
Noels, 1992; Phinney, 1990). The ways people handle their multiple ethnic identities have been 
linked to a number of well-being related outcomes (Berry, Phinney, Sam, &Vedder, 2006).  
Some past research indicates that holding on to one’s native culture leads to adjustment 
problems for immigrants (Griffith, 1983). For example, Abouguendia and Noels (2001) found 
that holding on to one’s heritage culture and refusing to participate in the host culture was 
negatively associated with self-esteem and positively associated with depression in South Asian 
immigrants in Canada.In contrast, other research indicates that abandoning one’s native 
identity and replacing it by the host culture’s identity may also lead to adjustment problems 
(Abu-Rayya, & Abu-Rayya, 2009a; Abu-Rayya, & Abu-Rayya, 2009b; Ortiz & Arce, 1984). 
In a sample of 506 adolescents from four ethnic backgrounds (i.e., Vietnamese, Pakistani, 
Turkish, and Chilean) living in Norway, Sam (2000) found that a tendency to hold on to one’s 
heritage culture and refuse to participate in the host culture was positively related to life 
satisfaction. Therefore, the findings so far are mixed and seem to be dependent on native and 
host cultures under study in each specific research.  
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The relationship between attachment to one’s ethnic identity and psychological functioning has 
been tested in a few studies using samples of Muslim immigrants. Among Muslim immigrants, 
attachment to one’s heritage ethnic identity has generally been found not to have negative 
implications for psychological adjustment. Güngör, Fleischmann, and Phalet (2011) found that 
attachment to an Islamic identity posed little challenge in the way of adopting Belgium 
culture for Muslims immigrants. Aswat and Malcarne (2007) examined the acculturation 
strategies and depression of a sample of Muslim immigrants in Canada. They found that 
immigrants with high original culture identification reported less lifetime (but not past-year) 
depressive symptoms. In sum, in Muslim cultures, research has largely documented positive 
implications for attachment to one’s original culture.  
Besides its direct effect on immigrants, I suggest that ethnic identity may also interact with 
social beliefs in their effect on mental well-being. That is, one’s level of attachment to one’s 
original country may moderate the relationship between social beliefs and mental well-being. 
This prediction is based on the speculation that scoring high or low on ethnic identity may be 
associated with differential endorsement of social axioms (as explained below). I suggest that 
high and low ethnic identity create noticeably different backdrops for immigrants (Phinney, 
1992) and, therefore, the relationship between social beliefs and mental well-being may be 
moderated by this variable. Ethnic identity has social components such as belonging and 
commitment to the ethnic community, and, in addition, social beliefs related to ethnic identity 
are part of the broader concept of attachment to national identity, which can affect well-
being. The aforementioned social beliefs are a sense of common identity and belonging, 
accepting each other as compatriots, positive attitude to others, being proud of belonging to 
an ethnic community, being willing to pay the necessary costs for the membership in an 
ethnic community and for its survival, positive attitude towards the principles of social 
solidarity and cooperation (Abolhasani, 2008) and intellectual, religious, and social 
attachment to each other (Jafarian, 2002).It is clear that the above mentioned influence a 
person's well-being. 
On the other hand, some research has clearly showed that there is a significant positive 
relationship between attachment to ethnic identity and social trust. For example, Heath & 
Roberts (2006) found that attachment to the British identity is linked with social trust. 
Putnam (2007) argued that one is more likely to trust another person if there is a shared 
element of identity such that the other person is not perceived as ‘socially distant’. 
Therefore, we can conclude that ethnic identity, particularly its social dimensions, can play a 
moderator role in the relationship between social beliefs and well-being. 
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The research questions 
The present study examined the following: firstly, differences between the levels of social 
axioms endorsed by a sample of Iranian immigrants in the UK, an Iranian sample, and a UK 
student sample. Secondly, this study examined the relationship between social axioms and 
mental well-being in the immigrant sample. Finally, the direct influence of ethnic identity on 
mental well-being, and the moderating role of ethnic identity on the relationship between 
social axioms and mental well-being were examined. Thus, the study was designed to provide 
some evidence for the following questions: Does the belief system of Iranians living in the 
UK remain unchanged in the new context, or are there changes in their belief system? Is 
endorsing of particular social beliefs advantageous or disadvantageous for the mental health 
of Iranians living in the UK? Are there differences between the relationship between social 
beliefs and mental well-being in Iranians living in Iran and Iranians living in the UK? Does 
the strength of the subjective sense of belonging to the Iranian culture and identity qualify 
these relationships? 
 
Group differences in social axioms 
Prior empirical research shows that immigrants gradually absorb new values and norms 
prevalent in their host cultures (Inglehart & Norris, 2009; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
Inglehart and Norris, for example, found that the values of Muslim immigrants (vs. Muslims 
living in original nations) were closer to those held by their host European cultures. In fact, 
they found that Muslim immigrants were located half-way between the Western dominant 
values and Islamic dominant values. Moreno and Abitia (2005, as cited in Inglehart & Norris, 
2009) found that Mexicans who live in the USA (as opposed to those living in Mexico) had 
values that were closer to those of Americans. Moreover, there is evidence that life 
evaluations (e.g., happiness scores) of migrants typically lie between those of the people in 
the host country and those in the country of origin (see Veenhoven, 1994).  
There is also evidence that emigrating to a new culture modifies the immigrants’ social 
axioms, such that their social beliefs become more like those of the host culture. This 
evidence is provided in a study (Safdar et al., 2006) using Iranian, Canadian, and Iranian 
Canadian samples. This study, which was an exploratory study, found that Iranian Canadians 
endorsed views that were intermediate between native Iranians in Iran and native Canadians 
(although some of the differences were not significant). Considering that Canada and 
England have relatively similar scores on social axioms (Bond et al., 2004), the same 
prediction is proposed in this study. That is, it is predicted that Iranians in the UK will yield 
scores which are intermediate between those of the UK student sample and Iranians in Iran. 
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This prediction is based on the notion that immigrating to a new society may indeed modify 
social beliefs of the individual. These predictions are summarized in the following 
hypotheses: 
 
1- Iranians in the UK will show social cynicism scores which are between those 
of UK student participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
2-  Iranians in the UK will show religiosity scores which are between those of the 
UK student participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
3- Iranians in the UK will show social complexity scores which are between 
those of UK student participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
4- Iranians in the UK will show reward for application scores which are between 
those of UK student participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
5- Iranians in the UK will show fate control scores which are between those of 
the UK student participants in the UK and Iranians in Iran. 
 
Group differences in mental well-being 
Considering that previous research shows that the British score higher than Iranians on 
subjective well-being (e.g., Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, & Welzel, 2008), it is expected that the 
UK student sample will score higher than the native Iranians on aspects of mental well-being. 
Better quality of life and life standards provide more opportunities for basic psychological 
and physical need satisfaction, which lead to better mental health. Furthermore, given that the 
Iranians in the UK may have many difficulties in adjusting to a dramatically different culture 
(for the reasons described above), it is also expected that the UK student sample will score 
higher on mental well-being than the Iranians in England. These predictions are summarised 
in the following hypotheses: 
 
6- The UK student participants in the UK will score higher than Iranians living 
in Iran and Iranian immigrants in the UK on subjective well-being.  
7- The UK student participants in the UK will score higher than Iranians living 
in Iran and Iranian immigrants in the UK on psychological well-being.  
  
Contribution of the social axiom dimensions to well-being among immigrants 
 
In the first study of this thesis, it was found that social cynicism was a predictor of both 
subjective and psychological well-being. However, the second study cast doubt on these 
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findings, showing that the relationship between social cynicism and well-being is not that 
robust, and may be non-significant in Iranian samples. I argued that in contexts where the 
conditions of life pose more challenges to individuals, social cynicism may come to be non-
harmful, or even helpful. Given that Iranian immigrants may have certain difficulties in 
adjusting to the new environment (as described above), I expected to see a non-significant 
relationship between social cynicism and mental well-being, as was the case in the second 
study.  
Social complexity was one of the predictors of mental well-being in Study 1 and Study 2 of 
the present thesis. This social belief domain seems to be especially useful in an immigrant 
sample. Considering that social complexity refers to the belief in multiple ways of achieving 
outcomes, and agreement that human behaviour is variable across situations, this belief 
domain is likely to help immigrants embrace new ways of doing things in a new culture and 
thus may help adjustment. This seems to be true at least about Iranian immigrants. The 
findings of one study on Iranian immigrants in the USA showed that resisting the host culture 
leads to negative consequences for mental well-being of Iranian immigrants (Ghaffarian, 
1998). Social complexity is inconsistent with resistance to the host culture and is likely to 
facilitate the integration of the native and host cultures. Therefore, it is expected that social 
complexity will lead to better mental well-being in the immigrant sample of the present 
study.  
Reward for application refers to a general belief that effort, knowledge, and careful planning 
will lead to positive results. Reward for application may also be useful for immigrants. For 
example, this belief set is likely to lead to active coping. This social belief domain has been 
found to relate positively to life satisfaction (Chen, Cheung, Bond, & Leung, 2006). In an 
Iranian sample, this domain was associated with active coping (Safdar et al., 2006). Active 
coping with difficulties in the new environment is an instrumental strategy towards better 
adjustment. Therefore, it is expected that reward for application is associated with better 
mental well-being.  
Fate control may harm adjustment to a new culture. This is the belief that life events are 
predetermined. It is likely that the belief that things are fated will lead to less active 
involvement in a new culture. Immigrants need to actively participate in the new culture to 
not be isolated and abandoned. Fate control is positively associated with external locus of 
control, spiritual beliefs, supernatural beliefs (Singelis et al., 2003), and general death anxiety 
(Hui, Bond, & Ng, 2007). Given these considerations, it is predicted that fate control will 
negatively predict mental well-being.  
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Finally, regarding religiosity, I predicted a positive relationship with mental well-being. 
Religiosity was found to correlate positively with multiple aspects of mental well-being in the 
Iranian sample used in the first study of the present thesis. This belief domain has also been 
found to correlate positively with empathy and gratitude in an Iranian sample (Joshanloo et 
al., 2010). These predictions are summarised in the following hypotheses: 
 
8- Social cynicism is not significantly related to indicators of well-being in 
Iranian immigrants. 
9- Reward for application is positively related to indicators of well-being in 
Iranian immigrants. 
10- Social complexity is positively related to indicators of well-being in 
Iranian immigrants. 
11- Fate control is negatively related to indicators of well-being in Iranian 
immigrants. 
12- Religiosity is positively related to indicators of well-being in Iranian 
immigrants. 
 
Ethnic identity 
Ethnic identity, as used in this study, is defined as the strength of the subjective sense of 
belonging to one’s original ethnic group in immigrants living in a host country. Prior research 
has found that attachment to one’s original culture can be helpful for immigrants (e.g., 
Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000). Muslim immigrants’ attachment to their 
original religious culture can contribute to “acculturative adjustment both as a marker of 
group identity and belonging and as a source of self-esteem, social support, and cultural 
continuity across generations” (Güngör, Fleischmann, & Phalet, 2011, p. 1357). Based on 
these findings, it is expected that ethnic identity (an indicator of one’s sense of attachment to 
one’s native culture) is positively correlated with mental well-being.  
Finally, as explained in the introduction, immigrants’ ethnic identity may moderate the 
relationship between social beliefs and mental well-being. Considering that, in this study, 
there are two mental well-being indicators (subjective and psychological well-being) and five 
social axioms, testing this hypothesis required testing 10 moderation analyses. These 
predictions are summarised in the following hypotheses: 
 
13- Attachment to Iranian identity is positively associated with mental well-
being. 
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14- Ethnic identity will moderate the relationship between social axioms and 
mental well-being. 
 
In sum, this study expanded on the findings of the previous chapters in this thesis through 
testing a set of hypotheses related to an Iranian immigrant sample in a cross-sectional study. 
The findings will speak more directly to the interaction between social axioms and cultural 
contexts in their effect on mental well-being.  
 
Method 
Participants 
The participants in this study were 66 Iranians living in the England.  A period of at least 
three years since leaving the country was considered as a criterion for Iranian immigrants 
with no maximum limit, whereby there are differences in the sample.  
Snowball sampling was chosen because the Iranian immigrants formed a small minority in 
England, and there was thus no easy access to a larger sample for any other sampling 
methods. The procedure was that in the beginning, the first sampling unit (person) was used 
for identifying and selecting the second unit. The researcher then contacted the second unit 
and obtained his/her written consent to participate in the survey after introducing himself and 
explaining the purpose of the research. The second unit was also used to identify the third 
unit and the sampling continued similarly. In this chain where someone was not willing to 
participate in research, they or the previous sampling unit were asked to introduce someone 
else. Not many people were willing; hence it was difficult to increase the size of the sample. 
Thirty-five of the participants were female and 31 were male. Ages ranged from 21 to 63, 
with a mean of 39.52 (SD = 11.035). The respondents were contacted through Iranian clubs 
and social groups, and snowball sampling. Fourteen participants reported that they had no 
partner, 15 reported that they were “in a relationship but not living with partner”, one 
participant reported that they were “single and living with a partner”, 26 participants were 
married, eight participants were separated, and two participants chose “other”. Fifty-one, one, 
five, and five reported their ethnicity to be Fars, Kurd, Turk, and Lor, respectively, and four 
participants mentioned other ethnicities. Fifty-one participants reported being Muslims, one 
Christian, and 14 participants did not report their religion.  
Five of the students reported that their fathers were illiterate. Eight participants reported their 
fathers’ highest educational qualification to be an elementary school diploma, seven a 
secondary school diploma, 21 a high school diploma, nine a junior college diploma, 11 a 
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bachelor’s degrees, and five a PhD. Eight of the participants reported that their mothers were 
illiterate. Twelve of the participants reported their mothers’ highest educational qualification 
to be an elementary school diploma, 13 a secondary school diploma, 19 a high school 
diploma, four a junior college diploma, five a bachelor’s degrees, one a master’s degree, three 
a PhD degree, and one participant did not know about their mother’s highest education 
qualification. 
Ten participants had a temporary visa, two had a student visa, 12 an indefinite visa, and 40 
were British citizens. Two participants mentioned other visa statuses. Sixty-four of the 
participants were born in Iran and two of them in other parts of the world.   
 
Measures 
In addition to the social axiom survey and well-being scales used in the previous two studies, 
an Ethnic Identity scale was used.  
Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure - Revised. The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure - 
Revised (MEIM-R; Phinney & Ong, 2007) is a 6-item measure assessing the strengths of the 
sense of belonging to one’s ethnic group (e.g. “I understand pretty well what my ethnic group 
membership means to me”). The items are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1= strongly 
disagree to 5= strongly agree. Higher scores indicate more attachment to Iranian ethnic 
identity. Cronbach’s alpha for the six items was .81 as reported in the scale development 
study (Phinney & Ong, 2007). MEIM-R items were adapted from its original lengthier 
version, the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM; Phinney, 1992). MEIM has been 
used with diverse groups including Muslim girls (Abu-Ali & Reisen, 1999).  
 
Results 
Analytical strategy 
 
In this study, Iranian immigrants living in England were recruited to respond to a survey 
including the focal variables of the thesis (i.e., social axioms and well-being) together with an 
ethnic identity measure. Data from the Iranian students group who were living in Iran and the 
UK student sample group were also included (coming from Study 1). Thus, the study had 
three groups. Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to examine mean differences 
among these groups. This test was applied to Hypotheses 1 to 7, where an independent 
categorical variable with three levels (group membership) predicted differences on a 
continuous dependent variable (i.e., mental well-being or social axioms). The first five 
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hypotheses predicted the existence of a linear trend for dependent variables across the three 
groups. Trend tests were used to test whether a group of means form a single pattern (i.e., 
trend) (Clark-Carter, 2009). In the first five hypotheses, I predicted that the level of any social 
axioms would show a linear trend. That is, the Iranians in the UK group would fall in 
between the two other groups. In other words, I predicted that there would be a linear trend 
for social axioms to increase (or decrease) across the three groups from the Iranian group 
(=1), to the Iranian immigrant group (=2), to the UK students group (=3).  
For testing the rest of the hypotheses, where the purpose was to examine the relationship 
between variables (i.e., social axioms, well-being, and ethnic identity), multiple correlation 
and regression analyses were used. Moreover, for hypothesis 14, moderation analyses were 
conducted. Moderation concerns the effect of a third variable (moderator) on the strength or 
direction of a predictor-outcome relationship. For testing this hypothesis, regression analysis 
was used (Baron & Kenny, 1986). For this purpose, the predictor and the moderator as well 
as the interaction term of the predictor and moderator are entered in a regression analysis to 
predict the outcome. It is necessary to centre the scores on the predictor and moderator before 
forming the interaction term. The aim of centring is to decrease the correlation between the 
interaction term and the predictor and moderator, to reduce the chance of multicollinearity 
among the variables (Warner, 2012). To centre a variable, the sample mean is subtracted 
from a variable’s scores. A significant interaction term indicates a significant moderating 
effect (Warner, 2012).  
The percentage of missing values for psychological well-being and subjective well-being in 
the present study were 9.1 and 18.2 respectively. Unlike the two previous studies, the amount 
of missing values is greater than 5%, and thus not to be ignored (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 
2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Given that traditional methods of handling missing data 
(e.g., listwise and casewise deletion, mean substitution, etc.) are now widely considered 
inadequate (Allison, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), with missing value rates > 5%, 
multiple imputation was used in this study to deal with missing values. Multiple imputation is 
developed and expanded by Rubin (1978; 1987). The idea of  
 
“Data analysis with multiple imputation is to create a small number, m, of copies of 
the data, each of which has the missing values suitably imputed. Traditionally, m = 3 
or 5. Then, each complete dataset is analysed independently. Estimates of parameters 
of interest are averaged across the m copies to give a single estimate.” (Royston, 
2004) 
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Multiple imputation is considered one of the strongest methods for dealing with missing 
values. In Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2006) words, multiple imputation is currently considered 
“the most respectable method of dealing with missing data” (p. 72).  Tabachnick and Fidell 
particularly suggest this method for regression. One of the advantages of this method is that it 
makes no assumption about whether data are randomly missing (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). 
Three to five imputations are adequate in many situations (Rubin, 1996), and this criterion is 
widely considered sufficient. However, given Allison’s (2003) recommendation that a 
slightly larger number of imputations may be beneficial, in this study, 10 imputed data sets 
were created. Throughout the Results section, the results calculated based on the original data 
set with listwise deletion, and the results calculated based on multiple imputation are 
presented in parallel.  
  
Preliminary Analyses 
Table 5.1 show means and standard deviations for all variables included in the study. Prior to 
analysis, all variables were examined for accuracy of data entry, missing values, outliers, and 
normality. 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics for the variables for the immigrant sample 
 No. items N M  SD α Skewness Kurtosis 
Psychological well-being        
 Autonomy 9 65 43.10 6.52 .50 .570 -.053 
 Environmental mastery 9 64 44.04 8.17 .65 .320 -1.153 
 Personal growth 9 66 42.28 8.36 .67 .320 -.937 
 Positive relations 9 64 41.76 9.45 .75 .148 -.647 
 Self-acceptance 9 63 41.52 9.20 .76 .254 -.851 
 Purpose in life 9 59 40.86 10.87 .82 .269 -.676 
Subjective well-being        
 Life satisfaction 5 66 21.69 5.53 .71 -.263 -.918 
 Positive affect 6 62 19.04 3.55 .78 -.251 -.204 
 Negative affect 6 61 13.80 4.64 .78 .478 -.328 
Social axioms        
 Social cynicism 18 63 55.71 10.43 .82 -.432 -.253 
 Reward for application a 11 63 40.92 5.08 .63 -.172 -.832 
 Social complexity a 9 63 33.25 3.81 .49 .501 .516 
 Fate control a 6 64 17.32 3.46 .51 -.059 .216 
 Religiosity 8 64 26.87 5.55 .70 -.312 .051 
Other        
 Ethnic Identity 6 61 21.37 5.29 .87 -.607 .152 
 
ascores with items excluded to improve reliability. 
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Missing data. Analyses showed that all variables contained missing data on 4.5% or fewer of 
the cases except the two dependent variables. The percentage of missing values for 
psychological well-being and subjective well-being were 9.1 and 18.2 respectively. 
Considering that the amount of missing values is substantial and not to be ignored (Meyers, 
Gamst, & Guarino, 2006), multiple imputation was used to generate 10 possible complete 
datasets, replacing the missing values. The two outcome variables and social axioms were 
included in the multiple imputation. The analysis was conducted using SPSS 19. The pooled 
dataset was analysed in parallel to the original data set for regression and correlation analyses 
focusing on the relationships between the variables. For examining outliers, normality, 
internal reliability, t tests, and ANCOVAs, the original data file was used.  
Outliers. To identify the univariate outliers, the variables were examined. No univariate 
outlier was detected in the sample, as indicated by z scores falling between -3.29 and +3.29 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). No multivariate outlier was identified in the sample by means 
of inspection of Mahalanobis distances with p< .001 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Normality. A further step was to examine the normality of the variables. For this purpose, the 
skewness and kurtosis of the variables were calculated. Skewness and kurtosis of all variables 
are shown in Table 5.1. As shown in the table, results revealed that the skewness and kurtosis 
of all variables were well within the generally accepted range of -2 to +2, indicating that 
deviation from normality was not substantial. Therefore, no extra corrective measure was 
taken.  
Internal consistency. To examine the internal consistency of the scales, Cronbach’s alpha 
values were calculated for all scales. Initial analyses showed that three of the social axioms 
yielded very low alpha values. The analyses showed that the Cronbach’s alpha of the reward 
for application scale could be improved from .49 to .63 by eliminating three of the items (i.e., 
item 13, 30, and 38). The analyses also showed that the Cronbach’s alpha of the social 
complexity scale could be improved from .31 to .49 by eliminating three of the items (i.e., 
item 14, 31, and 36). Finally, the analyses showed that the Cronbach’s alpha of the fate 
control scale could be improved from .45 to .51 by eliminating two of the items (i.e., item 32 
and 56). Shortening has been used in previous research on social axioms to improve the 
alphas of the scales (e.g., Kurman & Ronen-Eilon, 2004). I also adopted this strategy in this 
study. After these modifications, the alpha values of these three scales were within the alpha 
range of the scales reported in past studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2006a; Singelis, Hubbard, & 
Her, 2003; Leung et al., 2007). Low alphas should be interpreted with caution given the small 
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size of the samples in this study. In all the analyses of the current study, the scores with items 
excluded were used. Internal consistencies of all scales are presented in Table 5.1.  
Gender differences. Gender differences in all variables of the study were examined using an 
independent t test. An alpha level of .05 was used. The results showed that there was only one 
significant gender difference: female students (M = 25.54, SD = 4.90) scored significantly 
lower than male students (M = 28.48, SD = 5.93) on religiosity, t (62) = 2.17, p = .03.  
Groups differences on demographic variables. The present study used three samples: an 
immigrant sample collected for the present study, an Iranian sample collected in the first 
study, and the UK student sample collected in the first study. The three samples were 
compared in terms of age, gender, and relationship status (see Table 5.2). The results of an 
ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference in age across the three groups (F (2, 
201) = 142.791, p< 0.01). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
immigrant group scores significantly higher than the Iranian (p < .001) and the UK student 
group (p < .001). The three samples were also significantly different in terms of relationship 
status [χ² (14) = 97.89, p<0.05], but not significantly different in gender ratio [χ² (2) = 4.98, 
p=0.08].   
 
 
Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics of the samples and inferential tests 
  M(SD) 
 
 
Iranians, Study 1 Iranians in 
England, current 
study  
UK sample, 
Study1 
Test 
Age 21.97(1.958) 21.08 (4.919) 39.52(11.34) ANOVA .00 
Sex    χ² 0.08 
 Female 37 45 35   
 Male 36 21 31   
Relationship    χ² 0.00 
 No partner 41 34 14   
 Not living with partner 17 18 15   
 Single and living with 
partner 
2 0 1   
 Married 9 6 24   
 Separated 1 2 2   
 Widowed 0 1 0   
 divorced 0 0 8   
 Other 3 0 0   
 Missing 0 5 0   
 
 
Bivariate correlation analysis. Table 5.3 demonstrates the bivariate correlations between all 
variables of the study using the original data. Table 5.4 shows the intercorrelations using the 
pooled data resulting from multiple imputation. The correlation matrices for Iranians living in 
Iran and the UK student sample are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. The magnitude 
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of the correlation coefficients is largely similar across the original and the pooled data sets. 
Examples of slight differences were: the correlation between total psychological well-being 
and ethnic identity was significant in the original data but was not significant in the pooled 
data. The correlation between social cynicism and religiosity was not significant in the pooled 
data but was significant in the original data. A final example is the correlation between 
reward for application and religiosity that was not significant in the original data but was 
significant in the pooled data.   
 
Table 5.3. Intercorrelations of the scales in the original data file, immigrant sample 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1
7 
                  
1.Total 
psychological 
well-being 
1                 
2.Autonomy .68*
* 
1                
3.Environment
al mastery 
.88*
* 
.62*
* 
1               
4.Personal 
growth 
.87*
* 
.60*
* 
.72*
* 
1              
5.Positive 
relations 
.85*
* 
.56*
* 
.65*
* 
.70*
* 
1             
6.Self-
acceptance 
.86*
* 
.62*
* 
.72*
* 
.73*
* 
.71*
* 
1            
7.Purpose in 
life 
.86*
* 
.39*
* 
.76*
* 
.70*
* 
.72*
* 
.58*
* 
1           
8.Total 
subjective 
well-being 
.56*
* 
.56*
* 
.50*
* 
.48*
* 
.53*
* 
.51*
* 
.51*
* 
1          
9.Life 
satisfaction 
.40*
* 
.43*
* 
.40*
* 
.33*
* 
.31* 
.41*
* 
.46*
* 
.82*
* 
1         
10.Positive 
affect 
.59*
* 
.52*
* 
.49*
* 
.47*
* 
.57*
* 
.52*
* 
.45*
* 
.82*
* 
.49*
* 
1        
11.Negative 
affect 
-
.43*
* 
-
.47*
* 
-
.42*
* 
-
.44*
* 
-
.48*
* 
-
.39*
* 
-
.33* 
-
.81*
* 
-
.40*
* 
-
.62*
* 
1       
12.Social 
cynicism 
-.03 -.10 .07 -.20 -.23 -.04 .030 -.19 -.02 -.17 
.28
* 
1      
13.Reward for 
application 
.36*
* 
.17 .22 .26* .30* .31* 
.35*
* 
.17 .24 .15 -.02 .18 1     
14.Social 
complexity 
.47*
* 
.24 
.35*
* 
.36*
* 
.42*
* 
.37*
* 
.40*
* 
.25* .24 
.33*
* 
-.11 -.06 
.39*
* 
1    
15.Fate control -
.36*
* 
-
.25* 
-
.28* 
-
.36*
* 
-
.33*
* 
-
.29* 
-
.48*
* 
-
.26* 
-
.32*
* 
-.15 .15 
.30
* 
.04 
-
.2
4 
1   
16.Religiosity .12 .13 .00 .04 
.36*
* 
.21 .04 .22 .06 
.36*
* 
-.21 -.16 .24 
-
.0
5 
.0
7 
1  
17.Ethnic 
Identity .34* .15 .28* 
.39*
* 
.43*
* 
.27* .30* .12 -.05 .11 -.21 .00 .15 
-
.0
7 
-
.0
2 
.33*
* 
1 
* p < 0.05  
** p < 0.01  
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Table 5.4. Intercorrelations of the scales in the pooled data, the immigrant sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1
7 
1.Total 
psychological 
well-being 
1                 
2.Autonomy .60*
* 
1                
3.Environme
ntal mastery 
.80*
* 
.62*
* 
1               
4.Personal 
growth 
.77*
* 
.60*
* 
.72*
* 
1              
5.Positive 
relations 
.76*
* 
.56*
* 
.65*
* 
.70*
* 
1             
6.Self-
acceptance 
.79*
* 
.62*
* 
.72*
* 
.73*
* 
.71*
* 
1            
7.Purpose in 
life 
.83*
* 
.39*
* 
.76*
* 
.70*
* 
.72*
* 
.58*
* 
1           
8.Total 
subjective 
well-being 
.54*
* 
.56*
* 
.49*
* 
.47*
* 
.51*
* 
.50*
* 
.51*
* 
1          
9.Life 
satisfaction 
.43*
* 
.43*
* 
.40*
* 
.33*
* 
.31* .41*
* 
.46*
* 
.77*
* 
1         
10.Positive 
affect 
.51*
* 
.52*
* 
.49*
* 
.47*
* 
.57*
* 
.52*
* 
.45*
* 
.79*
* 
.49*
* 
1        
11.Negative 
affect 
-
.40*
* 
-
.47*
* 
-
.42*
* 
-
.44*
* 
-
.48*
* 
-
.39*
* 
-
.33* 
-
.80*
* 
-
.40*
* 
-
.62*
* 
1       
12.Social 
cynicism 
-.01 -.09 .07 -.20 -.22 -.04 .02 -.17 -.02 -.16 .27
* 
1      
13.Reward 
for 
application 
.35*
* 
.17 .22 .26* .29* .31* .35*
* 
.16 .23 .15 -
.02 
.1
7 
1     
14.Social 
complexity 
.44*
* 
.26* .36*
* 
.38*
* 
.42*
* 
.39*
* 
.41*
* 
.26* .25* .33*
* 
-
.11 
-
.0
9 
.35*
* 
1    
15.Fate 
control 
-
.31* 
-.22 -.24 -
.31* 
-
.30* 
-.25 -
.47*
* 
-.22 -
.29* 
-.13 .12 .2
5 
.03 -
.2
3 
1   
16.Religiosit
y 
.12 .11 .04 .07 .35*
* 
.21 .08 .15 .02 .25 -
.18 
-
.1
6 
.28* -
.0
8 
.0
6 
1  
17.Ethnic 
Identity 
.26 .15 .28* .39*
* 
.43*
* 
.27* .30* .10 -.05 .11 -
.21 
.0
0 
.14 -
.0
7 
-
.0
0 
.38*
* 
1 
* p < 0.05  
** p < 0.01  
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Table 5.5. Intercorrelations of the scales in Iranians living in Iran (from Study 
1) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1
6 
1.Total 
psychological 
well-being 
1      
 
          
2.Autonomy .68*
* 
1               
3.Environmen
tal mastery 
.88*
* 
.44*
* 
1              
4.Personal 
growth 
.80*
* 
.46*
* 
.64*
* 
1             
5.Positive 
relations 
.85*
* 
.52*
* 
.71*
* 
.52*
* 
1            
6.Self-
acceptance 
.84*
* 
.44*
* 
.72*
* 
.58*
* 
.67*
* 
1           
7.Purpose in 
life 
.83*
* 
.45*
* 
.72*
* 
.76*
* 
.60*
* 
.57*
* 
1          
8.Total 
subjective 
well-being 
.61*
* 
.24* .62*
* 
.40*
* 
.57*
* 
.73*
* 
.34*
* 
1         
9.Life 
satisfaction 
.56*
* 
.12 .65*
* 
.40*
* 
.49*
* 
.69*
* 
.33*
* 
.90*
* 
1        
10.Positive 
affect 
.53*
* 
.27* .48*
* 
.33*
* 
.56*
* 
.65*
* 
.25* .87*
* 
.67*
* 
1       
11.Negative 
affect 
-
.48*
* 
-
.30* 
-
.45*
* 
-
.30*
* 
-
.45*
* 
-
.53*
* 
-
.30*
* 
-
.83*
* 
-
.57*
* 
-
.68*
* 
1      
12.Social 
cynicism 
-
.45*
* 
-
.23* 
-
.44*
* 
-
.32*
* 
-
.45*
* 
-
.44*
* 
-
.27* 
-
.60*
* 
-
.44*
* 
-
.57*
* 
.61*
* 
1     
13.Reward 
for 
application 
.20 .05 .24* .24* .03 .20 .25* .15 .14 .12 -.12 -.06 1    
14.Social 
complexity 
.24* .18 .21 .25* .08 .13 .35*
* 
-.05 -.05 -.09 -.01 .14 .52*
* 
1   
15.Fate 
control 
-.13 -
.29* 
-.00 -.16 -.15 -.14 .05 -.13 -.04 -.19 .15 .40*
* 
-.00 .15 1  
16.Religiosity 
.28* .16 .24* .34*
* 
.14 .24* .29* .22 .09 .21 -
.33*
* 
-
.36*
* 
.55*
* 
.27
* 
-
.33*
* 
1 
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Table 5.6. Intercorrelations of the scales in the UK student sample (from Study 1)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1
6 
1.Total 
psychological 
well-being 
1                
2.Autonomy .62*
* 
1               
3.Environment
al mastery 
.75*
* 
.32*
* 
1              
4.Personal 
growth 
.75*
* 
.39*
* 
.48*
* 
1             
5.Positive 
relations 
.78*
* 
.31* .57*
* 
.40*
* 
1            
6.Self-
acceptance 
.80*
* 
.47*
* 
.56*
* 
.62*
* 
.60*
* 
1           
7.Purpose in 
life 
.71*
* 
.16 .55*
* 
.54*
* 
.58*
* 
.42*
* 
1          
8.Total 
subjective 
well-being 
.41*
* 
.16 .52*
* 
.08 .54*
* 
.46*
* 
.19 1         
9.Life 
satisfaction 
.34*
* 
-.02 .55*
* 
.10 .39*
* 
.36*
* 
.24 .72*
* 
1        
10.Positive 
affect 
.18 .10 .25* -.16 .37*
* 
.24* -.01 .83*
* 
.36*
* 
1       
11.Negative 
affect 
-
.48*
* 
-
.33*
* 
-
.41*
* 
-
.32*
* 
-
.51*
* 
-
.49*
* 
-.22 -
.74*
* 
-
.27* 
-
.50*
* 
1      
12.Social 
cynicism 
-.23 .00 -
.30* 
-.05 -
.38*
* 
.06 -
.29* 
-.02 -.10 .01 .00 1     
13.Reward for 
application 
.18 .09 .06 .20 -.04 .06 .20 -.00 -.13 .10 .02 .23 1    
14.Social 
complexity 
.10 -.01 -.04 .08 .01 .11 .16 -.05 -.10 -.01 .00 .00 .27
* 
1   
15.Fate control -
.34*
* 
-
.27* 
-
.31* 
-.23 -
.32* 
-.18 -
.36*
* 
-.16 .02 -.11 .31
* 
.53*
* 
.05 .0
5 
1  
16.Religiosity 
-.12 -.22 -.10 -.17 .06 -.19 -.04 .06 .03 .11 .03 .04 .25
* 
-
.0
9 
.1
3 
1 
 
 
 
Main Analyses 
The social axioms and subjective and psychological well-being scores were compared among 
the three groups of Iranian immigrants in the UK (the sample of the current study), Iranians 
in Iran (the sample used in Study 1), and the UK student sample in the UK (the sample used 
in Study 1) using a series of ANCOVAs. Considering that shortened versions of social 
complexity, fate control, and reward for application were being used in the current study, the 
same items were selected from the data from Study 1 to make the comparison possible. 
Considering that the samples from Study 1 mainly consisted of young adults, and the sample 
of the current study was more heterogeneous in terms of age, age was added as a covariate in 
all the ANCOVAs. Age did not interact significantly with group membership in any of the 
analyses. Therefore, the interaction is excluded in the results. Means and SDs for all variables 
across groups are shown in Table 5.7.   
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Table 5.7. Means and SDs  
 Iranians in Iran  Iranians in the UK  UK student in the UK 
 N M SD  N M SD  N M SD 
Social Cynicism 71 53.30 6.94  63 55.71 10.43  64 52.31 8.66 
Religiosity 73 29.82 5.15  64 26.87 5.55  65 24.26 7.19 
Social complexity 73 33.32 3.35  63 33.25 3.81  64 34.68 3.65 
Reward for 
application 
73 42.06 5.60  63 40.92 5.08  64 40.90 5.30 
Fate Control 73 17.47 3.05  64 17.32 3.46  64 16.54 3.54 
Subjective well-
being 
73 26.04 14.18  60 27.05 11.23  65 31.92 10.72 
Psychological well-
being 
70 252.7
0 
41.63  54 253.4
0 
43.77  60 265.9
3 
31.74 
Age  73 21.97 1.95  65 39.52 11.35  66 21.08 4.91 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would yield social cynicism scores 
which are intermediate between those of the UK students and Iranians in Iran. A between-
subjects ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group membership on social 
cynicism in the three groups, controlling for age.  
There was a significant effect of group membership on social cynicism (F (2, 193) = 2.898, p 
= 0.05, η2 = .029). Age did not significantly contribute to the prediction of social cynicism (F 
(1, 193) = 1.605, p = 0.20, η2 = .008). Group differences in social cynicism are displayed in 
Figure 5.1. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated no significant 
differences between the groups. The results of trend analyses showed that there was no linear 
trend (p = .472). Instead, the pattern of group differences was consistent with a quadratic 
trend (p =.021). Therefore, the first hypothesis of the study was not supported by the data.  
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Figure 5.1. Social cynicism across groups 
Note: British means the UK student sample 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would yield religiosity scores which 
are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in Iran. A between-
subject ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group membership on religiosity 
in the three groups, controlling for age.  
There was a significant effect of group membership on religiosity (F (2, 197) = 15.174, p< 
0.001, η2 = .133). Age did not significantly contribute to the prediction of religiosity (F (1, 
197) = 1.014, p = 0.315, η2 = .005). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the difference between Iranians in Iran and Iranians in the UK (p = .013), the 
difference between Iranians in Iran and the UK students in the UK (p< .001), and the 
difference between Iranians in the UK and the UK students in the UK (p = .038) were 
statistically significant. Iranians in Iran scored significantly higher than the other two groups 
on religiosity. Group differences in religiosity are displayed in Figure 5.2. Given that Iranians 
in the UK fell in between the other two groups, the second hypothesis of the present study 
was supported. The results of a trend analysis confirmed that there was a significant linear 
trend (p< .001).  
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Figure 5.2. Religiosity across groups 
Note: British means the UK student sample 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would show social complexity scores 
which are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in Iran. A 
between- subjects ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group membership on 
social complexity in the three groups, controlling for age.  
There was a significant effect of group membership on social complexity (F (2, 195) = 4.942, 
p< 0.01, η2 = .048). Age did not significantly contribute to the prediction of social complexity 
(F (1, 195) = 3.005, p = .085, η2 = .015). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the UK students in the UK scored higher than Iranians in Iran (p = .07) and 
Iranians in England (p = .06). These differences were only marginally significant. The results 
of a trend analysis showed that there was a significant linear trend (p = .023). However, the 
descriptive statistics (see Table 5.7) show that the scores of Iranians in England did not 
actually fall between the two other groups, despite this significant linear trend. Thus, this 
hypothesis is not supported by the data. Group differences in social complexity are displayed 
in Figure 5.3. 
 
122 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Social complexity across groups 
Note: British means the UK student sample 
 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would show reward for application 
scores which are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in 
Iran. A between- subjects ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group 
membership on reward for application in the three groups, controlling for age.  
The main effect of group membership on reward for application was not significant (F (2, 
195) = 1.26, p = .284, η2 = .013). Age did not significantly contribute to the prediction of 
reward for application (F (1, 195) = .366, p = .54, η2 = .002). Moreover, the group differences 
were not consistent with a linear trend (p = .22). Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported 
by the results. Group differences in social complexity are displayed in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4. Reward for application across groups 
Note: British means the UK student sample 
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Hypothesis 5 
The fifth hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would show fate control scores which 
are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in Iran. A between-
subjects ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group membership on fate control 
in the three groups, controlling for age. The effect of group membership on fate control was 
not significant (F (2, 196) = 2.776, p = .06, η2 = .028). Age did not significantly contribute to 
the prediction of fate control (F (1, 196) = 3.115, p = .08, η2 = .016). There was no significant 
linear trend (p = 0.087). Given these results, the fifth hypothesis of the study was not 
supported. Group differences in fate control are displayed in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Fate control across groups 
Note: British means the UK student sample 
 
Hypothesis 6 
This hypothesis predicted that the UK students in the UK would score higher than native 
Iranians and Iranian immigrants in the UK on subjective well-being. A between-subjects 
ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group membership on subjective well-
being, controlling for age. There was a significant effect of group membership on subjective 
well-being (F (2, 193) = 3.901, p = 0.022, η2 = .04). Age did not significantly contribute to 
the prediction of subjective well-being (F (1, 193) = .069, p = .792, η2<.001). These results 
supported the hypothesis. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
difference between Iranians in Iran and the UK students in the UK (p = .015) was statistically 
significant. Group differences in subjective well-being are displayed in Figure 5.6.  
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Figure 5.6. Subjective well-being across groups 
Note: British means the UK student sample 
 
Hypothesis 7 
This hypothesis predicted that the UK students in the UK would score higher than native 
Iranians and Iranian immigrants in the UK on psychological well-being. A between-subjects 
ANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group membership on psychological well-
being, controlling for age. Group membership did not have a significant effect on 
psychological well-being (F (2, 179) = 2.866, p = .060, η2 = .031). Age did not significantly 
contribute to the prediction of psychological well-being (F (1, 179) = 1.292, p = .257, η2 = 
.007). These results are not consistent with hypothesis 5.7. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Psychological well-being across groups 
Note: British means the UK student sample 
 
Hypotheses 8 to 12 
For this set of hypotheses, only data relating to Iranians in the UK was used. Both original 
data with listwise deletion and the pooled data set produced by multiple imputation were 
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analysed. In most of cases, the original and pooled results were consistent. Zero-order 
correlations reported in tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicate that social cynicism was not significantly 
related to both aspects of well-being. There was only a single significant correlation between 
social cynicism and one component of subjective well-being (negative affect). Therefore, 
hypothesis 8, which predicted that social cynicism would be unrelated to mental well-being, 
was largely supported. 
Reward for application was significantly and positively correlated with psychological well-
being, and unrelated to subjective well-being. Therefore, hypothesis 9, which predicted a 
positive correlation between reward for application and mental well-being, was partially 
supported.  
Social complexity was also significantly and positively associated with aspects of both 
psychological and subjective well-being. These results indicate that hypothesis 10, which 
posited a positive correlation between social complexity and mental well-being was 
supported.  
Fate control was negatively associated with psychological and subjective well-being. Hence, 
the results supported hypothesis 11, which predicted a negative relationship between fate 
control and mental well-being.  
Finally, there were significant correlations between religiosity and life satisfaction and 
positive relationships with others (see Table 5.3). The results using the pooled data indicated 
that there was a significant positive correlation between religiosity and positive relations (r = 
0.36, p< .01), but not between religiosity and life satisfaction (r = 0.06, p = .59). Given these 
results, hypothesis 12, which posited a positive relationship between religiosity and mental 
well-being, is weakly supported.  
To investigate these relationships more thoroughly, two separate regression analyses were 
conducted for each dimension of well-being. Subjective well-being was regressed on all five 
social axiom dimensions. The results indicated that 21.1% (adjusted 12.8%) of the total 
variance in subjective well-being was explained by the overall model comprising all social 
axioms, R2= .211, adjusted R2 = .128, F (5, 47) = 2.521, p = .04. However, inspection of 
regression coefficients indicated that none of the social beliefs significantly predicted 
subjective well-being in this sample. The results are shown in 5.8. These findings were 
matched by the analysis of the pooled data 
Given the small sample size, I decided to rerun the analysis excluding predictors with low 
regression weights. Social cynicism and reward for application were removed. Results 
indicated that 19.4% (adjusted 14.7%) of the total variance in subjective well-being was 
explained by the overall model comprising all three social axioms, R2= .1941, adjusted R2 = 
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.147, F (3, 52) = 4.169, p = .010. This time, fate control was a significant negative predictor, 
and the contribution of religiosity was a marginally significant positive predictor (p = .054). 
However, in the pooled data none of the contributions were significant. All in all, one can 
conclude that social axioms were not strong predictors of subjective well-being among this 
group of Iranian immigrants.  
Table 5.8. Regression models predicting aspects of well-being in immigrants 
   Original data  Pooled data 
Dependent variable Predictors  b  β t  b t 
Subjective well-being social cynicism  -.09 -.09 -.63  -.12 -.79 
religiosity  .33 .17 1.23  .26 .89 
reward for application  .24 .10 .64  .18 .56 
social complexity  .56 .19 1.19  .57 1.33 
fate control  -.78 -.25 -1.77  -.53 -1.22 
         
Subjective well-being religiosity  .47 .24 1.97  .35 1.38 
 social complexity  .63 .21 1.69  .68 1.83 
 fate control  -.85 -.27 -2.14*  -.59 -1.44 
         
Psychological well-
being 
social cynicism  .67 .15 1.23  .30 .54 
religiosity  1.19 .16 1.15  .94 1.01 
reward for application  -.45 -.04 -.27  1.75 1.40 
social complexity  5.95 .53 3.24**  3.69 2.48* 
fate control  -3.6 -.27 -2.17*  
 
-3.33 -1.99* 
* p< .05; ** p<.01 
Note: In the original data set, listwise deletion is used to handle missing values. The 
pooled data set is produced by multiple imputation. Number of imputations = 10.  
 
 
Another regression analysis was conducted to examine if social axioms would predict 
psychological well-being. Results indicated that 39.1% of the total variance in psychological 
well-being was explained by the overall model comprising all social axioms, R2= .211, 
adjusted R2 = .317, F (5, 41) = 5.265, p = .001. Inspection of the regression coefficients 
indicated that fate control negatively (β = -.278) and social complexity positively (β = .533) 
significantly predicted psychological well-being in this sample. The pooled results also 
showed that fate control and social complexity significantly predicted psychological well-
being. The results are shown in Table 5.8.  
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Hypothesis 13 
For the hypotheses related to ethnic identity, only data related to Iranians in the UK were 
used. Both original data with listwise deletion and the pooled data set produced through 
multiple imputation were analysed. As expected the MEIM-R was significantly positively 
correlated with psychological well-being (r = .34, p< .05). However, the pooled results 
indicated that the correlation between the MEIM-R and psychological well-being was not 
significant (r = .269, p> .05). The MEIM-R was not significantly correlated with subjective 
well-being (r = .125, p = .349). The pooled results also confirmed that the MEIM-R was not 
significantly correlated with subjective well-being (r = .101, p = .453). However, the pooled 
results confirmed that MEIM-R was positively correlated with environmental mastery (.28, p 
<.05), personal growth (.39, p <.01), positive relationships (.44, p <.001), self-acceptance 
(.27, p <.05), and purpose in life (.30, p <.05). Overall, there was a moderate relationship 
between MEIM-R and aspects of psychological well-being. The relationship between MEIM-
R and subjective well-being, however, was not significant in this sample.  
 
 
Hypothesis 14 
Using several regression analyses, it was tested whether the MEIM-R would interact with any 
of the social axioms in their effect on subjective and psychological well-being. For this 
purpose, 10 regression analyses were conducted. The predictor and moderator were centred in 
any moderation analysis before forming the interaction term. To centre a variable, the sample 
mean is subtracted from a variable’s scores. In the present set of analyses, the MEIM-R and 
social axioms were all mean-centred for testing moderation hypotheses. The results of the 10 
moderation analyses are reported in Table 5.9. 
The only significant moderation effect was that between fate control and the MEIM-R 
predicting subjective well-being. The results related to this significant moderation effect are 
presented in Table 5.9. Mean-centred fate control, mean-centred MEIM-R, and the 
interaction between the two variables were entered in the model as predictors of subjective 
well-being. The results indicated that 15.5% of the total variance in subjective well-being was 
explained by the overall model, R2= .155, adjusted R2 = .107, F (3, 52) = 3.191, p< .05. The 
inspection of regression coefficients indicated that MEIM-R and the interaction term 
significantly predicted subjective well-being in this sample. Considering that the interaction 
term between fate control and the MEIM-R was significant, there was a significant 
moderation effect. The pooled results confirmed this conclusion. The results are shown in 
Table 4.9, and schematically presented in Figure 4.8. Inspection of the results suggest that for 
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those scoring low on the MEIM-R, the relationship between fate control and subjective well-
being was nonsignificant, but for those scoring high, there was a strong negative relationship 
between the two variables.  
 
Table 5.9. Moderation analyses 
   Original data  Pooled data 
No. Dependent  Predictors b β t  b t 
 variable        
1 Subjective well-
being 
MEIM-R .88 .41 .78  .59 .52 
Social cynicism .01 .01 .03  -.03 -.09 
MEIM-R × Social 
cynicism 
-.01 -.39 -.58  -.01 -.38 
2 Subjective well-
being 
MEIM-R -
1.02 
-.48 -.53  -
1.05 
-.59 
Reward for application -.04 -.01 -.05  -.05 -.07 
MEIM-R × Reward for 
application 
.03 .64 .64  .03 .70 
3 Subjective well-
being 
MEIM-R 2.41 1.12 1.10  1.85 .84 
Social complexity 1.83 .62 1.67  1.62 1.49 
MEIM-R × Social 
complexity 
-.06 -
1.03 
-.97  -.05 -.74 
4 Subjective well-
being 
MEIM-R 2.07 .94 2.29*  2.0 2.18* 
Fate control 1.25 .40 1.21  1.23 1.17 
MEIM-R × Fate control -.13 -1.1 -2.16*  -.13 -2.12* 
5 Subjective well-
being 
MEIM-R .15 .07 .12  .21 .17 
Religiosity .23 .12 .29  .30 .37 
MEIM-R × Religiosity .00 .11 .14  .00 .05 
6 Psychological well-
being 
MEIM-R -
3.67 
-.43 -.77  -
3.16 
-.71 
Social cynicism -
2.68 
-.62 -1.56  -
2.07 
-1.23 
MEIM-R × Social 
cynicism 
.15 1.04 1.43  .12 1.24 
7 Psychological well-
being 
MEIM-R 5.05 .59 .65  1.84 .26 
Reward for application 3.60 .40 1.29  2.85 1.03 
MEIM-R × Reward for 
application 
-.07 -.35 -.34  .00 .00 
8 Psychological well-
being 
MEIM-R 9.82 1.15 1.30  6.73 .85 
Social complexity 8.33 .76 2.26*  7.21 1.86 
MEIM-R × Social 
complexity 
-.21 -.84 -.90  -.13 -.55 
9 Psychological well-
being 
MEIM-R 4.51 .53 1.30  2.68 .77 
Fate control -
3.40 
-.26 -.88  -
3.60 
-.89 
MEIM-R × Fate control -.10 -.21 -.43  -.02 -.11 
10 Psychological well-
being 
MEIM-R 1.35 .15 .27  1.69 .34 
Religiosity -.94 -.12 -.29  -.18 -.05 
MEIM-R × Religiosity .06 .24 .32  .01 .07 
Note. The MEIM-R and fate control were mean-centred.  
* p < .05 
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Figure 5.8. The relationship between fate control and subjective well-being as moderated by 
ethnic identity 
 
 
Discussion 
Hypotheses 1 
The first hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would show social cynicism scores 
which are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in Iran. This 
hypothesis was not supported by the data. Instead, I found that Iranian immigrants scored the 
highest among the three groups, although this difference was not statistically significant. The 
finding that social cynicism is fairly high in Iranian immigrants compared to the other groups 
should be interpreted in view of the fact that social cynicism is not a robust negative predictor 
of mental well-being in Iranian immigrants (see Table 5.3). Therefore, a strong endorsement 
of social cynicism beliefs does not seem dysfunctional in this group. This is inconsistent with 
the finding of Study 1 that social cynicism was a significant negative predictor of both 
dimensions of well-being in the Iranian and the UK students in the UK samples of Study 1. 
This finding is however consistent with the finding of Study 2 that social cynicism was not 
significantly negatively correlated with mental well-being in a group of Iranian students 
living in Iran. I argued that a significant drop in quality of life of Iranians at the time of data 
collection for Study 2 may have contributed to this change in the function of social cynicism. 
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That is, in some challenging contexts, being a cynic may turn out not to be dysfunctional. For 
example, a cynic may not fall prey to many social and financial traps in a challenging social 
situation.  
This may apply to Iranian immigrants as well. In the introduction of this study, I described 
the difficulties that Iranian and other Muslim immigrants face in Western countries. It can be 
suggested that given these challenges, being a cynic may not have its negative effects on 
mental well-being that it may have in a better social situation. In sum, these findings show 
that social cynicism is not significantly negatively associated with mental well-being, and 
that Iranian immigrants do not score lower than the other groups on social cynicism. This, 
nevertheless, does not seem to be harmful for this group in adjusting to a relatively 
threatening environment. These speculations should be empirically tested in future studies 
though. Using larger samples may result in significant differences between the groups on 
social cynicism. Also, longitudinal studies should be conducted to examine if immigrants’ 
initial levels of social axioms would help or harm their adjustment to the host culture.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would show religiosity scores which 
are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in Iran. This 
hypothesis was supported by the results of the linear trend analysis. I found that Iranians 
living in Iran scored the highest, the UK students in the UK scored the lowest, and Iranian 
immigrants fell in between the two other groups. This finding is in line with theoretical and 
empirical work assuming that immigrants gradually absorb new values and norms prevalent 
in their host cultures (Inglehart & Norris, 2009; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), but this is not the 
only possible interpretation of this finding as discussed below.  
It turned out that the largest difference in social axioms between Iranians living in Iran and 
the UK students in the UK was in the levels of religiosity (as indicated by a large η2 found for 
religiosity relative to other social beliefs). Based on these data, one could speculate that when 
individuals of an original culture emigrate to a new culture, it is possible that they absorb the 
values and beliefs prevalent in the host culture, even in the most critical aspects that capture 
the core differences between the two cultures. If this speculation turns out to be true in future 
longitudinal studies, these findings can be taken to provide evidence for the malleability of 
social beliefs.  
When faced with a secular culture ruled by democratic (rather than theocratic) regulations, 
Muslim immigrants may reconsider their core belief that religion is the most important source 
of optimal functioning for individuals and societies. However, one cannot rule out the 
131 
 
possibility that Iranian immigrants are actually a group of less religious Iranians who have 
emigrated to the UK to live in a more secular environment. In other words, it is possible that 
immigration has not produced lower levels of religiosity in the immigrant group relative to 
the non-immigrant Iranian group. Future longitudinal studies could help to unravel these 
complexities.    
 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would show social complexity scores 
which are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in Iran. I 
found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. The immigrants’ social complexity scores 
were almost identical to that of the non-immigrant Iranians. This means that emigration to the 
UK may have no effect on Iranian immigrants’ endorsement of social complexity beliefs. Of 
course, given the small sample size, this interpretation remains too speculative. This at the 
same time may indicate that Iranians who choose to emigrate are not necessarily those who 
show a stronger endorsement of social complexity beliefs, as some may expect.  
I argued that social complexity may be an important category of beliefs that is useful in new 
environments (such as in the context of immigration), because it facilitates exploring new 
ways of doing things, which may be a central prerequisite to successful acculturation. The 
findings of the regression analyses are consistent with this speculation. Social complexity 
was positively associated with psychological well-being in Iranian immigrants (see Table 
5.8). That Iranians in the UK show no evidence of stronger endorsement of social complexity 
beliefs is perhaps one of the reasons why they are not happier than non-immigrant Iranians, 
and they are less happy than the UK sample (see findings related to hypothesis 6).       
 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would show reward for application 
scores which are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in 
Iran. This hypothesis was not supported. I found no significant difference between the three 
groups, which suggests that the two cultures do not differ largely on this social belief, and 
immigration does not result in any remarkable change in the belief regarding reward for 
application in Iranian immigrants.  
It can be considered unfortunate that social complexity and reward for application, which are 
among the most important aspects of social beliefs when dealing with new environments and 
new challenges, were not strongly endorsed by Iranian immigrants compared to Iranians 
living in Iran. Reward for application has been previously found to contribute to the mental 
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well-being and successful coping of immigrants (Saftdar et al., 2006). Therefore, these 
findings may help us partly explain why Iranian immigrants were not found to be happier 
than non-immigrant Iranians, and they are less happy than the UK sample (see findings 
related to hypothesis 6). These findings can form a platform for future educational 
programmes for Muslim immigrants in Western countries. The development of social 
complexity (which facilitates exploring and trying new ways of doing things) and reward for 
application beliefs (which facilitates active coping) may help immigrants not to end up in a 
state of hopelessness in the face of the challenges posed by immigration.     
 
Hypothesis 5 
The fifth hypothesis predicted that Iranians in the UK would yield fate control scores which 
are intermediate between those of the UK students in the UK and Iranians in Iran. The 
findings did not support this hypothesis. No significant difference was found between the 
three groups, which may suggest that the two cultures do not differ largely on this social 
belief domain, and immigration does not result in any remarkable changes in the level of fate 
control in Iranian immigrants. I previously found that lower fate control contributes to both 
dimensions of mental well-being (i.e., subjective and psychological) in Iranian immigrants. 
Therefore, Iranian immigrants may greatly benefit from lower levels of fate control.  
It is also noteworthy that although the present UK sample’s score on fate control was not 
significantly different from those of the Iranian groups, prior research shows that the British 
are quite low on this social belief dimension compared with other nations including Iran 
(Leung & Bond, 2004). This is also consistent with prior research showing that non-
Westerners score higher on scales of external locus of control compared to Westerners (e.g., 
Smith, Trompenaars, & Dugan, 1995). These findings indicate that in the British cultural 
environment, fate control beliefs are not strongly endorsed. This may indicate that Iranian 
immigrants have not been largely influenced by this aspect of the British culture.  
These findings can be compared with findings on religiosity. Iranian immigrants’ religiosity 
beliefs are statistically different from Iranians living in Iran. That is, their religiosity level lies 
in between that of non-immigrant Iranians and the UK sample. However, Iranian immigrants’ 
fate control beliefs do not show the same pattern. If we accept that Iranian immigrants have 
come to endorse religiosity beliefs less strongly under the influence of the British culture, we 
may conclude that fate control beliefs are possible to be less changeable in immigrants than 
religiosity beliefs.  
If we agree with this line of arguing, why is that so? What does drive this difference between 
religiosity beliefs and fate control beliefs? One reason for this might be that it is quite easy 
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for immigrants to notice non-religious or alternative religious practices (e.g., Christian 
religious behaviours and symbols) in the host culture, as religious beliefs are generally 
explicitly demonstrated in religious practice (or the lack of religiosity is explicit in many 
aspects of individuals’ behaviour and society). Therefore, it would be easier for immigrants 
to notice and reflect on these aspects of the host culture, and accordingly absorb some non-
Islamic aspects of the new culture. However, fate control beliefs may be less explicitly 
expressed by people, or if expressed may be difficult to interpret by lay observers.  
For example, when a Muslim immigrant gets involved in simple everyday practices in the 
host culture (e.g., shopping, or just walking along a street), it is easily possible for him or her 
to notice many behaviours which are not consistent with Islam (e.g., women dancing, non-
Islamic dress codes, non-Islamic patterns of male-female relationships, etc.) in every corner 
of the city. However, it is difficult for them to figure out the motives behind the others’ 
behaviours, let alone to judge if these behaviours are externally or internally driven. 
Therefore, immigrants have less access to the locus of control or fate beliefs held by people 
in the host environment than their religious beliefs. This accessibility may lead to more 
awareness that may produce a higher chance of change with regard to religious beliefs, in 
comparison to fate control beliefs. These suggestions are all too speculative for the time 
being without further empirical studies and should be investigated in future.  
 
Hypothesis 6 and 7 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 predicted that the UK students in the UK would score higher than native 
Iranians and Iranian immigrants in the UK on aspects of well-being. This hypothesis was 
supported for subjective well-being, but not for psychological well-being. With regards to 
subjective well-being, the general pattern showed that the UK sample scored higher than the 
other two groups, although only the difference between the UK students in the UK and 
Iranians inside Iran was significant. This finding is consistent with past studies showing that 
Iran scores lower than the UK on subjective well-being (e.g., Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, & 
Welzel, 2008).  
However, with regards to psychological well-being, no significant difference was observed 
among the three groups. We do not have prior research comparing Iranians and the British on 
psychological well-being, and thus these findings are a novel contribution to well-being 
studies in Iran. It turns out that although Iranians are less happy (that is they experience less 
positive affect, more negative affect, and less satisfaction with life), they are not necessarily 
lower on psychological well-being and optimal functioning than the UK samples (based on 
the self-reports). This is an interesting finding confirming the importance of including both 
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subjective and psychological well-being scales in well-being studies, as the results for 
subjective well-being only may draw a less accurate picture of the standing of nations and 
groups on mental well-being.  
The fact that Iranian immigrants were not happier or higher on psychological well-being than 
Iranians in Iran may reflect that migration to a wealthier country (at least to the UK) does not 
make an Iranian happier. If it is the case that many Iranians migrate to achieve more financial 
resources (which may be the case given Iran’s weak economic status compared to Western 
countries), these findings are in line with the findings of Bartram (2011, p. 56), who showed 
that “migration as a means of increasing one’s income might be no more effective in raising 
happiness”, using data from a large sample of nations. Overall, these findings indicate that 
migration does not necessarily lead to better mental well-being.  
Of course, it might be the case that migration has some benefits for mental well-being, but 
that challenges posed to Muslim immigrants may neutralize these benefits. For example, 
discrimination is an important factor. Muslims in Western societies are the target of 
discrimination, such as being perceived as terrorists, which leads to worries and mental 
disorders (Ali, Liu, & Humedian, 2004; Moradi & Hasan, 2004; Segal, 1998). The negative 
and biased media coverage of Muslims and Islam is another challenge for immigrants from 
Iran and other Muslim nations in the West (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007).  
The phenomenon of Islamophobia (i.e., fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims) has led to 
discrimination and prevalence of prejudices against Muslims in secular Western countries, 
which can lead to social segregation of Muslim minorities (Ghaffari & Ciftci, 2010; Marshall 
& Ghazal Read, 2003). It is well documented in the literature that perceived discrimination 
(i.e., a sense of “being treated unfairly or negatively or being teased, threatened, or feeling 
unaccepted because of one’s ethnicity”, Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006, p. 311) is 
associated with smaller frequency of participation in the host culture and sometimes less 
successful adjustment (Berry eta l., 2006; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, Horenczyk, & Schmitz, 
2003). Therefore, many socio-cultural factors may collectively undermine Iranian 
immigrants’ mental well-being, neutralising the benefits of living in a more democratic and 
wealthy environment.  
Iranian immigrants may be characterised by a tendency to hold on to their original culture’s 
value system. This is reflected in a fairly high ethnic identity score for Iranian immigrants in 
the present sample (see discussion for hypothesis 13). Although attachment to one’s ethnic 
culture seems to be beneficial for the mental health of Iranians in some ways, if accompanied 
by sticking to some ineffective traditional norms and values, this tendency may be harmful in 
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a modern context. That is, reluctance to sacrifice traditional norms for the sake of one’s 
personal well-being may at times harm Iranian immigrants’ sense of well-being.  
For example, research shows that south Asian Muslims in the USA are reluctant to forgo 
family loyalty for the sake of their personal sense of well-being (Das & Kemp, 1997). This is 
also reflected in conflicts between parents and children over various modern and traditional 
norms. For example, Sayegh, Kellough, Otilingam, and Poon’s (2013) review indicates that 
intergenerational disagreement on family norms contributes to mental disorders among Asian 
Muslims in the USA. The same traditional beliefs prevent many Muslims from seeking 
professional help when dealing with serious mental problems. For example, Middle Eastern 
Muslims “are more accustomed to seeking advice about personal problems within their 
family support network than outside of it, as doing so may indicate disloyalty to one’s family 
and may be considered shameful…” (Sayegh, Kellough, Otilingam, & Poon, 2013, p. 226). 
Therefore, a collection of societal, psychological, and cultural characteristics in Iranian 
immigrants may come to neutralise the benefit they may get from immigrating to a wealthy 
democratic country.  
 
Hypotheses 8 to 12 
The results of the correlational analyses showed that social cynicism was largely unrelated to 
mental well-being. This finding is consistent with the findings of Study 2, which showed that 
social cynicism was unrelated to mental well-being among Iranian university students. As 
discussed in Study 2 (Chapter 4), this finding is, however, inconsistent with the majority of 
prior studies. In Study 2, I argued that this nonsignificant association might be a result of 
major economic-social problems of Iranian society, which may come to make social cynicism 
not so harmful. The same argument can be made for this sample of Iranian immigrants living 
in the UK. Prior research indicates that immigrants (especially Muslim immigrants) may face 
countless challenges in secular Western countries. In such a context, social cynicism may 
have less negative effects than it may have in more stabilised contexts (see Study 2 for more 
arguments).   
Reward for application was found to be significantly positively correlated with psychological 
well-being, and unrelated to subjective well-being. But these relationships seemed to be weak 
as in the regression analyses, when other variables were controlled for, reward for application 
did not explain a significant amount of variance. However, this positive relationship is still 
interesting. Reward for application may help an immigrant to use active coping strategies in 
the context of the new country, which is helpful to adjustment and achievement. These 
findings support the importance of reward for application for immigrants. Moreover, reward 
136 
 
for application was only associated with psychological well-being and not subjective well-
being. This might be because trying to actively deal with problems in everyday life may in 
fact decrease the frequency of positive affect and increase the frequency of negative affect in 
the short term. However, the long-term outcome of holding reward for application beliefs can 
be acquisition of more psychological strengths.  
Through practising problem-solving skills in this process, a person can grow more 
psychologically, and build more psychological strengths internally and in relationship with 
others. This is reflected in the present findings, as reward for application was associated with 
better psychological functioning. Altogether, the finding that reward for application has 
differential relationships with subjective and psychological well-being confirms the 
importance of including both aspects of well-being in psychological research and is in line 
with prior research showing that these two aspects of well-being have various sets of 
correlates (e.g., Joshanloo, Rastegar, & Bakhshi, 2012), at least when the current well-being 
scales are used.  
   Social complexity was found to be one of the most robust predictors of mental well-being 
in the present study. The results of correlation analyses revealed that social complexity 
predicted various aspects of psychological and subjective well-being in Iranian immigrants. 
The results of the regression analyses showed that social complexity was a significant 
predictor of psychological well-being (but not subjective well-being) when other aspects of 
social axioms were controlled for. This finding is in keeping with the findings of Study 1 in a 
non-immigrant Iranian sample. Therefore, it can be concluded that social complexity is a 
better predictor of psychological well-being than subjective well-being. This may be 
explained by the fact that an open mind-set and the tendency to try new ways of doing things, 
which prompts the person to constantly try new things and explore new possibilities, may 
turn out to have some affective costs in the short term. This is consistent with a past study by 
Brown et al. (2013). They found that, in the UK, bicultural children with a tendency to 
integrate their heritage and host culture identities showed more negative emotional 
symptoms. In fact, more exploration and facing more challenges may be accompanied by 
short-term negative emotions; however, in the long run, these explorations may help the 
individual build more psychological strengths. The present findings indicate that social 
complexity beliefs are in general beneficial to hold for immigrants, as they may facilitate 
better acculturation and integration to the new culture.  
Furthermore, according to the results of Study 2, one of the mechanisms through which social 
complexity contributes to better mental well-being is that it facilitates perspective taking. 
Perspective taking is defined as a tendency or ability of the respondent to adopt the 
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perspective, or point of view, of other people (Davis, 1980), which is generally a beneficial 
ability to have. However, it also seems to be helpful particularly in a new environment (such 
as the host culture), as perspective taking helps the person to better understand new people’s 
thoughts and feelings. This may lead to empathy and reduce possible clashes between the 
immigrants and the people of the new culture as well as culture shock. This may also 
facilitate successful acculturation, as it is easier to integrate into a new culture if one knows 
enough about how people in the new culture see the world, than if one feels alienated and 
finds the mind-set of the new people strange and unintelligible.  
Fate control was significantly negatively correlated with psychological and subjective well-
being, and this finding held when all other social axioms were controlled for in regression 
analyses. It can therefore be concluded that fate control was a robust and consistent predictor 
of mental well-being in this immigrant sample. This is not surprising as fate control has been 
found to be positively associated with external locus of control (Singelis et al., 2003). Among 
immigrants living in a new country, an internal locus of control and taking responsibility for 
one’s life seems more beneficial than attributing the causes of various events to supernatural 
and external sources.   
The review in the introduction of the thesis showed that prior findings on the relationship 
between fate control and well-being are non-conclusive. For example, Chen et al. (2009) 
found that fate control was positively correlated with suicidal ideation among the Hong Kong 
Chinese. In the first study of the present thesis, I found that fate control was associated with 
low autonomy. Other studies, however, have generally shown that fate control is unrelated to 
life satisfaction and indicators of interpersonal and social functioning (e.g., Joshanloo, 
Afshari, & Rastegar, 2010).  
The fact that fate control was a robust predictor of lowered well-being in the present 
immigrant sample is an interesting finding which suggests that the relationship between fate 
control and well-being depends largely on the situation. As I speculated above, an internal 
locus of control seems to be more adaptive in a new context, where a person benefits from 
using his or her agency to find new opportunities and solve new problems.  
Finally, religiosity was significantly positively correlated with positive relationships with 
others. Therefore, one can conclude that religiosity has slight benefits for Iranian immigrants 
in the context of Western cultures, whereas, the results of Study 1 showed that religiosity was 
correlated with multiple well-being indicators for Iranians living in Iran. These findings 
collectively suggest that the value of holding religiosity beliefs for an individual depends on 
the context in which he or she lives. In a highly religious context (such as Iran), religiosity 
may have more to offer than in a secular context (such as the UK).  
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However, it should not be ignored that religiosity did correlate positively with positive 
relations with others. This finding is consistent with a large body of prior research in the 
literature. In fact, it has been recognised (e.g., Ferraro & Koch, 1994; Hill & Butter, 1995; 
Seybold & Hill, 2001) that one of the greatest benefits of religiosity is the social connections 
that it offers:  
“Religious and spiritual communities provide opportunities for fellowship, 
involvement in formal social programs (e.g., visiting shut-ins, providing meals to the 
poor), and companionship. This kind of support can have beneficial effects by 
reducing both psychological and physical stressors.” (Seybold & Hill, 2001, p. 23) 
 
Hypothesis 13 
Participants in the immigrant sample scored high on the MEIM-R (3.56 on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 6), which means the participants of the sample used in this study seemed to have a 
fairly strong rather than weak attachment to its ethnic root (Iran). This mean score is larger 
than the mean of a large and diverse multi-national sample of immigrants (N = 1,463; Mean 
age = 32.5 years, SD age = 4.9), which was 3.41 (Brown, et al., 2014). This finding is 
consistent with the findings reported by Saroglou and Mathijsen (2007) in a group of 
Muslims in Belgium. Saroglou and Mathijsen found that a sample of mostly young Muslims 
in Belgium showed a strong attachment to their country of origin, and this attachment was 
stronger than that they felt for the host culture they were living in (i.e., Belgium).  
I also found that attachment to Iranian culture had a positive effect on immigrants’ 
psychological well-being. This finding is inconsistent with some past studies in certain 
cultures which show that a strong tendency to maintain one’s original culture may be a 
barrier in the way of adopting a new culture and thereby leads to lowered well-being. This 
line of research suggests that this negative effect happens because a strong ethnic identity 
contributes to factors such as isolation and loneliness in Muslim immigrants (Abu-Bader, 
Tirmazib, & Ross-Sheriffa, 2011; Ahmed, Kaufman, & Naim, 1996). Moreover, the 
widespread perspective of European host societies is that holding to traditional and religious 
identities is a drawback in successful adjustment of Muslims to host cultures (Güngör, 
Fleischmann, & Phalet, 2011). The present study found no negative psychological effects for 
attachment to one’s ethnic identity. Indeed, the strength of ethnic identity was positively 
correlated with some aspects of psychological well-being. Therefore, the present results are 
consistent with the view that Muslim immigrants’ attachment to their original religious 
culture “contributes to acculturative adjustment both as a marker of group identity and 
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belonging and as a source of self-esteem, social support, and cultural continuity across 
generations” (Güngör, Fleischmann, & Phalet, 2011, p. 1357).  
It is also important to observe that ethnic identity in the present sample was most strongly 
correlated with positive relationships, which indicates that for Iranian immigrants in the 
context of the UK, one of the most important benefits of attachment to one’s Iranian identity 
may be the establishment of social connections with compatriots as well as high perceived 
social support from the Iranian community and Iranian friends, which in turn reduces the 
sense of loneliness for Iranian immigrants high on ethnic identity.  
 
Hypothesis 14 
This hypothesis predicted that there would be significant interactions between ethnic identity 
and certain social axioms in their effects on well-being. Only one significant interaction was 
found: that between ethnic identity and fate control. The results showed that for those scoring 
low on ethnic identity, the relationship between fate control and subjective well-being was 
nonsignificant, but for those scoring high on ethnic identity, there was a strong negative 
relationship between fate control and subjective well-being. In other words, having a strong 
attachment to one’s Iranian ethnicity exacerbated the negative relationship between fate 
control and subjective well-being in this Iranian immigrant sample. Stated the other way 
around, for those who have a strong attachment to the Iranian identity, endorsing fate control 
beliefs had a more negative effect than for those who did not identify strongly with their 
Iranian origin.  
Making sense of the results of the moderation analysis is not easy given the dearth of prior 
empirical studies on this topic. However, one can speculate that this effect of ethnic identity 
may be based on the association of strength of ethnic identity with religiosity. Stronger ethnic 
identity is correlated with stronger pro-religion attitudes (see Table 5.3). These data implicitly 
suggest that for more religious people, stronger endorsement of fate control beliefs has more 
adverse effects. This might be because pairing religious beliefs and fate control beliefs may 
result in some dysfunctional coping strategies.  
A part of fate control beliefs is that one can change fate by involvement in certain rituals. If 
high pro-religion attitudes as well as fate control beliefs are salient for an individual, it is 
quite likely that he or she gets involved in certain dysfunctional problem-solving behaviours 
that backfire. For example, an Iranian with these characteristics may rely on Iranian 
do’anevisi (prayer-writing) to solve their problems. For this, the person needs to visit a 
do’anevis (prayer-writer). A do’anevis charges others to provide certain do’as (prayers) and 
instruction for certain rituals and magical practices to change fate and avoid bad luck. 
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Visiting a do’anevis is a common cultural practice in Iran, done by religious people from 
various socio-economic backgrounds. In sum, it makes sense to speculate that stronger ethnic 
identity goes with higher religiosity and when higher religiosity is accompanied by higher 
fate control beliefs, an individual may rely on dysfunctional problem-solving and coping 
strategies, and this may lead to lower subjective well-being 
 
 Final thoughts 
Including an Iranian immigrant sample in this study enabled me to examine differences on 
social axioms between Iranians living in Iran and Iranian immigrants. The results showed that 
immigration might results in some changes in some aspects of social axioms but might have 
no effect on other aspects. However, given the lack of longitudinal data in the present study, 
the findings are preliminary and should be complemented by longitudinal analyses to be 
conducted in future immigration studies.  
Since the data of study 1 has been used in this study, the question may be raised why the 
samples of these two studies (1 and 3) were not combined and reported within one single 
chapter. The data of Chapter 1 were collected in 2008 and that of Chapter 5 (Study 3) a few 
years later. Clearly, the 2008 student sample may not be representative of current students in 
Iran owing to inevitable political and socio-economic changes in these years. Also, Study 1 
focused on Iranians living in Iran and Study 3 on Iranian immigrants.  
In this area of study and in Iranian-Muslim samples, there is not a body of prior empirical 
research to draw on. Social axioms have been rarely studied in the context of immigration, 
and the field of social axioms research is itself nascent. Psychological studies with Iranian 
samples, in particular Iranian immigrant samples, are scant. Lack of empirical evidence and 
theorizing in this field of inquiry adds to the significance of the present study. At the same 
time, it makes explaining the findings challenging. To partially redress these gaps, Study 4 of 
the present thesis seeks to provide qualitative data in some complex areas arising largely from 
the findings of Study 3 in this thesis. In Study 4, a group of Iranians living in the UK will be 
interviewed about their thoughts on new influences and experiences with regard to social 
beliefs in the context of a new country. The study aimed at providing more insights from 
people’s own perspective on the central variables of the present thesis.  
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Chapter 6 
Study 4 
Social Axioms and Mental Well-Being in Iranian Immigrants in 
England: A Grounded Theory Study 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Study 3 suggested that the way life experiences are interpreted by Iranians in England can be 
influenced by new cultural beliefs that they come to face in England. The empirical studies do 
not help to fully interpret some of the findings of Study 3. Therefore, in Study 4, a qualitative 
study was designed to shed more light on some of these findings. Specifically, the purpose of 
Study 4 is to investigate what Iranians living in the UK think of these influences and new 
experiences in the context of a new country. The qualitative technique used for this study was 
an in-depth interview using open-ended questions. The responses of the participants were 
subject to a qualitative analysis based on the well-established methodology of grounded 
theory (Glaser, 1978).  
 
Introduction to Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded theory is a popular approach in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and many 
other fields. The theory dates back to a 1967 book, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, by 
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. In this book, the authors argue that researchers need a 
method allowing them to “move from data to theory”. These authors developed a research 
methodology that enables researchers to derive theories to explain human behaviour from 
empirical data. These data-driven theories are tightly related to the specific data used to 
develop them. In other words, these theories are “grounded” in the data from which they 
emerge. As such, these theories do not hinge on constructs, categories, or variables from 
earlier theories.  
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Roberts and Taylor (1998, p. 102) define grounded theory as a method that “starts from the 
ground and works up in an inductive fashion, to make sense of what people say about their 
experiences, and then to convert those statements into theoretical propositions”. Grounded 
theory is therefore a process of inductive analysis that leads to discovering a new theory 
(Glaser, 1992; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The aim of this approach is to develop an “integrated 
theory based on conceptual, hypothetical relationships” (Glaser, 2002, p. 4) in the context of 
each individual research. It is important to note that grounded theory aims to conceptualise 
rather than describe. Data production, data analysis, and theory development are all tightly 
intertwined in this research methodology. 
Grounded theory is rooted in symbolic interactionism (Park & Burgess, 1921; Hughes, 1971), 
which is identified as “a social-psychological theory of social action” (Bowers, 1988, p. 36). 
Symbolic interactionism sees an individual as a socially constructed being, and focuses on 
social interaction processes that help individuals to make sense of the world they live in. 
Building on these principles of symbolic interactionism, grounded theory posits that people 
constantly try to make sense of the world. It is also posited that reality is a social construct. In 
grounded theory, the processes that are occurring in social situations are studied to derive a 
theory that explicates human actions in the particular social context under study (Stern, 1980).  
Grounded theory is particularly useful where researchers do not know much about the 
phenomenon under study, or where established theories to explain certain individual or group 
behaviours are lacking (Stanley & Cheek, 2003). These situations include those where there 
are scant empirical verifications of existing perspectives, where existing perspectives diverge 
on important issues, or where a novel viewpoint is looked for (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hitt et al. 
1998; Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001). In such occasions, grounded theory provides a unique 
means to facilitate a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Given that grounded theory 
does not rely specifically on pre-existing empirical evidence, it may be useful in the 
aforementioned situations (Eisenhardt 1989).  
 The fundamental difference between Glaser and Strauss seems to be their approach to data 
analysis. Glaser is viewed as remaining more faithful to the original version of grounded 
theory in his approach to data analysis, while Strauss with Corbin incorporated modifications. 
It seems that; 1) they finally came to an abductive reasoning in which there is a preliminary 
study and then a close examination. In this regard, all possible explanations for the observed 
data will be considered in the formulation of theory and the researcher will then provide a 
favourable interpretation. 2) They argue that there may be different explanations for what 
emerges from the data. 3) They also confirmed the importance of contextual factors that may 
affect a situation (Cooney, 2010). 4) Although there is an idea discovery process in both the 
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Glaser and Strauss approaches, Glaser seemingly argued that preunderstanding in the process 
is useful for developing sensitivity to a wide range of possibilities while Strauss argued that 
scattered preunderstandings not only provide sensitivity, but they also might be used to 
develop new theory (Heath & Cowley, 2004). In general, the difference between Glaser and 
Strauss in data analysis can be summarized as indicated in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1. The differences between Strauss and Glaser approach to grounded theory 
 Strauss and Corbin Glaser 
Initial coding Open coding 
Use of analytic technique  
Substantive coding  
Data dependent 
Intermediate phase Axial coding 
Reduction and clustering of 
categories (paradigm model) 
Continuous with previous 
phase 
Comparisons, with focus on 
data, become more abstract, 
categories refitted, emerging 
frameworks 
Final development Selected coding 
Detailed development of 
categories, selection of core, 
integration of categories 
Theoretical 
Refitting and refinement of 
categories which integrate 
around emerging core 
Theory  Detailed and dense process 
fully described 
Parsimony, scope and 
modifiability 
 
Source: Heath & Cowley (2004, p. 146) The method employed in the present study is 
more like Strauss and Corbin (1998b).  
1. Glaser (1998) and Strauss (1987) both agree that a researcher does not begin a project 
without a preconceived theory in mind, although they consider the role of this theory 
differently. 
 For Glaser, the previous understanding based on the general context of the problem and wide 
reading are what make a researcher sensitive to a wide variety of hypotheses and 
probabilities. But for Strauss, the previous understanding has early effects and provides 
special understanding based on past experience. 
The traditional approach (Glaserian) is ontologically viewed as post-positivist where the 
researcher is viewed as independent, a neutral observer of what is being viewed and they 
discover data in an objective and neutral way (Blaikie, 2007).  
However, the researcher has not been like this in the present study. The researcher himself is 
an Iranian immigrant and undertook the study with background knowledge about the main 
questions in this study. 
The researcher looks at human nature from an Islamic perspective. He believes in humans’ 
right to determine their own destiny. Like many Muslims in Iran, he also believes that he is 
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inherently free to choose or reject, and that he has the complete freedom to act or not to act. 
Moreover, he believes that the destiny of humans is shaped by God in such a manner that any 
human being can freely choose his path toward prosperity or misery. The background 
knowledge has not only developed sensitivity for the researcher, but it might also be used to 
develop the assumptions and to formulate the final theory in this study. 
2. On the other hand, a researcher begins a study with a series of questions and a 
predetermined theoretical framework from Glaser's point of view. But from Strauss's point of 
view, the researcher may begin with a preconceived theory, the development of which 
depends on the participants’ responses to a semi-structured interview (Howard-Payne, 2015) 
In this study, the researcher was guided by the data as they were collected and analysed, 
rather than by predetermined theoretical frameworks. Grounded theory analysis gradually led 
to further conceptual levels of analysis. According to Howard-Payne (2015), these are signs 
of a Straussian grounded theory approach.  
3. Procedural differences are also apparent between the two approaches.  
During the analysis, the researcher pursued the guidelines and phases, including open coding, 
axial coding, and selective coding, which are more compatible with Strauss’s approach. 
In open coding, categories and subcategories were selected according to the interview. In 
axial coding, one of the open coding categories was centred as the core category, and the 
other categories were linked with it. The focus was on developing a theory on the relationship 
between the categories in selective coding. The three types of coding were a point of 
disagreement between Strauss and Glaser. Accordingly, Strauss's approach was adopted in 
the present study, the main reason for which was a very limited number of studies available 
in this field. The present study was the first research on immigrant Iranians using such a 
method. Due to the lack of previous research, there was a need for a systematic, purely 
exploratory method. To meet the need, Strauss's approach was more effective. 
 
Processes and Procedures 
Concepts, categories, and propositions are key elements of grounded theory. Concepts are 
very important because theory is developed from a conceptualisation of the data, not the raw 
data (i.e., actual incidents and activities) per se (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The actual events 
are seen as potential indicators of concepts. Concepts are given labels and are constantly used 
in the context of each research for the respective incidents. Categories are more abstract than 
the respective concepts. They are generated by examining similarities and differences 
between lower level concepts.  Categories are described as the cornerstones of the developing 
theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 7). Finally, propositions show general conceptual relations 
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between a category and its concepts, and between separate categories (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998; Whetten, 1989). Through refining and elaborating propositions, the final theory is 
formulated.  
The key elements of concepts, categories, and propositions emerge through analysing the 
data. Data analysis in grounded theory is often referred to as coding. Three stages of coding 
involve open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), as 
described below.  
Open coding 
This is the first step in data analysis. Open coding is the process of extracting and naming 
concepts and categories from the available data. In this stage of coding, the researcher aims to 
describe general features of the phenomenon under study. In other words, it is “a way of 
identifying important words, or groups of words, in the data and then labelling them 
accordingly” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 9). Open coding results in sub-categories, and core 
categories, with their properties and dimensions (Jones & Alony, 2011, p. 101). The 
properties of a category are described in this stage.  
 
Axial coding 
The next step is axial coding. In axial coding, the researcher seeks to identify possible causal 
relationships between the categories resulting from open coding. That is, the main purpose of 
this stage is to make sense of possible connections between categories to gain an 
understanding of the phenomenon to which they relate (Kendall, 1999). This is carried out 
through the process of choosing one core category and relating all other categories to it 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In this stage, the researcher examines the relationships between the 
core phenomenon of interest, and other categories. Categories other than the core category can 
serve as causes, outcomes, or contextual categories (Crook & Kumar, 1998). 
Selective coding 
After tentatively establishing links between the categories, theory building starts. This stage 
involves the creation of a theory to make sense of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Finding 
a core category helps develop a single storyline around which all categories and connection 
are explained. In a sense, all other categories are integrated through this category, and thus 
“an explanatory whole” emerges (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 146). The result is a core story, 
“which is a brief narrative of the most important aspects of the data, subsuming all of the 
other categories and articulating their relationships to the core story” (Fassinger, 2005, p. 
161). 
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The Present Research and Rationale for Research Method 
Explaining some of the findings of Study 3 is challenging given the lack of empirical and 
conceptual work on the sample under study. Although I explained many relationships that 
existed between various variables in Study 3 based on previous theory and empirical studies 
in various cultures, many of the explanations provided seemed to be speculative at this point. 
Therefore, much remains to be investigated to gain a full understanding of the ways Iranians 
in England understand and experience mental well-being and its relationship to social axioms. 
Given the dearth of prior studies in this area of research, producing more data would help to 
understand the themes of the present thesis more thoroughly. The purpose of the present study 
was to describe and explain Iranian immigrants’ understanding of mental well-being and ill-
being, and the role of holding certain social beliefs in achieving mental well-being.  
The present study took advantage of a well-established qualitative technique (i.e., grounded 
theory methodology) to shed more light on the relationship between variables studied in the 
chapters previous in an Iranian immigrant sample living in the UK. In the present study, in-
depth interviews were used to produce raw data to be subjected to grounded theory analysis. 
In-depth interviewing is a widely used and popular method of data collection for grounded 
theory research (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). A researcher needs to determine major issues to 
be covered during the interview. However, the interview structure is not fixed, and the process 
is flexible enough to allow topics to come up in the context of specific interactions between 
the interviewer and the interviewee. This allows responses to be fully explored and keeps the 
researcher responsive to relevant issues raised by the interviewee at any given moment in the 
process (Hollway & Jefferson, 1997; Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003).  
In in-depth interviewing, the interviewer tries to encourage the interviewee to talk freely and 
interviewers’ interventions are dependent on the participant’s responses to prior questions. 
Given that participant’s initial responses are generally superficial, the interviewer brings up 
deeper and more informed questions to direct the interaction towards a fuller understanding of 
the interviewee’s ideas.  
It is evident that, in the UK, Iranian immigrants’ social beliefs and views of ethnic identity 
and mental well-being have not been explicitly studied to date. Relevant empirical and 
conceptual studies on this topic are non-existent. It is also evident that psychologists and 
psychotherapists do not have a clear and widely accepted view of the relationship between 
social beliefs, ethnic identity, and well-being for this group. Given the lack of empirical 
evidence and conceptual consensus, grounded theory serves as a useful and appropriate 
methodology. As explained before, grounded theory is mostly beneficial where there are scant 
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empirical verifications of existing perspectives, or where existing perspectives diverge on 
important issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hitt et al. 1998; Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001). These 
factors collectively make grounded theory an appropriate method for this study.  
It is also noteworthy that for the purposes of the present study, grounded theory seems more 
appropriate than many other qualitative methods. For example, another widely used 
qualitative method is thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is “is a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79), which 
does not lead to a theory. Given the lack of theories regarding my research questions in this 
specific sample, in the present study I was interested in summarising all the findings in a 
theory grounded in the data, and such a theory cannot result from thematic analysis. In 
addition, in this study, I was interested in the effects of beliefs, ethnic identity, and other 
factors on mental well-being. Therefore, grounded theory methodology seems a better fit.  
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is another widely used qualitative 
methodology. IPA is concerned with inner or phenomenological experiences of the participant 
(Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006; Smith, 2004; Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009; Smith 
&Osborn, 2003). The main difference between this method and grounded theory is that IPA is 
generally used for an in-depth examination of the lived experiences of a single case. When 
more than one case is included in an IPA analysis, the purpose would be to thoroughly 
describe a single case and compare this case with other participants. In the present study, I am 
not interested in how each individual participant internally experiences mental well-being. 
Instead, I am interested in understanding the processes leading to mental well-being and ill-
being, and the influences of social beliefs and other factors. Moreover, in this study, I am 
interested in the interaction of various factors (e.g., beliefs and ethnic identity) in influencing 
mental well-being. In other words, this study aims at describing and explaining the 
relationships among a relatively large number of variables, rather than trying to understand 
how people internally experience mental well-being, and thus grounded theory seems a better 
fit. Finally, I was interested in summarising all the findings in a theory, which cannot result 
from IPA. 
 
Method 
Participants 
          A convenience sample of Iranians was interviewed. The participants were 14 Iranians 
living in the UK for at least 3 years. A period of at least three years since leaving the country 
was considered as a criterion for Iranian immigrants with no maximum limit, whereby there 
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are differences in the sample.  The range of residence was 3-21 years in the Iranian 
immigrants group, with an average of about 11 years. 
 Of the sample, 10 were female (71.4%) and 4 were male. Age ranged from 18 to 53, with a 
mean of 30.64 (SD = 10.32). Four participants reported that they were students; three reported 
that they were workers; two reported that they were both working and studying, and five 
reported they were neither worker nor student. One participant reported their degree to be 
General Certificate of Secondary Education or equivalent, one reported A-levels or 
equivalent, four reported bachelor’s degrees, two reported PhDs, and four reported being 
undergraduates. Two participants did not report their education. Two, five, two, and five 
participants reported their ethnicity to be Lur, Fars, Turk, and “other” respectively. Thirteen 
participants reported being Muslims and one did not self-report their religion. 
 
Procedure 
Potential participants were contacted in person, or via phone or email, and were told about the 
purpose and procedure of the study and the ethical issues involved.  
The snowball sampling method was also employed in this study. As previously mentioned, 
the reason why this method was adopted was that the Iranian immigrants formed a very small 
minority of the population, which made it difficult to select subjects using other methods. The 
methodology was as follows: a member of the Iranian Association in the UK was the first 
person interested in participating in the study. After the interview, he was asked to introduce 
another Iranian resident in England. Whether or not the next person was willing to participate 
in the study, he or she was asked to introduce another person. This continued until the last 
person. 
Extra information was provided via email if requested by participants. After they agreed to 
take part in the interview, a time and place were agreed upon that would suit the participant. 
Interviews were conducted privately in comfortable and quiet places (e.g., a room in the 
participant’s house). The interviews took 45 minutes on average and were recorded. Before 
the interview started, the participants read the information sheet and signed the consent form. 
They were also given the option of using voice filter to make their voice unidentifiable, but 
none of the participants took this option, and all preferred to move on using normal voice 
recording.  
A number of major questions (as listed in the following section) were asked in the interview 
with each participant. When a participant’s response was irrelevant or not clear, clarifications 
were provided by the interviewer, and additional questions were asked. Moreover, follow-up 
questions were asked after each main question when needed, to encourage the interviewees to 
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provide more information on the central foci of the study. After the interviews, the 
participants were debriefed and were given the opportunity to ask questions.  
All the interviews were in Farsi as the participants had sufficient proficiency in their native 
language, and there was no need to translate. However, after interview and translation into 
English a bilingual person checked the translation and confirmed the accuracy of it. I coded 
all the transcripts. A number of interview audio files were also sent to a second person, an 
academic colleague in Tehran, who acted as second coder. The code sets were largely similar 
with minor differences resolved after discussion.  
 
Interview Questions 
The interview questions were developed based on the observations and findings from the 
previous three studies in this thesis, especially the third study. Some of the questions focused 
on social cynicism, because in Study 3, I found that Iranians living in the UK scored higher 
on social cynicism than the UK student sample and Iranians living in Iran. Several questions 
focused on fate control and social complexity as these two social axioms were found in Study 
3 to predict aspects of well-being among Iranian immigrants. Also, one question concerned 
the relationship between ethnic identity and mental well-being in participants’ views since 
Study 3 indicated that ethnic identity had a moderate positive effect on mental well-being of 
Iranians living in the UK. A few questions focused on the participants’ views of the 
determinants of mental well-being in the Iranian immigrant community in England, and they 
were encouraged to think about possible differences that may exist between these 
determinants for Iranian immigrants and members of other ethnicities. This was done with the 
aim of eliciting more general ideas surrounding the variables of the study to facilitate the 
process of theory building when analysing the data. The questions are listed below. Each 
question was followed by a couple of follow-up questions which were occasionally asked to 
encourage the interviewees to provide more information about their views. These follow-up 
questions are provided in parentheses.  
 
Social cynicism 
A1. In your opinion, how do Iranians in England generally view human nature, other people, 
society, and social institutions in this country? (1-What are your personal attitudes towards 
the people living in this society? 2-Do you trust the institutions and organisations in this 
society?) 
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A2. In your opinion, what are the reasons for the prevalence of this viewpoint among Iranians 
living in England? (Do you think this viewpoint can in any ways help or harm an individual 
who is living in this society?) 
A3. Do you think developing such views on human nature, other people, society, and social 
institutions is good or bad for the mental health of Iranians living in England? (1-Why do you 
think that this is harmful or beneficial for mental health?2-Can you give me an example of a 
problem you had with someone, and explain how holding this viewpoint affected the way you 
dealt with it? 2-Can you give me an example of a problem you had with an institution, and 
explain how holding this viewpoint affected the way you dealt with it?) 
 
Social flexibility 
B1. Some people may believe in rigid rules for doing things. In contrast, others have a more 
complex view and believe that there are multiple ways of achieving a given outcome. The 
latter group also may believe that the context in which human beings live is very complex and 
people may have opposite behaviours on different occasions. Therefore, they may believe to 
deal with things in a flexible way leads to success. In your view, which viewpoint is generally 
taken about the world and human behaviour by Iranians living in England, the flexible or the 
rigid view? (Is your personal view consistent with the dominant Iranian view?) 
B2. In your opinion, what are the reasons for the dominance of the above viewpoint among 
Iranians living in England? (1- Do you think some aspects of British society prompt Iranians 
to hold such an attitude? 2- Do you think this viewpoint can in any ways help or harm an 
individual who is living in this society?) 
B3. Do you think developing such views is good or bad for the mental health of Iranians 
living in England? (Can you give me an example of a problem you had in society, and explain 
how holding this viewpoint affected the way you dealt with it?) 
 
Fate control 
C1. In your view, do Iranians living in England believe in fate? (1- What about yourself? 2- 
How would you define fate and fatalism?) 
C2. In your opinion, do Iranians living in England believe that there are some ways for us to 
alter and control our fates? (1- What about yourself? 2- Can you give me an example of a time 
you tried to alter fate or submit to it? 3- Do you think this Iranian viewpoint can in any ways 
help or harm an individual who is living in this society?) 
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C3. Do you think the above-mentioned views are helpful or harmful for the mental health of 
these people? (Can you give me an example of a problem you had in society and explain how 
holding this viewpoint affected the way you dealt with it?) 
 
Mental health and Iranian identity 
D1. What factors do you think contribute to the mental health of Iranians living in England? 
(1- Besides social and financial factors, what else would contribute to mental health of 
Iranians?) 
D2. In your view, what are the main factors harming the mental health of Iranians living in 
England?  
D3. Are the factors harming or helping the mental health of Iranians different from the factors 
harming or helping the mental health of other nationalities in England? (What cultural or 
psychological differences between Iranian and non-Iranian cultures do you think are causing 
these differences in determinants of mental well-being?) 
D4. Do you think a strong attachment to Iranian identity can or cannot help the mental health 
of Iranians living in England? (In your view, why does this attachment have the effect you 
mentioned?) 
 
Analysis and Results 
Once the data were collected the following steps were taken to analyse the content of the 
interviews and data. 
 
Step 1: Open coding 
At this stage, categories and subcategories are identified, concepts are developed, and their 
properties and dimensions are determined (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Lee, 2001). In the current 
study, like all other studies that use the grounded theory method, the categories are the basis 
for the creation of a theory. This basis provides an effective channel to make the growing 
theory coherent (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Pandit, 1996). The properties provide more details 
about each category. The researcher places the properties on a continuum and finds examples 
that show the two ends of the continuum in the data (Creswell, 2005). 
Table 6.1 shows the categories and subcategories, their properties and dimensions, which 
were generated based on the data obtained from the in-depth interviews with 14 Iranians 
living in the UK. The data obtained from the interviews were divided into six categories as 
follows: 
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1. Human nature in general and the nature of the institutions and organizations in 
the UK. 
2. Flexibility and rigidity of Iranians living in the UK 
3. Belief in fate among Iranians living in the UK. 
4. Factors helping and harming the mental health of Iranians living in the UK.  
5. Similarities or differences between these factors and the factors related to the 
mental health of people with other nationalities living in the UK.  
6. The effects of dependence on Iranian national identity on the mental health of 
Iranians living in the UK. 
 
Two subcategories for each of the six categories (i.e., 12 subcategories in total) were defined. 
The subcategories and their properties for the six categories are the following: 
 
1. Focusing on positive aspects (e.g., self-improvement, peace of mind, and 
confidence) vs. focusing on negative aspects (e.g., preventing others from causing 
harm) 
2. Being flexible (e.g., calmness in face of hardship) vs. being rigid (e.g., not 
asking for help from others) 
3. Believing in fate but also believing that one can control fate (e.g., attribution of 
unpleasant events to fate and pleasant events to self) vs. not believing in fate (e.g., 
attribution of unpleasant events to self) 
4. Factors helping the psychological well-being of Iranians living in the UK (e.g., 
high financial and social status, strong social relations, and contentment/non-
greediness) vs. harmful factors (e.g., loneliness, jealousy, and lack of self-confidence) 
5. The similarities between these factors and the factors related to the mental 
health of people with other nationalities living in the UK (e.g., financial and social 
status) vs. differences between these factors and the factors related to the mental 
health of people with other nationalities (e.g., strong emotional bonds with family 
members who are living back in Iran) 
6. The positive effect of dependence on Iranian national identity on the mental 
health of Iranians living in England vs. the negative effect of dependence on Iranian 
national identity on the mental health of Iranians living in England. 
 
Similar answers were classified to determine the properties of the subcategories as shown in 
Table 6.1. Sample quotes are also included in the Table. In this classification, those answers 
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that conveyed the same meaning were categorised as one of the properties of the 
subcategories. For instance, if the participants in the interview said that their belief in 
humans’ good nature could help them show positive reactions in their dealings with other 
people, facilitate the achievement of their goals, change themselves, improve their 
personalities, and other similar answers, the responses were classified as the property of “self-
improvement”. Answers such as a particular belief can help one have peace of mind and 
release tension, stop feeling homesick and feel calm, and transcend the problems, were used 
to define the property of “peace of mind”. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2. The results of the open coding of the interview data 
Dimension Category Properties Sample responses Question 
Good 
Self-
Improvement 
Helping one’s 
personality to 
develop, changing 
one’s behaviour, 
facilitating the 
achievement of 
goals 
• The existing discipline 
among humans and in the 
institutions contributes to 
humans' self-improvement.  
• A positive perspective 
helps human beings to improve 
themselves. 
Human 
nature 
Peace of mind 
Releasing tension, 
absence of the 
feeling of 
homesickness, 
and not feeling 
hopeless in the 
face of problems. 
 
• A good view helps us to 
release mental stress and be able 
to relax. 
• If you have a good view of 
human nature, you will try to 
have good relations with other 
people. 
• If you have a good view of 
institutes and humans, even 
though they do not help you with 
your works, you will not consider 
that as malignance. Instead, you 
will think that it is the law of that 
country and you will then feel 
relaxed. 
Human 
nature 
Trust Increased trust 
• It is good to see people 
positively because as trust 
between people increases life will 
get better. 
• Increasing trust and 
facilitating daily life routines 
• If you know that institutes 
are required and obliged to do 
something that is legal, you can 
trust them and feel relaxed. 
Human 
nature 
Evil Conservatism Preventing others • Since Iranians here are a Human 
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Table 6.2. The results of the open coding of the interview data 
Dimension Category Properties Sample responses Question 
from causing 
harm 
 
minority, they will be hurt if they 
are not conservative and cautious.  
• I do not like to be intimate 
with anyone. Most Iranians here 
have no good relations with each 
other. Therefore, it is possible to 
be hurt. 
• They try not to trust anyone 
immediately lest their social 
position is hurt. 
nature 
Hindered 
progress 
Delay in making 
progress 
• If one thinks that other 
people are bad, he will be 
hindered from any progress. 
• Everyone interferes with 
another one's life instead of doing 
his own work. Therefore, they 
put into trouble both themselves 
and others. 
Human 
nature 
Flexible 
Success 
 
 
Personal success, 
job progress, 
educational 
progress, 
effectively using 
available 
resources. absence 
of the feeling of 
homesickness 
 
• If he is not flexible, he will 
fail in his business and in 
obtaining academic qualifications 
and he will then have to deal with 
jobs which are not related to his 
educational field and specialty. 
Doing irrelevant works will result 
in sadness in a foreign country. 
They should therefore be flexible. 
• Flexibility will provide the 
individuals with increased 
possibility of using the facilities. 
• Flexibility is accompanied 
with new experiences resulting in 
life excitement and less sadness 
in a foreign country 
Flexibility 
Rigid Independence 
Self-reliance,  
not needing help 
from other people 
 
• There is no need for 
flexibility in so far as an 
individual's prestige and life is 
not under risk. 
• One should comply with 
the rules so that there will be no 
need for begging for permission 
or mercy. 
• One cannot behave flexibly 
with many people. Instead, it 
would be better to do as one 
wishes. 
Flexibility 
Believing in 
fate 
Attribution of 
unpleasant 
events to fate   
Coping with the 
problems well, 
belief that there is 
• Some things can be 
controlled, but some other things 
such as mortality are beyond the 
Fate 
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Table 6.2. The results of the open coding of the interview data 
Dimension Category Properties Sample responses Question 
 external help 
 
 
control of humankind. 
• Belief in fate is useful and 
it results in relaxation. 
• Belief in fate helps with 
coming to terms with problems. 
• If you attribute some of the 
failures to someone or 
something, you can deal with 
them more easily. 
Attributions of 
pleasant events 
to self   
Taking 
responsibility 
• God has not already 
planned everything. He has 
granted us wisdom to decide 
freely about our lives. 
• If you make your utmost 
effort, he will provide you with a 
good fate. He can provide you 
with hope. 
Fate         
Disbelieving 
in fate 
Effort 
Believing in 
personal effort, 
control over fate 
based on the 
individual's 
awareness, effort 
and capability 
 
• Fate means having no 
control and making no effort.  
• If one thinks that 
everything depends on fate, there 
will be no reason for taking any 
actions. 
• The new generation 
considers fate as superstition. 
• Belief in fate is followed by 
a false relaxation and credulity. 
• Fate cannot necessarily 
provide any help. One should try 
to control his life. 
• God helps us, but I do not 
think he plans anything for us. 
Fate         
Helpful 
Good financial 
and social 
status                  
Good life 
conditions, good 
social position, 
proper foods, no 
language problem, 
adherence to law, 
understanding and 
adaptation to 
English culture 
 
• Life conditions are good 
here. If you have a good job and 
a good academic qualification 
plus physical health, you will 
generally have access to all 
preliminary needs. They serve 
like an umbrella. 
• Facilities, money, insurance 
are things that if provided by UK 
government, Iranians will have a 
good mental health. 
Iranians’ 
psychological 
well-being 
Social and 
family 
relations 
 
Maintaining 
contact with 
family, having a 
good relationship 
with other people 
 
• Keeping high quality 
relations and mutual 
understanding in the family can 
boost mental health.  
• Being mixed with the 
society, participation in team 
Iranians’ 
psychological 
well-being 
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Table 6.2. The results of the open coding of the interview data 
Dimension Category Properties Sample responses Question 
sports and avoiding competition 
with other people can be useful. 
• Helping others and 
communication with each other 
can promote mental health. 
Contentment 
No greed, no 
financial envy, 
being content with 
what we have 
 
• If people's expectations of 
life are reasonable and if they do 
not have any unreasonable 
demand, they will have a good 
mental health. 
• If one is content and uses 
what he has, he can certainly 
enjoy his life. 
• Taking the life easy and 
thinking about the objectives you 
have can better your mental 
health. 
Iranians’ 
psychological 
well-being 
Harmful 
Family and 
social relations 
Keeping away 
from the society 
and feeling lonely, 
being away from 
family, not having 
English friends, 
being away from 
one’s home 
country, being 
away from 
relatives 
 
 
• Iranians here have no 
complete mental health because 
there is almost no one who can 
live without concerns about his 
family who is living in another 
country 
• Concerns including 
economic, social and political 
conditions of my family in Iran 
do not let me feel relaxed. 
• Some of the Iranians do not 
introduce themselves as Iranians, 
but I have not seen any individual 
of any different country to 
conceal his true national identity. 
• Lack of understanding of 
the society they live in is 
harmful.  
• Lack of understanding the 
system and failure to 
communicate threatens Iranian's 
mental health. 
• Distance from family, 
home country, and Iranian-style 
shops is detrimental to mental 
health. In addition, the British 
weather, small houses, and 
unfamiliar foods are detrimental. 
We are all dependent on family 
and relatives, whereas British 
people aren`t like us. 
Iranians’ 
psychological 
well-being 
Envy Competitiveness, • Greed, jealousy, non-Iranians’ 
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Table 6.2. The results of the open coding of the interview data 
Dimension Category Properties Sample responses Question 
greed, envy 
 
contentment and lack of any 
personal goal are harmful. 
Irrespective of whether you live 
in Iran or another country. 
psychological 
well-being 
Distrust 
Suspicion of other 
people 
 
• Since there is insufficient 
understanding about this society, 
language problems and inability 
in making communications 
which can result in distrust. 
• One feels that other 
Iranians will cheat him. 
Iranians’ 
psychological 
well-being 
Similarities 
Socioeconomic 
factors 
Good standards of 
living, suitable 
housing, good job, 
sufficient income, 
good social 
position, 
unfamiliar food, 
language 
problems, respect 
for the law, 
familiarity with 
and adaptability to 
English culture 
 
• Everybody wants the same 
things, housing, amusement, 
good life and lawfulness, 
irrespective of where you live. 
• Naturally, everyone wants 
to have a good life, irrespective 
of whether he is Iranian or 
British. 
Psychological 
well-being of 
other 
nationalities 
Differences 
Emotional 
factors 
Family 
atmosphere, 
emotional issues, 
similarity of 
societies with 
Britain 
 
• It is quite different for the 
Europeans. We Iranians are 
dependent on family. I think that 
is not the same in other countries. 
• Because other nations are 
more like British people than 
Iranians, their problems are 
fewer. 
• Since the countries of other 
nations are law-centered, they 
adjust more easily to the British 
culture. 
• We are highly dependent 
on family, but they are not. So, it 
differs. 
• English people are 
indifferent to family but not all of 
them. I think we are more 
emotional than other foreigners. 
Psychological 
well-being of 
other 
nationalities 
Useful 
Helpful in 
relation to 
Iranians 
Contacts with 
compatriots, 
common customs 
 
• Holding to Iranian identity 
is very helpful and contributes to 
happiness. 
• It gives me a sense of 
homeland.  
Iranian 
identity 
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Table 6.2. The results of the open coding of the interview data 
Dimension Category Properties Sample responses Question 
• Our history and ancestry 
help me understand myself and 
my country better. 
• It is useful for me to live 
here with Iranian heritage and 
cultural symbols. 
• It is helpful to use good 
things of our culture. 
Harmful 
Harmful in 
relation to 
foreigners 
Different customs 
from foreigners, 
lack of 
understanding 
Iranian identity by 
foreigners  
 
• If an Iranian want to live 
here as he lives in Iran, but he 
fails to do so, he will have 
difficulties. 
• This identity is harmful in 
relation to non-Iranians because 
they cannot respond 
appropriately. 
• This identity is harmful 
because an English person cannot 
give a good feedback to our 
hospitality. 
• It would be better if we did 
not have these customs. 
Iranian 
identity 
 
 
Step 2: Axial coding 
Axial coding is the process of relating codes (categories and properties) to each other or the 
process of relating categories. This step is called “axial” coding because the analysing occurs 
around the “axis” of a category. The researcher picks one of the categories in the open coding 
and defines it as the core of the study and relates the rest of the categories to it. In this 
research, “belief in fate” has been chosen as the core category to form the basis for the 
creation of a theory. This category was chosen due to its important relationships with the rest 
of the categories, and its centrality in participants’ responses. In their responses to the 
interview questions, the interviewees made plenty of reference to this variable (see the next 
section for more discussion on centrality of fate beliefs and see Table 5.2 for sample quotes). 
For example, in their strategies to achieve mental well-being, their responses were focused on 
various positions towards fate.  
It seems that the two categories of human nature and flexibility influence the core category of 
“belief in fate”. In other words, whether a person believes in fate or free will is partly 
determined by his or her standing on these two categories. As shown in Table 6.1, 
respondents indicated that a belief in good human nature may motivate the individual to try to 
actively improve various aspects of their self. This active engagement in self-improvement is 
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consistent with discounting the importance of fate in one’s life. As another example, if one 
sees potential for greatness in human nature, he or she is likely to be ready to allocate positive 
life outcomes to oneself. With regards to flexibility, respondents emphasized the importance 
of flexibility in pursuit of individual success. Emphasizing flexibility is in nature inconsistent 
with believing in a fixed fate. In a way, showing flexibility in various life domains is a 
strategy for battling one’s predetermined fate, as perceived by some participants. Or, if one 
believes that one can choose to show various behaviours depending on the context, at one’s 
discretion, he or she may be ready to see the importance of one’s own role in bringing about 
various effects and outcomes. In sum, one’s view on human nature and the utility of 
flexibility is an important factor in determining one’s readiness to put in enough effort to 
achieve important goals in life, rather than passively receive predetermined life outcomes. 
The core category of fate is, thus, determined partly by individuals’ endorsement of various 
beliefs related to human nature and flexibility. Individuals’ beliefs about fate on the other 
hand partly affect people’s levels of mental well-being. The relationship between fate beliefs 
and well-being will be the focus of the next section. It is important to bear in mind that the 
relationship between human nature, flexibility, fate, and well-being should be contextualized 
within participants’ lives as immigrants living in a foreign country. Thus, the categories of 
Iranian well-being, well-being of other nationalities, and Iranian identity serve as contextual 
categories that influence the relationships between human nature, flexibility, fate, and well-
being. For an immigrant, achieving optimal mental well-being depends on solving the 
everyday problems and hassles that he or she faces in a new environment as a member of the 
minority.  
For example, an immigrant who endorses free will and values personal effort in achieving 
success and well-being may invest more time and energy in expanding his or her social 
network in the new country, which in turn will contribute to greater mental well-being. On the 
other hand, it is possible that for some immigrants who are living under terrible conditions in 
the host country, deterministic beliefs are helpful. For example, this may help the immigrant 
to find meaning in the hardship she is going through. But for others with better objective 
conditions (e.g., better grasp of English, and better financial status), deterministic beliefs may 
turn out to be harmful for one’s mental well-being, because these beliefs may impede 
grasping of opportunities that present themselves.  
Iranian identity also serves as a contextual factor that affects the categories of human nature, 
flexibility, fate, and well-being, and their relationships. For example, Iranian cultural heritage 
affects the strategies that Iranian immigrants choose to achieve well-being. Iranian 
immigrants’ emphasis on their emotional bonds with their families is evident in their 
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responses. This strong bond with one’s family may serve as a source of comfort for some 
immigrants. However, for others, this may turn out to be a barrier in the process of integration 
into the host country. Spending so much time with one’s family members can come to reduce 
the amount of time that a person spends outside with members of the host country. Hence, the 
relationship between fate beliefs and well-being should be viewed in the context of Iranian 
identity and life conditions associated with immigration.    
 
Step 3: Selective coding and the created theory 
At this stage, the researcher develops a theory based on the relationship between the 
categories that were generated in the axial coding process. In other words, the researcher 
creates a grounded theory considering the relationship between the categories and drawing on 
field notes and observations. It seems that many of the Iranians believe that God created 
human beings and has a great deal of control over our lives. Iranians also believe that human 
beings have a lot of control over their own lives. In other words, Iranians believe that one can 
believe in fate and control one’s own fate at the same time. The participants believed that 
humans are free but at the same time they believe that God has absolute power over the world 
and anything in it including humans.  
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Table 6.3. Sample quotes related to fate and free will 
Attribution of unpleasant events to fate Importance of free will 
• Since human nature is good, the Lord 
intends good for us and therefore, 
anything which seems bad to us can have a 
positive consequence in the future. One 
should not become sad for bad happenings 
because we have no control over them and 
they are related to our fate.  
• We can change fate direction (e.g.; by 
changing the objectives or people around 
us or by praying and helping other 
people). 
• In some cases, man determines his 
fate. By observance of many rules and 
regulations governing the society and by 
using modern sciences, we can prevent 
several problems of life which are related 
to our ignorance. Our success in doing this 
depends on trusting in God and our good 
conducts; otherwise, God will deprive us 
from enjoying these facilities.  
• Fate means negative consequences. 
Nothing is bad for good people, and they 
can determine their successes in life.  
• The more we are useful for humans 
and society, the more the impediments in 
our life will be removed by God or life.  
• Human determines his fate himself. 
This is of course true for the things which 
are within the scope of our powers.  
• God tells us that if we do good things, 
we will receive rewards in this world and 
the other world. In many cases, we can 
gain more material and spiritual rewards 
by increasing our knowledge and good 
things.  
• Not everything in life is the result of 
our efforts because there are so many 
things which are beyond our control such 
as birth and death, political and 
economical problems, war and peace, etc. 
So, we leave many things to the Lord and 
we are satisfied with his satisfaction.  
• Everyone who believes in fate 
believes in God as well. He tries to be 
good and sees good consequences as well. 
If we do good things and we see bad 
consequences, it must have a reason that 
we do not know about that. However, the 
kind Lord is just and compensates all good 
works but in a special way that no one 
knows but him. 
• Whenever something bad happens, I 
know that it ought to happen. Sometimes 
we know the reason and sometimes we do 
not. However, I know that it is advisable 
for me. 
• It was our fate to be here. For several 
years I suffered from living in a foreign 
country far from all my belongings, but 
now I see that God liked me and made me 
come here. So, as he promises in the Holy 
Quran, after difficulties it comes the turn 
to peace. 
• If we do not believe in fate and we do 
not relate our defeats to that, we always 
ask ourselves if we have done anything 
wrong and we are now experiencing its 
negative consequence. We always blame 
ourselves and this may result in 
depression. 
• Even those who claim that they 
strongly believe in science and do not care 
for non-scientific issues, as soon as they 
face a problem and cannot do anything, 
they say, "God knows everything better" 
or "Let's see what our fate is." 
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Two important points arise from the interviewees’ responses.  
1. The participants found it possible (as indicated in their responses) that when 
the individual faces unpleasant events in life such as death of relatives, disease, 
etc. they accept such unpleasant events more easily and consequently attain peace 
of mind by attributing such events to God’s power. In other words, one can deal 
with hardship more easily if one believes in a larger plan of existence as 
predesigned by God.  
2. But the participants also believed that one does not need to attribute the cause 
of all good things and achievements to God. They believed that individuals also 
have a lot of freedom in their life and can make things happen. Attributing one’s 
achievements to one’s free will not only propels one to work hard towards 
achieving their goals, but also paves the way for achieving higher self-esteem and 
mental well-being.  
 
Sample quotes in support of these two major points are provided in Table 5.2.  
As explained in the past section, it was evident in the participants’ responses that the belief in 
fate and the ability to control it can be the result of particular characteristic properties such as 
flexibility versus rigidity. Alternating between belief and disbelief in fate (i.e. having control 
over one’s behaviour) is a characteristic of flexible people rather than rigid people, and it is 
probable that rigid people tend to adopt only one approach (either belief or disbelief in fate) 
and follow and act based on this belief.  
Such strategies can be influenced by contextual conditions which are specific to Iranians, as 
well as some conditions which are general and true about other nationalities too. For instance, 
Iranians believe that they are emotionally dependent on their families more than other 
nationalities, and it is hard for them to be away from their families, whereas some other 
factors such as economic status, appropriate income, accommodation, social position, job, and 
education are equally important for other nationalities, and influence mental health.  
In sum, belief in fate and in the ability to control fate is rooted in beliefs in the goodness vs. 
badness of human nature as well as flexibility vs. rigidity. On the one hand, advocating free 
will prompts people to work hard to achieve their goals and the achievement of goals leads to 
a feeling of satisfaction. On the other hand, Iranians may choose to attribute their failure in 
achieving goals and unpleasant events in life to an external factor and divine power, and this 
attribution gives them peace of mind in some situations. In the interviewees’ opinion, the path 
from belief in fate to mental well-being in Iranians living in the UK is influenced by some 
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nation-specific contextual conditions (e.g., dependence of Iranians on family) and some 
universal contextual conditions (e.g. social and financial status).  
 
Discussion 
 
The participants in general had positive attitudes toward the nature of humankind. This 
general consensus seems to stem from the tenets of an Islamic worldview. According to the 
principles of Islam, which is the religion of most Iranians, humankind is born with a decent 
nature. According to Islam 
 
“No one has been born sinful, wicked or with malicious intentions. All impurity and 
indecency arise from contingent factors, being the result of extraneous elements 
combined with the exercise of free will. Moreover, even negative tendencies 
acquired through heredity can be overcome by the power of the human will together 
with the right motivation. Thus, the Christian conception of ‘original sin’ in respect 
of the children of Adam is utterly alien to Islam.” (Subhānī & Shah-Kazemi, 2001, 
pp. 9-10) 
 
Therefore, a positive attitude towards the nature of humankind is in line with Islamic-Iranian 
culture. A question that arises at this point is why then Iranians in general and Iranians living 
in the UK in particular, score slightly higher than the UK student sample on social cynicism 
(as shown in Study 3). This might be due to Iranians’ negative views of social institutions, 
which is an important component of social cynicism. In fact, prior research shows that Iran 
scores rather low compared to the world average on societal collectivism, which “reflects the 
degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward 
collective distribution of resources and collective action” (House, Javidan, Hanges, & 
Dorfman, 2002, p. 5). This cultural aspect indicates a lack of trust in organisations within 
society (House, Javidan, & Dorfman, 2001; Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). Therefore, the 
rather high score of the Iranians in comparison to the UK student sample on social cynicism 
may be largely explained by their negative views of social institutions, rather than by their 
negative views of human nature. Although these notions are speculative at this stage, they 
may have significant implications for research on social cynicism. It seems that a distinction 
between the social institutions vs. human nature components of social cynicism is useful to be 
made in future studies as these components may turn out to have differential sets of predictors 
164 
 
and outcomes. For example, an Islamic worldview may more strongly affect the human nature 
component than the institution component of social cynicism.  
In the case of Iranian immigrants in the UK, their general distrust in social institutions may be 
justifiable. As discussed in Chapter 5, there is evidence of public hostility against Islam and 
Muslims, particularly after September 11 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Raiya, Pargament, 
Mahoney, & Trevino, 2008). Direct and institutional discrimination against Muslims, and the 
negative images of Islam and Muslims shown in the media, prompt Muslims in the UK to 
sometimes perceive themselves as discriminated against and threatened (Sartawi & Sammut, 
2012). This may partly explain the finding that Iranians in the UK scored slightly higher than 
Iranians in Iran on social cynicism (see Study 3). However, an alternative explanation cannot 
be ruled out: It can well be that Iranians who are high on social cynicism are more likely to 
emigrate, and they bring with them the tendency to be cynical (for discussions see Study 3).   
 With regards to fate control, Iranians’ beliefs, as expressed in the interviews, again resonate 
closely with Islamic ideas. Iranians believed that God has power over humans’ lives, but 
humans are endowed by God with free will and the intellectual faculty needed for making 
independent decisions (Subhānī & Shah-Kazemi, 2001). Human life also “falls under the 
guardianship of Allah…Whatever Allah wills to occur will happen, and whatever he wills not 
to occur does not” (Morgan, 2010, p.6). The notion of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-
controlling God, for Muslims, however, does not obliterate human free will. Muslims resolve 
this paradox in the following way:  
 
“Despite the power of Allah in all things, Muslims believe humans have important 
choices to make. Although Allah retains control, we have free will… Although Allah 
wills everything that happens, the instant before a human being performs an action, 
the responsibility for how it is performed is switched to the person, so that he or she 
will be held accountable for it on Judgment Day.” (Morgan, 2010, pp. 6-7). 
 
In sum, for Muslims, human free will does not contradict God’s absolute dominion over 
everything in the world. This notion helps Muslims to resolve the paradox of human free will 
and all-controlling God. This is reflected in the participants’ ideas expressed in the interviews 
in the present study. They viewed God as all-controlling and human beings as having free 
will. Interestingly, the participants report that these notions may come to help individuals in 
maintaining mental well-being. They believe that humans should not stop trying to achieve 
more due to the fact that life is predestined by God. Given that God has bestowed us with free 
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will we are responsible to exercise our free will towards better mental well-being and 
achievements.  
However, when bad things happen to a person, they should accept that this is predestined by 
God and a trial of the person’s faith in God. Thus, it should be tolerated with patience. In 
other words, the participants believed that by attributing the cause of various life events 
sometimes to oneself and sometimes to God (in a flexible way), one can cope with difficulties 
more successfully. Active pursuit of happiness and acceptance of disasters, difficulties, and 
calamities as God’s will are important strategies the participants deemed useful. Interestingly, 
Morgan (2010) observes that Muslims can solve the paradox of God’s dominion and human 
free will in such a way that it contributes to their mental health: 
 
“At any rate, humans do not know their ultimate fate until they have made every 
possible effort to live a good life. Making such an effort enables them to see the 
rewards that come in the midst of sorrow and the peace that comes from knowing 
they are doing Allah’s will. This attitude does not resolve the inherent logical 
problems of trying to combine responsibility and divine predestination, but it does 
have solid psychological benefits.” (p. 7) 
 
These findings can be interpreted in the context of attribution theory, which tries to explain 
how people make causal explanations (Heider, 1958; Kelly 1973). It has been shown in ample 
research that people tend to be biased in their causal attributions. Evidence indicates that 
people are motivated to distort the process of causal attribution in the service of the self 
(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Miller & Ross, 1975). This phenomenon is called self-serving 
bias, which describes the propensity of individuals to discount their own faults when 
explaining failures, whereas emphasizing their own characteristics in explaining successes 
(Bradley, 1978). In order to discount one’s involvement in failures, people usually attribute 
the cause to external factors on which they have no control. This is generally done to maintain 
a positive sense of self-esteem (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). It seems that this indigenous 
strategy of flexibly switching between endorsing free will and fate sometimes paves the way 
for biased attributions in the service of the self. For example, when facing failure and 
difficulty, Iranians may attribute the cause to fate and discount their own role in bringing 
about the difficult situation. This attribution style may be unrealistic. However, it may help 
people to find solace in difficult moments.    
Whether or not this strategy is beneficial for the mental health of Iranians is not clear now. At 
this point, what the data suggest is that a belief in fate control contributes to lower mental 
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health of Iranian immigrants (see Study 3), and that a belief in fate control has more negative 
consequences in the British sample than among Iranians (see Study 1). A question that arises 
is whether the available data help us in any way to validate or invalidate this Iranian lay 
strategy for obtaining peace of mind. Fate control as measured by the social axioms survey 
does capture some important aspect of the Iranian lay strategy (i.e., that life is in some ways 
predestined, and one can control fate in some ways). If we accept that the fate control scale 
measures endorsement of the Iranian lay strategy emerging in the interviews, we would have 
to conclude that this strategy is not actually helpful as fate control was found to be a negative 
predictor of mental well-being in Study 1 and Study 3.  
However, one can also argue that the fate control scale fails to capture the core of the lay 
strategy emerging in the present study. This lay strategy suggests that one should allocate the 
cause of negative events to God and see them as God’s trial of a Muslim’s faith, which is 
entirely absent in the fate control scale. Future studies should investigate these speculations 
by developing and using fate control scales which capture the subtleties of the concept of fate 
control in the Iranian-Islamic culture. These considerations also suggest that futures studies on 
fate control would benefit from distinguishing between a fate component and a control 
component, which are currently lumped together in a single scale.  
Another idea emerging from the interviews was that being flexible rather than rigid can 
positively contribute to mental well-being. To the participants, one of the mechanisms of this 
influence is the effect of flexibility on the way people take advantage of the lay strategy 
mentioned above. That is, Iranians believed that taking the position that life is both 
predestined and one has control over it needs the person to be flexible. In other words, the 
ability to recognise multiple ways of doing things and consider multiple perspectives (which 
characterize social complexity) provides the individual with the possibility of flexible 
attribution of certain events to oneself or to God to cope better given the situation.  
The idea that social complexity contributes to mental well-being is consistent with the 
findings of Study 3, which showed that social complexity positively predicted mental well-
being in Iranian immigrants. Moreover, the idea that social complexity contributes to mental 
health through promoting certain attribution styles (i.e., attributing causes to oneself or God in 
certain situations) is a novel contribution to the literature. Based on the previous studies 
reported in this thesis and prior empirical research done by other researchers, I speculated 
about other mechanisms of this influence in Study 3. This lay idea emerging from the 
interviews with Iranian immigrants seems to be another plausible mechanism which warrants 
empirical attention. This idea can be empirically tested provided that a more sensitive scale 
for the assessment of various components of fate control in Iranian samples is available.  
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Another interesting point emerging from the interviews was that, for many participants, 
mental well-being was understood as a peaceful state of mind, which is accompanied by 
contentment. This understanding of mental well-being is consistent with the Islamic 
understanding of mental well-being. In Islam, well-being is defined as an internal balance 
which leads to peace of mind and contentment (Abu-Raiya, 2012; Ashy, 1999). According to 
Joshanloo (2013), for Muslims, happiness is a tranquil and content state of mind that is 
bestowed by God to a Muslim. This state results when one reaches balance. 
 
“The concept of balance has a significant role to play in the Islamic 
conceptualization of happiness. The balance between the selves (as introduced 
above), between body and soul, individual and social should be maintained. A 
Muslim ideal is to let the godly part of the soul (i.e., the heart, the inner centre where 
faith in God resides) rule over other aspects of our personality.” (Joshanloo, 2013, p. 
1865) 
 
Thus, the Islamic understanding of mental well-being centres on contentment, tranquillity, 
and balance. However, this version of mental well-being does not seem to be the dominant 
one in Western cultures (Joshanloo, 2013). In fact, prior research indicates that while in many 
non-Western cultures (such as Islamic ones), low-arousal emotional states (such as 
tranquillity and contentment) are favoured, in many Western cultures, high-arousal states, 
such as euphoria and ecstasy, are more favoured (Tsai, 2007; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006; 
Tsai, Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007). For example, Tsai, Knutson, and Fung (2006) showed 
that European Americans valued high-arousal positive emotions significantly more and low-
arousal positive emotions significantly less than East Asians. These cultural differences may 
stem from greater cultural factors. For example, western culture is believed to strongly value 
influencing others and the environment, while non-western culture is believed to value 
adjustment more strongly. Research shows that influencing others is more associated with 
expressing high-arousal emotions and adjusting to others is more associated with expressing 
low-arousal emotions (Tsai, 2007; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fung, & Yeung, 2007). At any rate, it 
seems that in conceptualising mental well-being, the current sample is strongly influenced by 
their original culture, rather than the host culture.   
The participants believed that one factor undermining mental well-being that is largely 
specific to the Iranian immigrant community is Iranians’ strong emotional attachment to their 
families. The participants mentioned that people from other nationalities do not show this 
strong attachment and thus can more easily enjoy new experiences and new people in the new 
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culture. However, Iranians stay emotionally attached to their families who are living in Iran to 
a large extent, which does not let them get fully involved in new experiences and 
relationships.  
In fact, the results of a large-scale survey across the world shows that Iranians are highly 
attached to their families and Iran’s score on this dimension is actually among the highest in 
the world (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). In-group collectivism or family 
collectivism is defined as “the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and 
cohesiveness in their organizations or families” (House et al., 2002, p. 5). The findings show 
that Iran has a score on this dimension which is considerably higher than the world average, 
indicating Iranians’ rather strong attachment to their families (House, Javidan, & Dorfman, 
2001; Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). Therefore, there is some element of truth in the lay 
understanding expressed by the interviewees that Iranians are more emotionally attached to 
their families than many other nationalities.  
Finally, the participants were rather accurate in their idea that socio-economic factors are 
related to mental well-being. Prior research shows that employment, economic status, and 
education level do influence well-being across nations (e.g., Pinquart & Sörensen, 2000; 
Zimmerman & Katon, 2005). Steptoe, Tsuda, Tanaka, and Wardle (2007) compared 
depressive symptoms in 17348 university students with high, average, and low income from 
23 countries using the Beck Depression Inventory. They found that poor socio-economic 
background was associated with depressive symptoms within all the countries. 
In sum, this study revealed interesting lay ideas of Iranian immigrants about their experiences 
of well-being and the role of culture and social axioms in their daily life. In some cases, these 
lay understandings are consistent with the empirical evidence provided in the prior chapters of 
this thesis, for example, that social complexity can positively contribute to mental well-being. 
In some cases, the interviews provided novel insights about the relationship between the 
variables which are ignored in prior empirical studies. An example is the way fate control 
beliefs can be used to obtain mental well-being. All in all, these findings help us gain a fuller 
understanding of the way mental well-being and social axioms are understood by this 
immigrant group. However, many aspects of the lay theory produced and reported in the 
present qualitative study should be empirically tested in future studies, to draw safer 
conclusions.  
Finally, another issue that must be considered is the risk and protective factors in 
acculturation that affect immigrants’ mental health. This is particularly important in cultures 
that are not similar in nature, such as Iranian and British cultures. Acculturation is the process 
of cultural and individual change that results from the contact between a minority group 
169 
 
(immigrants) and the majority of a society. It results in change in the minority group 
members’ original cultural behaviour, values, and beliefs to adapt to a new culture (Baltas & 
Steptoe, 2000).  
At the culture level, the change involves social structures, institutions, and cultural practices 
and it involves behavioural repertoires at the individual level. The cultural and psychological 
change emerges over time, from a few years to several generations (Berry, 2005). 
 A literature review showed a complex relationship between acculturation, mental health, and 
well-being. Although some studies indicated a positive relationship between acculturation 
and mental health (See also Koneru, Weisman de Mamani et al., 2007), the other studies did 
not confirm such results (e.g. Aprahamian, Kaplan, Windham, Sutter, and Visser, 2011). The 
diverse results can be explained as that although acculturation can facilitate daily social 
interactions (Balls Organista et al., 2003) and improve readiness for treatment options 
(Rodriguez-Reimann, Nicassio, Reimann, Gallegos, and Olmedo, 2004), it can increase the 
stress or conflict between two cultures (Nguyen & Peterson, 1993) and reduce family support 
(Gil, Wagner, and Vega, 2000), resulting in negative effects on well-being and mental health 
(See also Koneru, Weismande de Mamani, Flynn, and Betancourt, 2007).  
         Furthermore, certain factors, such as length of stay in the host country and level of 
education (Zlobina, Basabe, Paez, & Furnham, 2006) or the worthiness of the original culture 
(Ward & Kennedy, 1993) may influence acculturation and, therefore, the relationship. Safdar, 
Struthers, and Oudenhoven (2009) examined acculturation among Iranian immigrants in the 
USA, UK and Netherlands. With slight modifications, the Multidimensional Individual 
Differences Acculturation Model (Safdar, Lay, & Struthers, 2003) was confirmed. The model 
provided a positive relationship between psychosocial resource and out group contact, 
including personal resilience, cultural competence, and social support from the larger society 
as sociopsychological resources. Based on the results of the qualitative study, Iranian 
immigrants mainly had a positive attitude toward human nature and institutions in the UK 
(social support from large society), most of them believed that attachment to their Iranian 
identity provided mental health support (cultural competency), and most of them again 
considered self-improvement, calmness and confidence (personal resilience) to be the 
positive outcomes of the positive view of institutions. Accordingly, it seems that such a 
process can be interpreted as contributing to the well-being of Iranians living in England, 
although it needs further investigations. 
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Chapter 7 
 
General Discussion 
In the discussion section of each of the four studies, the findings were extensively discussed 
and put into the context of relevant theories and findings. In this general discussion, a 
summary of the findings of the present thesis is presented first. Secondly, the major 
contributions of the present studies to the fields of social axioms and mental well-being are 
discussed. Finally, the limitations of the research and suggestions for future studies are 
discussed.  
 
Summary of the findings 
 
Study 1 examined the basic relationship between social axiom dimensions and aspects of 
subjective and psychological well-being across two nations. Country and personality were 
controlled in the analyses to examine unique contributions of social axioms beyond these 
variables. The study showed that social axioms predicted aspects of mental well-being beyond 
personality and country. Moreover, I found that social cynicism and social complexity were 
the strongest predictors of subjective and psychological well-being, respectively.  
These findings were followed up in Study 2. Study 2 focused on the mechanisms of the 
relationship between social cynicism and social complexity and subjective and psychological 
well-being, respectively. This study predicted that two possible psychological variables would 
mediate the relationship between these social axioms and mental well-being, namely 
mindfulness and perspective taking. The sample of this study consisted of Iranian university 
students. I found that perspective taking partially mediated the relationship between social 
complexity and psychological well-being, but mindful acceptance did not mediate the 
relationship between social cynicism and subjective well-being. A surprising finding in this 
study was that social cynicism was not significantly correlated with the aspects of mental 
well-being.  
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To follow up the findings of Study 1, in Study 3, a sample of Iranian immigrants living in 
England was used. The study compared the immigrant sample with the Iranian and UK 
student sample on the major variables of the thesis, i.e., social axioms and mental well-being. 
The study also examined the role of ethnic identity on the relationship between social axioms 
and well-being in the immigrant group. I found that the immigrant sample’s scores on social 
cynicism, social complexity, reward for application, and fate control were largely similar to 
those of the Iranians living in Iran and the UK student sample. However, the immigrant group 
scored lower than the Iranian group and higher than the UK student group on religiosity. With 
regards to mental well-being, the immigrant group scored similarly to the other groups on 
subjective and psychological well-being. I found that fate control (negatively) and social 
complexity (positively) predicted mental well-being in the immigrant group. Finally, I found 
that attachment to Iranian ethnic identity had moderate positive consequences for the 
immigrants’ mental well-being. 
 Study 4 was a qualitative study which aimed at building a theory based on Iranian 
immigrants’ beliefs about mental well-being and the importance of culture and social axioms. 
One of the main contributions of Study 4 was to unravel one of the coping styles prevalent 
among Iranians. This study indicated that Iranians tend to use an indigenous strategy to 
achieve mental well-being and peace of mind, and deal with life difficulties. Iranian 
immigrants reported that they believe that humans must not discontinue pursuing more 
achievements and successes due to the fact that life is predestined by an all-knowing, all-
powerful God. However, when bad things occur, humans should accept that these bad things 
are predestined by God and a test of the person’s faith. Thus, disasters should be tolerated 
with serenity and tolerance. As elaborated in Study 4, this indigenous strategy stems from 
Iranian-Islamic culture and enables Iranians to use a flexible way of utilizing their knowledge 
of fate to find solace in times of hardship. Moreover, Iranian immigrants tend to find social 
flexibility beliefs useful in the process of using this strategy. They believe switching between 
believing in a predestined life and in free will require a fair amount of flexibility.     
The findings of the three quantitative studies conducted (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) were largely 
consistent and confirmed the qualitative study.  
On the one hand, Study 3(Chapter 5) revealed that the Iranian immigrants have a relatively 
high level of religiosity (more than the UK student sample) and Study 1 (Chapter 3) indicated 
a positive relationship between religiosity and personal growth and purpose in life.  
On the other hand, the qualitative study showed that the Iranians used an indigenous 
approach, which is influenced by their religious identity, to deal with the difficulties of life 
and attain peace. In the qualitative study, the researcher claimed that the Iranians interpret 
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difficulties of life as divine tests while they believe in free will and that the important matters 
in their life are predetermined. Such an interpretation apparently requires having a relatively 
high level of religiosity (as was confirmed in Study 3) and the application of knowledge and 
religious attitude in everyday life (as was confirmed in Study 1, i.e. the relationship between 
religiosity and well-being). The link between quantitative and qualitative studies can be 
summarized in Figure 6-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1. Link between quantitative and qualitative studies.  
A religious attitude (as demonstrated in Study 3) may make a person fearless and free from 
sadness in the face of adversity, as indicated in Study 1 and the qualitative study, so that there 
is a relationship between religiosity, purpose in life, and personal growth;  
According to the holy Quran, Surah (chapter) Al-Anfal, Ayah (verse) 65: if there would be 
twenty of you who were truly patient in the face of adversity, you might overcome two 
hundred of those who are determined to deny the truth, and one thousand if one hundred of 
you;  
Surah (chapter) Yunus, Ayah (verse) 2 and 62: Unquestionably, there will be no fear for the 
allies of Allah (God), nor will they grieve.  
And Surah (chapter) Yunus, Ayah (verse) 84: And Moses said: "My people! If you have 
(really) believed in Allah, then put trust in Him (alone)." 
In all of the three verses, God implicitly wants to tell Muslims that faith in God and strong 
belief in him can be a source of strength to face challenges and threats, so that if there are a 
small number of them who truly believe in God and have patience, they should not be afraid 
even in wars as they can defeat the enemy with the power of true faith in God. 
It is important to consider that when the effect of ethnic identity was controlled, the positive 
relationship between religiosity and well-being became non-significant (Study 3), and the 
current findings of the qualitative study would indeed be in serious doubt if it was significant. 
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In other words, the link between qualitative and quantitative studies is clear from this 
perspective as well. 
 
 
Main Contributions of the Present Thesis 
This thesis had some limitations which will be discussed below. However, the findings 
presented in the thesis contribute to the fields of social axioms and mental well-being in 
important ways. Below, some of these contributions are discussed. 
 
Contributions to the field of well-being. 
Previous studies have thoroughly studied diverse predictors of mental well-being. In 
particular, the relationships between personality factors and socio-economic status as 
predictors of mental well-being have received extensive attention (for reviews see Dasgupta 
& Mäler, 2000; Diener & Diener, 1995; Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & 
Smith, 1999). For example, there is ample research on the relationship between the big five 
and self-esteem and aspects of well-being (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). But, surprisingly, the 
relationship between beliefs and aspects of well-being has not received enough attention so 
far. Piecemeal evidence is available on the relationship between some belief domains (e.g., 
external control beliefs) and well-being. However, most of these studies have focused on 
religious beliefs (e.g., Ellison, 1991; Krause, 2003), and very little is known about the effects 
of non-religious domains of belief on aspects of well-being.  
In my view, an important question for the field of mental well-being is whether the beliefs 
that individuals endorse have any influence on their subjective and psychological well-being. 
But previous research does not offer much about this important question, largely because 
beliefs have not received enough empirical attention as predictors of mental well-being. One 
of the reasons for this may be that there are not many conceptual frameworks for a systematic 
and comprehensive study of belief domains in psychology. Previous studies have often 
focused on single domains of beliefs, such as meritocracy beliefs (Foster, & Tsarfati, 2005) 
and external control beliefs (Ferreira, & Sherman, 2006). Fortunately, the empirical study of 
social axioms, which was initiated in the last decade, offers a robust framework for a 
systematic incorporation of beliefs in psychological research.  
To examine if beliefs are important when it comes to predicting mental well-being, the 
present thesis used social axioms to predict the aspects of mental well-being. The findings are 
interesting and informative. It turns out that the five social axioms contribute about 13% and 
21% over and above country in the prediction of subjective and psychological well-being 
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(Table 3.9). Does the influence of social beliefs in predicting mental well-being hold when the 
contribution of personality traits is controlled for? In other words, can social axioms 
contribute to mental well-being over and above the role of personality traits? It would be 
impressive for any predictor to contribute a significant amount of variance over personality to 
mental well-being, given that the Big Five have been found to be among the strongest 
predictors of mental well-being (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 
1999). It turns out that social axioms do contribute beyond personality (and country) to the 
prediction of mental well-being. They explained 6% and 13% of the variance in subjective 
and psychological well-being, respectively, over country and the Big Five (see Table 3.10 and 
Table 3.11). These findings are impressive and indicate that beliefs that people endorse do 
play an important role in determining their levels of subjective and psychological well-being.  
The findings also contribute to an ongoing debate in the field of well-being. One of the 
debated topics in well-being studies is whether eudaimonic and hedonic well-being should be 
seen as distinct aspects of well-being (Delle Fave, & Bassi, 2009; Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & 
King, 2008; Keyes & Annas, 2009; Ryan & Huta, 2009). Some researchers such as Kashdan 
et al. (2008) argue that these two aspects of well-being are not conceptually and empirically 
distinguishable and should be merged. They also indicate the superiority of subjective well-
being over eudaimonic well-being, due to its inherent pleasantness. However, other 
researchers provide evidence that the two aspects of well-being are structurally and 
functionally distinguishable (for short reviews see Joshanloo, Rastegar, & Bakhshi, 2012; 
Keyes & Annas, 2009). For example, Joshanloo et al. (2012) review evidence that the 
relationship between the Big Five personality traits and hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of 
well-being are somewhat different. Most notably, openness to experience has been found to 
be associated with psychological well-being, whereas it has been found to be mostly unrelated 
to hedonic well-being. 
What does the present thesis have to contribute to this debate? The present thesis provides 
some evidence that indicates functional differences of these aspects of well-being. For 
example, as mentioned above, the current findings indicate that the predictive power of social 
axioms is higher in predicting psychological well-being than subjective well-being. This 
preliminary finding seems to be of great conceptual importance. The outcome that beliefs may 
influence our functioning (psychological well-being) more strongly than our 
subjective/emotional well-being provides useful insights regarding the nature of the 
beliefs/well-being relationship, which should be thoroughly studied in future research. 
Briefly, this finding indicates that individuals’ life satisfaction judgments and emotional 
appraisals of their lives are less influenced by their general social beliefs (e.g., their beliefs 
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about fate) than their actual functioning in important domains of their life (such as their 
relationships with others). This may be because it is less likely that our social beliefs (such as 
beliefs about fate) get involved when we are evaluating our lives and our experienced 
emotions. However, it seems that these beliefs have stronger effects on the way we live our 
lives and function in daily life. Future studies are needed to further explain and expand these 
findings.  
The first three studies of the present thesis provide some evidence affirming the notion that 
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being have differential sets of correlates and show differential 
patterns of relationship with other variables (such as social axioms and personality traits). 
Thus, these findings not only lend support to my choice in including both aspects of well-
being in the present thesis, but also contribute to the current debate in the field about 
functional distinguishability of these aspects of well-being.  
In addition to this contribution, the present studies also provide some evidence underlining the 
important point that inclusion of both aspects of well-being is necessary when comparing 
nations on mental well-being. For example, I found that although Iranians are lower on 
subjective well-being than the UK student sample, they do not necessarily score lower on 
some aspects of psychological well-being and optimal functioning than the UK student 
sample. These findings show that neglecting one of the aspects of mental well-being in cross-
national research may result in biased comparisons and a less accurate picture of the standing 
of nations and groups on mental well-being.  
Besides these major contributions to the field of mental well-being, the present set of studies 
contributed to the nascent field of well-being studies in Iran in some other ways. For example, 
in Study 2, I found that the scales of mental well-being used in the study are unrelated to 
social desirability in Iran, which is promising for well-being studies in Iran, given that the 
scales used in the present thesis are among the most widely used well-being scales used by 
researchers worldwide and by Iranian researchers.Study 4 revealed that unlike Westerners, for 
Iranian Immigrants, mental well-being seems to mainly involve low arousal emotions such as 
contentment rather than high arousal emotions such as enjoyment and ecstasy (Joshanloo, 
2013; Tsai, 2007). Study 4 also provided fresh insights about an indigenous coping style used 
by Iranians in difficult moments, which deserves more research attentions in future studies. 
Notwithstanding these strengths and contributions, and fresh insights about how mental well-
being is experienced in Iran, it should be pointed out that the present studies provide only 
preliminary evidence and should be followed up by multiple follow-up studies before we can 
regard the findings as reliable. The findings should be integrated with the findings of future 
studies in Iran to gain a clearer picture of the experience of mental well-being in Iran.         
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Contributions to the field of social axioms 
It has been argued that social beliefs have important roles to play in our survival as social 
beings (Leung et al. 2002). The functionalist approach to beliefs maintains that beliefs have 
instrumental, ego-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge-related roles to play in our 
lives (Leung & Bond, 2004). We need to have a rather accurate understanding of the social 
world we live in, or else we will face some difficulties in making effective choices. Although 
perfectly realistic and unbiased beliefs are hard to achieve and hold to give the complexity of 
social life and inherent proneness of human mind to cognitive biases (Haselton & Nettle, 
2006), certain beliefs in certain contexts can be more functional than others (Leung et al. 
2002).  
Previous research has empirically investigated the functionalist view of beliefs by correlating 
social axioms with various important aspects of functioning such as coping styles (Bond, 
Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nielson, 2004) and suicide attitudes (Lam et al., 2010; Chen 
et al. 2009). The previous research provides enough evidence to suggest that social axioms do 
play important roles in our functioning. Certain belief domains (such as social cynicism) tend 
to harm our functioning in various life domains and contexts. And certain belief domains 
(such as social complexity) serve us well in many contexts.  
I believe the best way to evaluate the functional perspective of social beliefs is to investigate 
these beliefs’ implications for individuals’ mental well-being. However, the previous research 
has rarely focused on mental well-being as the outcome of social beliefs. One could conclude 
that the previous research has investigated the consequences of social axioms for mental well-
being rather indirectly. As far as the direct study of mental well-being is left out in this line of 
research, our understanding of the contribution of social beliefs to mental well-being will stay 
limited. The present study sought to fill this gap by studying the direct link between social 
beliefs and aspects of mental well-being.  
The present study drew on the comprehensive model of social beliefs provided by the 
research on social axioms to provide a more inclusive picture of this relationship. On the other 
hand, by including a wide-ranging set of three hedonic (life satisfaction, positive affect, and 
negative affect) and six eudaimonic (autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, 
positive relations with others, purpose in life, and self-acceptance) aspects of mental well-
being, the study sought to offer a broad and detailed understanding of the relationship 
between social beliefs and aspects of mental well-being.  
The present thesis provides evidence about the relationship between social axioms and nine 
aspects of mental well-being, which makes the present thesis one of the most comprehensive 
investigations of this sort. In general, the findings are in line with the functionalist view of 
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beliefs and support the proposition that different beliefs lead to different emotional 
experiences, and different life experiences, and life outcomes. Moreover, by including 
samples from two countries, the studies provide evidence about possible national differences 
in the functions of social beliefs. Thus, the social beliefs may function differently in different 
cultures. For example, fate control has no effect on life satisfaction and suicidal ideation of 
Chinese (Lam et al., 2010), has some negative influences on the mental well-being of 
Iranians, and has more pronounced negative effects on the mental well-being of the UK 
student sample (see the findings related to Hypothesis 4, Study 1).   
The findings related to the basic relationship between social axioms and aspects of well-being 
presented in Study 1 showed that the relationship between social axioms and aspects of well-
being were generally stronger in Iran than in the UK. Why is this so? Prior findings may help 
us understand why this is the case. This pattern of results can be explained in view of findings 
that have emerged in prior research where societal level dimensions of social axioms (i.e., 
dynamic externality and societal cynicism) were used. In brief, Bond et al. (2004) analysed 
the dimensionality of social axioms at the culture level, using item means from 41 cultural 
groups. Factor analysis of these culture averages (rather than individual scores) revealed a 2-
dimensional structure. Factor 1 contained items from four of the individual-level axiom 
dimensions: reward for application, religiosity, fate control, and social complexity and 
therefore was labelled dynamic externality. “The items in this factor tapping religiosity and 
fate control involve the assertion of outside forces at play and give rise to the label externality, 
but the emphasis on effort and cognitive engagement gives a dynamic quality to this 
construct” (Leung & Bond, 2008, p. 205). Factor 2 was labelled societal cynicism, “because 
all the items are from the individual-level factor of social cynicism, but derived from a 
cultural group’s average scores, thus representing “citizen” endorsements. The adjective 
societal is used to signal that this factor is derived from these culture-level inputs” (Leung & 
Bond, 2008, p. 205). 
Bond et al. (2004) found that dynamic externality was negatively associated with national 
wealth. That is, dynamic externality was associated with lower quality of life, lower life 
expectancy, higher adult illiteracy rate and lower level of human development, to name a few. 
Leung and Bond (2008) argue that “this conflation of items from different individual-level 
dimensions are primarily a response to poverty and arises from the cultural press channelled 
through socialization agencies to overcome difficulties in survival” (p. 210). According to 
Leung and Bond, these aversive conditions result in cultural socialisation of citizens for 
“average belief profiles” high in reward for application and religiosity, both orientations 
encouraging “entrepreneurialism and prosociality”. That is, Leung and Bond (2008) assume 
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that dynamic externality beliefs would be developed as a consequence of the need to cope 
with such difficulties. These beliefs are likely to play adaptive roles in the face of such 
miseries and hardship.  
Bond et al. (2004) also found that although societal cynicism is negatively correlated with 
nations’ wealth, its relation is weaker than that between wealth and dynamic externality. 
Instead, social cynicism is more driven by disruptive social, political, and economic changes 
that impinge on institutions and the lives of individuals (Leung & Bond, 2008). Clearly, 
unlike England, Iran is a third world poor country with low GDP per capita indicating the 
country’s low standards of living. The functionalist view of social axioms suggests that in 
face of such hardship, social axioms tend to be more relevant to adjustment and functioning. 
That is, when the objective conditions are not desirable (e.g., in the presence of poverty and 
injustice), people may try to consciously or unconsciously make use of certain beliefs and 
ideologies to buffer the negative effects of unpleasant life conditions (Diener, Tay, & Myers, 
2011; Gebauer, Nehrlich, Sedikides, &Neberich, 2012; Inglehart, 2010). And these belief 
systems tend to play more pronounced roles in the life of people. This can partially explain 
why social axioms have stronger relationships with positive affect balance and functioning in 
Iran than in England. However, these are mere speculations, which should be empirically 
investigated in future studies.  
Studies on social axioms among immigrants are almost non-existent. Thus, another important 
contribution of the present thesis was including samples from Iranians living in Iran and 
Iranians living in England. Moreover, one of the purposes of this thesis was to examine 
differences between the levels and functions of social axioms between Iranians who are living 
in Iran and Iranians who are living in a largely different cultural context. Although 
longitudinal studies are needed to answer such questions conclusively, the present thesis 
provided useful initial insights to form a platform for future studies on the topic. One of the 
findings that stands out is that I found that the levels of social axiom scores are largely similar 
(except for religiosity) between Iranians living in Iran and Iranians living in England.  
This finding is very important as it indicates a fair amount of stability in social beliefs even 
when people go through the life-changing experience of emigration. This may indicate that 
radically different beliefs sets are not needed to prompt an individual to migrate, or that 
immigration does not lead to radical belief changes in immigrants. Interestingly, the patterns 
of relationship between social axioms and well-being in immigrants too were found to be 
largely like those found in Iran. Altogether, these findings contribute the insight that it should 
not come as a big surprise if social beliefs are found to be more stable than changeable in 
future longitudinal research. In fact, evidence is currently accumulating that some beliefs are 
179 
 
considerably heritable. For example, research has shown that genetic influences account for a 
great proportion of individual differences in political and social attitudes (e.g., Eaves, 
Eysenck, & Martin, 1989; Hatemi et al., 2010; Martin, Eaves, Heath, Jardine, Feingold, & 
Eysenck, 1986). 
Studies on social axioms are scant in Iran and England. Therefore, the present thesis provides 
important initial insights for future research on social axioms in the context of these two 
nations. Again, it should be noted that given the small sample sizes, and exploratory nature of 
the studies, more research is needed in both nations.  
 
Limitations 
To summarize, the limitations of the present study were related to the sample and scales. 
The first limitation that could affect the results is the small sample size. In Study 1 (Chapter 
3) a sample of more than 100 people could lead to stable correlation coefficients with high 
power given the fact that hypotheses 1-5 were generally expressed, regardless of 
segmentation variables such as gender and country, and that the mentioned hypotheses were 
examined through the bivariate correlation coefficient analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2010; 
Pallant, 2011). Since hypotheses 6-9 were also generally expressed and the sample was not to 
be categorized based on any of the other variables, the sample size was appropriate for 
hierarchical regression analysis according to Stevens (1996, p. 72), Tabachnick & Fidell 
(2007, p. 123), and Pallant (2011, p. 150). According to Stevens (1996) the required sample 
size for regression analysis with a high power is 15 per predictor variable. Accordingly, a 
sample size of 90 is appropriate if the analyses are carried out based on up to 6 variables. 
However, the study sample size is 139. According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2007) and Pallant 
(2011), minimum sample size is obtained through the formula n = 50 + 8m whereby the 
appropriate size is 98. In this formula, m is the number of predictor variables. Hence the 
analyses carried out were acceptable in terms of sample size. In addition, the sample size is 
appropriate for a stepwise regression method whereas a smaller size may also be appropriate 
for hierarchical regression analysis (Pallant, 2011, p. 152). Hence, although the sample size 
for this study is enough, a larger sample size than this could change the significance of 
relationships (according to Hoyle, 1995), Therefore, generalization of the results should be 
done with caution. 
The data of Chapter 3 (study 1) were collected in 2008 and that of Chapter 5 (Study 3) a few 
years later. It is obvious that the 2008 student sample may not be representative of current 
students in Iran owing to political and socio-economic changes over these years. This means 
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that there should be further caution in the generalization of the results. Here, the sampling 
method should also be considered. Administrative considerations (such as distribution of 
Iranian immigrant across the UK) and unwillingness to participate limited the number of 
Iranian immigrants who were potential participants. This was the reason why non-random 
methods were used for sampling, again highlighting the caution necessary in generalizing the 
results to a wider population.  
Regarding the sample, another issue that can be considered as a limitation is the subcultural 
differences between the students in the UK and even between the Iranian students, again 
indicating the need for caution in generalizing and drawing conclusions from the findings of 
the study. The University of Tehran, from which the Iranian sample group was selected in 
Study 1, is one of the largest central universities in Iran, with thousands of students from 
different subcultures. Such diversity clearly affects the results. Each of these sub-cultures has 
their own particular social beliefs, attitudes, music, dances, customs, and views on health that 
may influence well-being. For example, Xia & Qian (2001), in their study on two Chinese 
subcultural groups, revealed that mental health status among the participants was rather 
different. In the final qualitative study, the members of the immigrant group have different 
backgrounds, including family, education, and employment, and different motives for 
immigration with different number of years since the immigration. Again, the generalization 
of the results requires caution. 
Moreover, a small number of Iranian immigrants were willing to participate in study 3; the 
results may thus be biased towards high-level SES (Social Economical Status) participants 
and not representative of different socio-economic levels.  
The second limitation in the study was that certain measures had poor technical 
characteristics. Some of the measures showed an internal consistency of less than 0.70. 
However, a 0.70 cut off point for acceptable internal consistency is not always regarded as a 
gold standard as internal consistency is dependent on the number of points in the range of 
Likert scales, the number of items for each sub measure, the common covariance of the items, 
and the ratio of reverse-scored items to the total number of items (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994). It seems that where the number of items or the number of points on the Likert scale is 
low, the internal consistency related to subscales is low as well. However, this may be 
considered as a methodological limitation which influences the generalization of the findings. 
Also, the participants were not asked about their motivations for immigration. I also think 
motivations and experience of immigrant during the migration period effects on their 
responses. For example, Jalili (1982) categorized the Iranian immigrants in the USA into 
three groups. The first was those who had emigrated during 1950-1970. They had mostly 
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higher education with favourable economic situation in the middle class. The second group 
included those who emigrated during 1970-1980. They were not originally in the same social 
class but later they became members of the upper class due to the economic boom and rapid 
growth in those years. The third group members who had emigrated during 1978-1980 were 
heterogeneous in terms of economy and education. Such a categorization can be considered 
true for Iranian immigrants in the UK, and such variables obviously can affect well-being. 
 In sum not asking for their motivation can be considered in the study as a limitation. 
 
 
Future Directions 
Despite these limitations, the findings are important and promising and need to be expanded 
in future studies. There are many avenues for future studies. Study 3 revealed that 
immigration may not have a large effect on the degree to which social axioms are endorsed by 
individuals. This finding raises an important question: Are social axioms more stable or 
changeable? Although the present cross-sectional findings are more along the line of stability 
of social beliefs, it should be noted that this very question can best be answered using 
longitudinal designs rather than cross-sectional designs. Future studies should explore this 
issue by assessing the levels of social axioms in individuals over long periods of time (e.g., 
years or decades). Moreover, the behavioural genetics study of heritability of social beliefs 
could feed well into this line of research.  
It is important not to forget that the levels of social axioms and their functions should be 
separately investigated in future studies. The present thesis also indicated that there may be 
some changes in the function of social beliefs at different time points. For example, I found 
that social cynicism was strongly correlated with lowered well-being in the first study, but not 
correlated with well-being in Study 2 and Study 3. Therefore, future longitudinal studies 
should track changes in the levels of social beliefs as well as changes in the functions of social 
axioms.  
It is also important to consider the role of age in social axiom studies. The functions of social 
beliefs may change across various ages and life stages. The present study does not speak to 
this possibility. However, it may be the case that some belief domains are useful at some life 
stages (e.g., adolescence) and not useful or even harmful in another life stage (e.g., late 
adulthood). For example, it is possible that in young adulthood low endorsement of fate 
control beliefs and high endorsement of reward for application beliefs would allow the 
individual to take initiative in life and pursue ambitions and use active coping and effective 
problem-solving styles. However, in late adulthood when individuals ‘physical strength and 
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achievement possibilities diminish, relatively higher endorsement of fate control beliefs and 
lower endorsement of reward for application beliefs might help the individual to come to 
terms with their current situation more easily.  
One of the surprising findings of the present thesis was that social cynicism was not 
significantly associated with mental well-being in Study 2 (while it was strongly associated 
with social axioms in Study 1). I pointed to socio-economic changes in Iranian society 
between the two data collection phases, to speculate about the reasons for this change. My 
main argument was that normally cynical beliefs and pessimism tend to harm mental well-
being (for example see Scheier& Carver, 1992). However, drawing on previous societal 
studies, I argued that in social and economic hardship, damages caused by social cynicism 
may be neutralized by certain advantages. In times of financial and social insecurity, cynical 
individuals may fall prey to social and economic traps less frequently. These speculations 
may apply both to individuals and societies. Future longitudinal studies, thus, could explore 
these possibilities both at the individual and societal levels. We can empirically verify these 
notions by tracking levels and functions of social cynicism over longer periods of time.  
In Study 3, I measured the strength of ethnic identity in Iranian immigrants. The measure of 
ethnic identity used in the study (the MEIM-R; Phinney & Ong, 2007) measures the degree to 
which immigrants are attached to their original culture (i.e., Iran). However, a related area of 
research and theorizing has shown that much more can be gained by studying other relevant 
variables in immigrant studies. Berry (1986; 1988; 1997) argues that immigrants use various 
acculturation strategies/attitudes that have various implications for their adjustment in the host 
culture. These strategies are used by the immigrants to manage their heritage and host cultural 
identities. He categorizes acculturation strategies into four distinct varieties: integration, 
assimilation, separation, and marginalization (Berry, 1997).  
Assimilation is when an individual stop maintaining practices of his or her original culture 
and embraces the mainstream culture to get integrated into the host culture. Integration is 
when an individual decides to stick to his or her original culture but also intends to get 
integrated into the host culture (Berry, 1986; Phinney et al., 2006). Separation is when an 
immigrant chooses to maintain his or her original culture but refuses to interact with the host 
culture, which leads to a withdrawal from integration into the host culture. Finally, 
marginalization refers to when an immigrant forgoes his or her original culture as well as 
stops attempting to get integrated into the host culture (Berry, 1986; Phinney et al., 2006). 
Study 3 measured only attachment to one’s heritage culture, and the complexity of people’s 
strategies in managing their multiple identities was not considered. Future studies could draw 
on Berry’s model and use more comprehensive scales to measure the full range of 
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acculturation attitudes (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006) to draw a more elaborate 
picture of the influence of ethnic identity on mental well-being, and ethnic identity’s 
moderating effects on the relationship between social axioms and mental well-being. For 
example, measuring attachment to one’s ethnic identity alone, Study 3 found that attachment 
to one’s heritage ethnic identity has moderate positive effects on mental well-being of 
immigrants. However, it has been argued that attachment to their heritage culture and 
participation and attachment in the host culture interact with each other in their effects on 
psychological adaptation (Berry, 1986; Phinney et al., 2006). Therefore, future research 
would benefit from a more comprehensive assessment of various acculturation strategies 
based on Berry’s theoretical model.  
Study 4 indicated that some Iranians use an indigenous strategy to achieve contentment and 
handle hardship. They tend to believe that, in our daily life, we should keep trying to excel as 
we are bestowed by free will and have our lives to create on our own. However, when 
disasters occur, we should accept that this is predestined by God and a test of the person’s 
faith. Disasters are considered reminders from God to draw our attention towards Him. This 
helps tolerating hardship with tolerance and even helps to strengthen one’s faith in God in 
times of hardship. Empirically testing applicability of this indigenous strategy is an interesting 
avenue for future studies in Iranians (and more generally in Muslims). This may involve 
developing new psychological measures to capture this indigenous way of coping with 
hardship in Muslim cultures.  
As mentioned in Study 4, there are differences in how cultures define mental well-being. 
Unlike Westerners, for Muslims, mental well-being seems to consist mainly of peace of mind 
and contentment rather than high arousal emotions such as excitement and euphoria 
(Joshanloo, 2013; Tsai, 2007). Therefore, strategies to gain happiness and mental well-being 
are believed to differ across cultures. Prior research shows that happiness-increasing activities 
should be designed based on the characteristics of indigenous cultures, and there is no one-
size-fits-all strategy to be used across all cultures (Boehm, Lyubomirsky, & Sheldon, 2011; 
Layous, Lee, Choi, & Lyubomirsky, 2013). Therefore, future research should focus on 
indigenous strategies used by Muslims to increase their sense of well-being and happiness. 
Study 4 provided insights about one such strategy in Muslims, but certainly there are other 
strategies to be studied in future research.   
In sum, the present set of studies was designed to provide fresh insights about the experience 
of mental well-being in Iran and the role of social beliefs in this regard. The studies were 
largely exploratory, and the findings should be considered as preliminary. However, the thesis 
makes unique contributions to the fields of mental well-being research and social axioms, as 
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discussed above. For example, the present studies contribute to the hotly debated issue of 
conceptualizing hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. The studies necessarily had some 
limitations, which were also discussed above. For example, some strong methods such as 
experimental designs and implicit association testing were not utilized in the present thesis. 
Finally, several avenues for future studies were discussed. For instance, it was suggested that 
future research could investigate possible positive functions of social cynicism in socially and 
financially difficult times.   
Social axioms might relate differently to well-being under different circumstances, and 
therefore the results of this study have potential for change in the UK students. For 
example, on the one hand there is relationship between social axioms and social factors 
including life satisfaction (Lai, Bond & Hui (2006), lower job satisfaction (Leung, Ip, & Leung, 
2010), and lower income (Stavrova & Ehlebracht, 2016), and on the other hand there is a 
relationship between these social factors and well-being. Accordingly, it can be predicted 
that when these social factors change over time the relationship between social axioms and 
well-being may change  
Also, the main study aim was to examine the relationship between social axiom and well-
being by controlling two variables, country and personality. The researcher believes that this 
aim was attained by the analyses outlined and all the previously developed hypotheses were 
tested by the appropriate statistical methods. However, the aim cannot be achieved through 
the measurement of the mediator-moderator variables. 
I suggest to future researchers to consider the role of mediator and moderator variables in the 
relationship between social axiom and well-being. 
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Appendix A - Social Axioms Scale 
The following sentences are statements related to beliefs. Please read each statement 
carefully and mark the answer alternative that most closely reflects your opinion. Please note 
the meaning of the numbers:  
 
1 
Strongly 
disbelieve 
2 
Disbelieve 
3 
No opinion 
4 
Believe 
5 
Strongly 
believe 
 
1. Religious faith contributes to good mental health. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Caution helps avoid mistakes.  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Good luck follows if one survives a disaster.  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Human behavior changes with the social context. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Religion makes people escape from reality.  1 2 3 4 5 
6. People may have opposite behavior on different occasions.  1 2 3 4 5 
7. One’s appearance does not reflect one’s character. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Fate determines one’s successes and failures.  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Religious people are more likely to maintain moral standards.  1 2 3 4 5 
10. Ghosts or spirits are people’s fantasy.  1 2 3 4 5 
11. Individual effort makes little difference in the outcome.  1 2 3 4 5 
12. There is a supreme being controlling the universe. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. One who does not know how to plan his or her future will eventually fail.  1 2 3 4 5 
14. There are phenomena in the world that cannot be explained by science.  1 2 3 4 5 
15. Knowledge is necessary for success.  1 2 3 4 5 
16. Young people are impulsive and unreliable.  1 2 3 4 5 
17. It is rare to see a happy ending in real life.  1 2 3 4 5 
18. Mutual tolerance can lead to satisfactory human relationships.  1 2 3 4 5 
19. Individual characteristics, such as appearance and birthday, affect one’s fate.  1 2 3 4 5 
20. Females need a better appearance than males.  1 2 3 4 5 
21. Adversity can be overcome by effort.  1 2 3 4 5 
22. Every problem has a solution.  1 2 3 4 5 
23. One has to deal with matters according to the specific circumstances.  1 2 3 4 5 
24. Competition brings about progress.  1 2 3 4 5 
25. There is usually only one way to solve a problem. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. Most disasters can be predicted.  1 2 3 4 5 
27. To deal with things in a flexible way leads to success.  1 2 3 4 5 
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28. Old people are usually stubborn and biased. 1 2 3 4 5 
29. A person’s talents are inborn.  1 2 3 4 5 
30. Good deeds will be rewarded, and bad deeds will be punished.  1 2 3 4 5 
31. One’s behaviours may be contrary to his or her true feelings.  1 2 3 4 5 
32. There are certain ways to help us improve our luck and avoid unlucky things.  1 2 3 4 5 
33. One will succeed if he/she really tries.  1 2 3 4 5 
34. Failure is the beginning of success.  1 2 3 4 5 
35. Humility is dishonesty.  1 2 3 4 5 
36. To experience various life styles is a way to enjoy life.  1 2 3 4 5 
37. Religious beliefs lead to unscientific thinking.  1 2 3 4 5 
38. Social justice can be maintained if everyone cares about politics.  1 2 3 4 5 
39. Current losses are not necessarily bad for one’s long-term future.  1 2 3 4 5 
40. To plan for possible mistakes will result in fewer obstacles.  1 2 3 4 5 
41. Power and status make people arrogant.  1 2 3 4 5 
42. All things in the universe have been determined.  1 2 3 4 5 
43. Powerful people tend to exploit others.  1 2 3 4 5 
44. People will stop working hard after they secure a comfortable life.  1 2 3 4 5 
45. The various social institutions in society are biased towards the rich.  1 2 3 4 5 
46. Belief in a religion helps one understand the meaning of life.  1 2 3 4 5 
47. It is easier to succeed if one knows how to take short-cuts.  1 2 3 4 5 
48. Kind-hearted people are easily bullied.  1 2 3 4 5 
49. Old people are a heavy burden on society.  1 2 3 4 5 
50. The just will eventually defeat the wicked.  1 2 3 4 5 
51. A modest person can make a good impression on people.  1 2 3 4 5 
52. Belief in a religion makes people good citizens.  1 2 3 4 5 
53. People deeply in love are usually blind.  1 2 3 4 5 
54. Kind-hearted people usually suffer losses.  1 2 3 4 5 
55. To care about societal affairs only brings trouble for yourself. 1 2 3 4 5 
56. There are many ways for people to predict what will happen in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 
57. Hard working people will achieve more in the end. 1 2 3 4 5 
58. Significant achievement requires one to show no concern for the means 
needed for that achievement. 
1 2 3 4 5 
59. Harsh laws can make people obey. 1 2 3 4 5 
60. Most people hope to be repaid after they help others. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix B - Psychological Well-being Scale 
 
Please read the following statements and mark the answer alternative that best describes your 
situation. Notice the meaning of the numbers:  
 
1 
strongly 
disagree 
2 
disagree 
3 
mildly 
disagree 
4 
not disagree 
nor agree 
5 
mildly agree  
6 
agree 
7 
strongly 
agree 
 
1. I am not afraid to voice my opinions, even when they are in opposition to the 
opinions of most people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. In general, I feel I am in charge of the situation in which I live.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am not interested in activities that will expand my horizons. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Most people see me as loving and affectionate. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I live life one day at a time and don't really think about the future.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. When I look at the story of my life, I am pleased with how things have turned 
out.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. My decisions are not usually influenced by what everyone else is doing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The demands of everyday life often get me down.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I don't want to try new ways of doing things--my life is fine the way it is. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Maintaining close relationships has been difficult and frustrating for me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I tend to focus on the present, because the future nearly always brings me 
problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. In general, I feel confident and positive about myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I tend to worry about what other people think of me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I do not fit very well with the people and the community around me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I think it is important to have new experiences that challenge how you think 
about yourself and the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I often feel lonely because I have few close friends with whom to share my 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. My daily activities often seem trivial and unimportant to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I feel like many of the people I know have gotten more out of life than I have. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. Being happy with myself is more important to me than having others approve 
of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. I am quite good at managing the many responsibilities of my daily life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. When I think about it, I haven't really improved much as a person over the 
years. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. I enjoy personal and mutual conversations with family members or friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. I don't have a good sense of what it is I'm trying to accomplish in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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24. I like most aspects of my personality.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. I tend to be influenced by people with strong opinions.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. I often feel overwhelmed by my responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. I have the sense that I have developed a lot as a person over time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. I don't have many people who want to listen when I need to talk. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. I used to set goals for myself, but that now seems like a waste of time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. I made some mistakes in the past, but I feel that all in all everything has 
worked out for the best. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. I have confidence in my opinions, even if they are contrary to the general 
consensus. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32. I generally do a good job of taking care of my personal finances and affairs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. I do not enjoy being in new situations that require me to change my old 
familiar ways of doing things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. It seems to me that most other people have more friends than I do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. I enjoy making plans for the future and working to make them a reality. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. In many ways, I feel disappointed about my achievements in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37. It's difficult for me to voice my own opinions on controversial matters. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38. I am good at juggling my time so that I can fit everything in that needs to get 
done. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. For me, life has been a continuous process of learning, changing, and growth.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40. People would describe me as a giving person, willing to share my time with 
others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41. I am an active person in carrying out the plans I set for myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42. My attitude about myself is probably not as positive as most people feel about 
themselves. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43. I often change my mind about decisions if my friends or family disagree. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44. I have difficulty arranging my life in a way that is satisfying to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45. I gave up trying to make big improvements or changes in my life a long time 
ago.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46. I have not experienced many warm and trusting relationships with others.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47. Some people wander aimlessly through life, but I am not one of them.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48. The past had its ups and downs, but in general, I wouldn't want to change it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
49. I judge myself by what I think is important, not by the values of what others 
think is important.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
50. I have been able to build a home and a lifestyle for myself that is much to my 
liking. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
51. There is truth to the saying you can't teach an old dog new tricks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52. I know that I can trust my friends, and they know they can trust me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
53. I sometimes feel as if I've done all there is to do in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
54. When I compare myself to friends and acquaintances, it makes me feel good 
about who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix C - Negative Affect Scale 
 
During the past 30 days, how much of the time did you feel  
 
 
1 = All the time 
2 = Most of the time 
3 = Some of the time 
4 = A little of the time 
5 = None of the time 
 
1. .so sad nothing could cheer you up? 
2... nervous? 
3. . Restless or fidgety? 
4. . Hopeless? 
5. . That everything was an effort? 
6... worthless? 
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Appendix D - Positive Affect Scale 
 
During the past 30 days, how much of the time did you feel  
 
1 = All the time 
2 = Most of the time 
3 = Some of the time 
4 = A little of the time 
5 = None of the time 
 
1.. cheerful? 
2.. in good spirits? 
3.. extremely happy? 
4. . calm and peaceful? 
5. . satisfied? 
6. . full of life? 
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Appendix E - Satisfaction with Life Scale 
 
Using the 1 - 7 scale below indicate your agreement with each item by placing the 
appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your 
responding. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1.____ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.  
2.____ The conditions of my life are excellent. 
3.____ I am satisfied with my life. 
4.____ So far, I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
5.____ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
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Appendix F - Big Five Inventory 
 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.  For example, do you 
agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please write a number next 
to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.  
Answer quickly. Please do not skip any items. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree Disagree Neither agree Agree Agree 
strongly a little nor disagree a little strongly 
 
I see myself as someone who... 
 
1. Is talkative    1 2 3 4 5 
2. Tends to find fault with others  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Does a thorough job  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Is depressed, blue  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Is original, comes up with new 
ideas  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Is reserved  1 2 3 4 5 
7. Is helpful and unselfish with others  1 2 3 4 5 
8. Can be somewhat careless  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Is relaxed, handles stress well  1 2 3 4 5 
10. Is curious about many different 
things  
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Is full of energy  1 2 3 4 5 
12. Starts quarrels with others  1 2 3 4 5 
13. Is a reliable worker  1 2 3 4 5 
14. Can be tense  1 2 3 4 5 
15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker  1 2 3 4 5 
16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm  1 2 3 4 5 
17. Has a forgiving nature  1 2 3 4 5 
18. Tends to be disorganized  1 2 3 4 5 
19. Worries a lot  1 2 3 4 5 
20. Has an active imagination  1 2 3 4 5 
21. Tends to be quiet  1 2 3 4 5 
22. Is generally trusting    1 2 3 4 5 
23. Tends to be lazy    1 2 3 4 5 
24. Is emotionally stable, not easily 
upset    
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Is inventive    1 2 3 4 5 
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26. Has an assertive personality    1 2 3 4 5 
27. Can be cold and aloof    1 2 3 4 5 
28. Perseveres until the task is finished    1 2 3 4 5 
29. Can be moody    1 2 3 4 5 
30. Values artistic, aesthetic 
experiences    
1 2 3 4 5 
31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited    1 2 3 4 5 
32. Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone    
1 2 3 4 5 
33. Does things efficiently    1 2 3 4 5 
34. Remains calm in tense situations    1 2 3 4 5 
35. Prefers work that is routine    1 2 3 4 5 
36. Is outgoing, sociable    1 2 3 4 5 
37. Is sometimes rude to others    1 2 3 4 5 
38. Makes plans and follows through 
with them    
1 2 3 4 5 
39. Gets nervous easily    1 2 3 4 5 
40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas    1 2 3 4 5 
41. Has few artistic interests    1 2 3 4 5 
42. Likes to cooperate with others    1 2 3 4 5 
43. Is easily distracted    1 2 3 4 5 
44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or 
literature    
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix G - The Revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM-R) 
 
Using the 1 - 5 scale below indicate your agreement with each item. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly    strongly 
 
1- I have spent time trying to find out more about my ethnic group, such as 
its history, traditions, and customs.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2- I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group. 1 2 3 4 5 
3- I understand pretty well what my ethnic group membership means to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
4- I have often done things that will help me understand my ethnic 
background better. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5- I have often talked to other people in order to learn more about my ethnic 
group. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6- I feel a strong attachment towards my own ethnic group. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix H - BIDR Version 6 - Form 40 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how true it 
is. 
 + + + + + + + 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 not true   somewhat   very true 
 
____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
____ 3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me. 
____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself. 
____ 5. I always know why I like things. 
____ 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
____ 7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
____ 10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
____ 11. I never regret my decisions. 
____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough. 
____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
____ 15. I am a completely rational person. 
____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments 
____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
____ 19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
____ 20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
 
 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how true it 
is. 
 + + + + + + + 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 not true   somewhat   very true 
 
____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
____ 24. I never swear. 
____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught. 
____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back. 
____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
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____ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
____ 30. I always declare everything at customs. 
____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street. 
____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
____ 35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about. 
____ 36. I never take things that don't belong to me. 
____ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick. 
____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits. 
____ 40. I don't gossip about other people's business. 
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Appendix I - Davis' Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Perspective Taking Subscale 
 
Using the scale below, please indicate how well each item describes you.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Does not 
describe me well 
   Describes me 
very well 
     
 
 
1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of 
view.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision.  
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to 
other people's arguments.  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them 
both.  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for 
a while.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were 
in their place.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix J - The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale 
 
Please circle how often you experienced each of the following statements within the past 
week. 
1. I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
2. When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and bodye xpressions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
3. When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
4. When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
5. When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against my face. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
6. When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
7. I am aware of thoughts I’m having when my mood changes. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
8. I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles getting 
tense. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
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9. Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
 
10. When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
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Appendix K – The Demographic Questionnaire 
 
1- Age: _____                           
 
2- Gender:       Female      Male  
 
3- What degree are you studying for? 
Undergraduate degree    Subject_________________ Year of study:  ___ 
Postgraduate degree     Level:  Masters  PhD  
Subject_________________ Year of study:   ___ 
 
4- Relationship Status: 
Single:     
No partner  
In a relationship but not living with partner     
Single and living with partner  
Married  
Separated  
Divorced  
Widowed  
Other Please specify: _____________ 
 
5- Do you have any children? 
No    
Yes Please state how many and their ages ______________________ 
 
6- Occupation status: 
Do you have a part-time job? 
No    
Yes Please state the nature of this job and how many hours a week you work in this job 
   ____________________________________________ 
                                                                            
7- Ethnicity: 
White  
Black – Caribbean  
Black – African  
Black – Other Please specify: _____________ 
Chinese  
Indian  
Pakistani  
Bangladeshi  
Other Please specify: _____________ 
 
8- Religious Affiliation 
 Christian: 
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Anglican  
Roman Catholic  
Protestant  
Eastern Orthodox  
Free Church  
Other Christian      Please specify ________ 
Muslim: 
Shia  
Sunni  
Jewish  
Hindu  
Buddhist  
Sikh  
Other Please specify _______ 
Non-religious 
Atheist  
Agnostic  
Secular humanist  
No religious preference  
 
9- Do you consider that you are actively practising your religion? 
Yes  
No  
 
10- What is the highest educational qualification of your father? 
None  
GCSEs or equivalent  
A-Levels or equivalent  
Bachelor’s degree  
Master’s degree  
PhD  
Don't know  
 
11- What is the highest educational qualification of your mother? 
None  
GCSEs or equivalent  
A-Levels or equivalent  
Bachelor’s degree  
Master’s degree  
PhD  
Don't know  
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Appendix L – The Consent forms 
 
 
 
I ……………………………………………………………………. (Please type name) 
 
Give my full consent to take part in Parviz Rastegar’s research investigation with the full 
understanding that I may withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  
 
If I withdraw from the study, the data that I have submitted will also be withdrawn at my 
request. I have received an information sheet explaining what the experiment entails and what 
will be expected from me.  
 
I understand that the information that I will submit will be confidential and used only for this 
study. I have read and understood the above information.  
 
I agree/do not agree to participate in the study. 
 
 
Signed: 
  
 
Date: 
 
 
Researcher: 
Parviz Rastegar 
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DEBRIEFING 
 
 
Previous studies have documented the relationship between age, gender, socioeconomic 
status, personality traits, culture, life experiences, interpretive mechanisms and psychological, 
emotional and cognitive well-being (Ryff & Singer, 2002). Among these predictors, social 
beliefs might have an influence on people’s well-being. Indeed, in a past study, we found that 
social beliefs predicted various aspects of well-being. It is likely that the relationship between 
social beliefs and aspects of well-being are mediated by some other variables. The aim of the 
present study was to investigate two possible mediators of this relationship, namely, 
perspective taking and mindfulness.  
 
 
Do you have any further questions?  
 
Do you wish to be informed as to the outcome of the study? 
 
You may contact us using this email address:   
 
prastegar@yahoo.com (Parviz Rastegar) 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
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INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
I am doctoral student at the University of Hertfordshire undertaking a study to investigate the 
predictors of the different aspects of well-being.  
 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to simply follow the instructions and complete the 
questionnaire.  
 
It is expected that the completing of the questionnaire will last about 40 to 50 minutes. 
 
Any data you do provide today will remain both confidential and anonymous and will be 
used only for the purposes outlined here.  
 
You may use the contact number below should any queries or concerns arise in the future.  
 
(As a participant you will be asked not to discuss the study with others until the study is 
completed (15/JUN/2011)).  
 
You will have an opportunity to answer questions now and at the end of the experiment.   
 
Please note that any information you may supply today will only be used for the purposes 
outlined here, and you may withdraw your assistance at any time if you wish and without 
explanation.  
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Name of researcher and his email address. 
 
Parviz Rastegar 
prastegar@yahoo.com 
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Appendix M – ethics approval forms 
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